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Rhodesia

Soviet activities in southern Africa indicate that the Soviets look at Rhodesia as another opportunity to further their influence in the area.

- A. Moscow is not deterred by the prospect that achieving its aims in Rhodesia will be more difficult in Rhodesia than it has been in previous Soviet adventures in Africa.
  - B. Moscow, the principal supporter of Joshua Nkomo, appears prepared to increase its support for the anti-Smith guerrillas; the Soviets already favor an expanded Cuban involvement with the guerrillas.
  - C. The Soviets are hampered, however, by the Frontline states suspicions of Soviet intentions and that current unwillingness to permit a major expansion of the Soviet presence.
- For its part, Moscow has doubts about the reliability of some of the frontline presidents, particularly Zambia's Kaunda.

Angola

Moscow and Havana remain the dominant foreign influences in Angola but the relationship among the three is not untroubled.

- A. Moscow and Havana are concerned about their inability to halt the UNITA insurgency. UNITA is not able to bring down the government but it is highly disruptive, which aggravates the economic problems confronting Neto and his foreign backers.
- B. The continuation of the insurgency and the deteriorating economic situation have fueled anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban sentiment among the population and Neto still harbors suspicions that Moscow was behind last year's unsuccessful

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Aives coup.

Namibia

Moscow presently regards Namibia/SWAPO as secondary to its major interests in southern Africa--Angola and Rhodesia.

- A. Moscow provides political and military support for SWAPO but the level of military assistance is less extensive than that provided the Rhodesian insurgents.
- B. Moscow will accept a negotiated settlement as long as it believes it will enhance SWAPO's chances for taking power in Namibia.
- C. Moscow believes that a SWAPO government could ultimately decrease the opportunity for South Africa to provide aid, via Namibia, to opposition groups in Angola.
- D. Nonetheless, Moscow is concerned that a negotiated settlement would enhance the US image at the expense of the USSR. The Soviets have not supported the current round of negotiation for this reason and because they have been cut out of the politicking.

The Horn

The USSR's relatively low profile on the Eritrean insurgency is in marked contrast to its extensive and highly visible role in behalf of Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. Cuba has also taken a less active role in Eritrea.

- A. Mengistu's preference for a military solution in Eritrea has caused some tension with Moscow and Havana who continue to prefer a negotiated settlement for political as well as military reasons.
- B. Another source of tension between Moscow and Addis Ababa

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is Mengistu's reluctance to form a Marxist-Leninist party along lines acceptable to Moscow.

- C. Such tensions are not insurmountable and it appears that Moscow will be able to establish a long-term relationship with Ethiopia. The Soviets are already heavily investing in naval facilities for their ships over the long haul.
- D. While Moscow probably hopes for an opportunity to return to Somalia, it has made no overtures to Siad and would respond with caution to any signals from the Somalis.

#### Chad

There is no evidence of direct Soviet support for the Chad Liberation Front (Frolinat).

- A. The rebels are equipped with Soviet manufactured weapons supplied by the Libyans.
- B. There is no indication that the Soviets have sought to prevent the Libyans from transferring this material.
- C. This policy gives the Soviets flexibility; if the insurgency succeeds, they can claim to have been important supporters; if the rebels fail, the Soviets have been detached enough to prevent repercussions and deny responsibility.

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RHODESIA

- I. The security situation in Rhodesia is deteriorating gradually, but the guerrillas do not appear close to a military victory over the Rhodesian security forces.
- A. The Rhodesian forces are able to defeat virtually any group of guerrillas they can find, but they are unable to prevent guerrillas from infiltrating into Rhodesia or from operating in widespread areas of the country.
- B. The number of guerrillas inside Rhodesia is growing, and is believed to be nearly 7,000, but many are lying low or engaging in banditry.
- C. Most guerrilla operations take place in rural areas, and include attacks on white farms and intimidation of the rural population.
- II. Rhodesia's biracial transitional government has placed major emphasis on an amnesty program to reduce the fighting, but only a small number of guerrillas have defected to the government.
- A. The major internal black leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, have been contacting guerrillas, but their *lack of* success in producing defectors has caused friction with Prime Minister Smith.
- B. The failure of efforts to reduce the fighting, and an apparent loss of black support in Rhodesia by Muzorewa and Sithole, has led to declining white morale and has caused Smith to look--thus far without success--for alternatives to the internal settlement.

III. Although Joshua Nkomo's Zambia-based Zimbabwe African People's Union and Robert Mugabe's Mozambique-based Zimbabwe African National Union are nominally allied in the Patriotic Front, there is virtually no military cooperation between them.

A. ZAPU and ZANU see each other as rivals for power once black rule is achieved, and there have been occasional clashes between their forces inside Rhodesia.

B. Most Soviet and Cuban aid for the Rhodesian nationalists goes to ZAPU.

- APC's?
1. ZAPU forces are well equipped with Soviet weapons and receive training and advice from a few Soviet and at least 50 Cuban military personnel in Zambia.
  2. The Soviets have been critical of settlement negotiations and have urged Nkomo to increase the military effort against the Salisbury government.
  3. Until now, however, Nkomo has been holding back the bulk of his forces in Zambia because he wants them available for possible use in a future power struggle against ZANU.

C. ZANU has a larger force inside Rhodesia than ZAPU, but the ZANU guerrillas are not as well equipped.

1. ZANU receives military supplies from a variety of sources, channeled to it through the OAU via the frontline African presidents.
2. ZANU forces in Mozambique apparently are receiving a limited amount of help from Cuban military advisers.

IV. Although the short term outlook for further Rhodesian settlement negotiations is not good, the leaders of both the transitional government and the Patriotic Front remain interested in talks because of the shortcomings of their military positions.

- A. Smith is now taking a negative position toward further talks with Nkomo in an effort to appease hardening white attitudes, but he probably supports the proposed all parties meeting under the framework of the UK-US settlement plan. Although Muzorewa and Sithole have been more strongly opposed to such a meeting, Smith probably believes they will eventually conclude that they have no choice but to attend.
- B. Nkomo and Mugabe apparently are in no hurry for further talks because they believe the Salisbury government is growing weaker. Despite Nkomo's recent public negative remarks about the all-parties meeting, however, both he and Mugabe probably can be persuaded to attend.

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Rhodesian Security Forces

Ground Forces

manpower	10-12,000
mobilizable reservists	6,000
armored vehicles	60
artillery	24

Air Force

manpower	1,500
combat aircraft	37

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Zimbabwe Insurgent Strength Estimates  
(as of August 1978)

ZAPU

Trained	12,000
Under training	10,000
Available for training	<u>14,000</u>
	36,000

ZANU

Trained	10,000
Under training	3,000
Available for training	<u>10,000</u>
	23,000

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