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A LINE IN THE SAND
A HISTORICAL STUDY OF BORDER SECURITY DURING INSURGENCIES AND
LESSONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY AFGHAN-PAKISTAN FRONTIER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The content of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: _____

3 April 2009

Thesis Advisor: Colonel James F. Dickens, United States Army

*A scrimmage in a Border Station --
A canter down some dark defile --
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail --
The Crammer's boast, the Squadron's pride,
Shot like a rabbit in a ride!*

-- Rudyard Kipling, *Arithmetic on the Frontier*

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Abstract

There is increasing consensus amongst those nations engaged in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan that Taliban sanctuaries in the ungoverned border regions of Pakistan are central to the insurgency in both countries. Two individual or complementary means of countering this problem include the denial of sanctuary in Pakistan and improving border security between the two countries.

This paper examines the border security measures used in three historical insurgencies: Algeria (1954-62), Dhofar (1968-75) and Rhodesia (1965-80). The study applies the methods and lessons from these historical examples to the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan border. Using this framework, the author attempts to support the thesis that traditional methods of border security, even with the use of modern technology, are not applicable to the Afghan-Pakistan border. Furthermore, attempts at obtaining such control would prove counterproductive to this counterinsurgency. The analysis focuses on physical barriers, population resettlement, external action, tribal or auxiliary forces and in-depth interdiction.

The study finds that barriers and population resettlement are impractical for use in Afghanistan and likely to result in adverse consequences at the strategic level. The other measures have varying degrees of utility and applicability. The author concludes that a high degree of border control is unachievable along the Afghan-Pakistan border and suggests that border security should remain an economy of effort within the overall campaign. If these findings are accepted, it implies that the U.S. led Coalition should resist calls to concentrate on the border and, instead, strengthen security in the interior of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I. Introduction

It is commonly understood that the current insurgency in Afghanistan and in particular the south and east of the country is fuelled by recruits, arms and money transiting through or originating from Pakistan. Moreover, insurgents use areas within Pakistan, specifically Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as a sanctuary. The main role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is to support the National Government's efforts to build and maintain a secure environment allowing reconstruction and development of the country.¹ Initial activities have focused on the major areas of population and economic activity. This focus has fixed the majority of coalition personnel and resources in the interior of the country at the expense of the border regions. On taking command of ISAF in June 2008, Gen McKiernan stated his concerns about the Afghan-Pakistan border:

One part of it, is what can be done to assist the Government of Pakistan dealing with the problem [the insurgent sanctuary inside Pakistan], but the second part of the discussion needs to be, how do we exert more control of the border. The wrong people and items are moving back and forth across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.²

General McKiernan's comments raise the prospect of increased efforts both to deny insurgent sanctuaries within Pakistan and to provide greater control of the Afghan-Pakistan border. Prospective US military reinforcements for Afghanistan in 2009 and the increasing strength and capability of Afghan National Security Forces provide the potential means to reinforce nascent border initiatives.

¹ NATO, "International Security Assistance Force: Security," ISAF, <http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/security/index.html> (accessed Sep 4, 2008).

² Carlotta Gall, "Afghan Borders Concern NATO Force Leader," *New York Times*, Jun 5, 2008.

Historically, many insurgent groups have relied on external sanctuaries as locations to conserve, strengthen, and project their power. The isolation of external sanctuaries as a means of separating insurgents from the population has frequently been part of successful counterinsurgency strategies. David Galula, who both fought in and studied the Algerian War of Independence, attributed sealing the Tunisian and Moroccan borders as a major contribution to French operational success.³ The French predominantly used physical barriers to seal the Algerian borders although other traditional methods of isolating external sanctuaries include population resettlement, external action, tribal or auxiliary forces and in-depth interdiction.

The complex terrain, length of border, Pushtun population and tribal groups straddling both sides of the border, inter-twined economy and other societal issues combine to present major challenges to the attempted control of the Afghan-Pakistan border. This thesis contends that traditional methods of border security, even with the use of modern technology, are not applicable to the Afghan-Pakistan border and consequently a high degree of border control is unachievable. Indeed, attempts at obtaining such control would prove counterproductive to the counterinsurgency. This viewpoint is not without historical precedent; Richard Clutterbuck's study of the Vietnam conflict provides the warning:

*It is tempting for Western Analysts to look for consolation by ascribing this escalation [Vietnam after 1963] solely to reinforcements from North Vietnam . . . Viet Cong reinforcements from North Vietnam would have been ineffective and easily destroyed if they had not had a popular base to support them.*⁴

³ David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 244.

⁴ Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long War – Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 65-66.

Acceptance of the premise that a high degree of border control is unachievable would allow planners and strategists to focus on other avenues to progress the campaign in Afghanistan. However, the relegation of border security to a lower priority abandons a central tenet of many historical counterinsurgency strategies.

In order to develop this thesis, the lessons from three 20th Century counterinsurgencies -- Algeria (1954-62), Rhodesia (1965-80) and the Dhofar region of Oman (1968-75) -- are applied to the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan border. All three historical case studies used physical barriers along international borders to isolate insurgent sanctuaries. In addition, the Omani forces used barriers in the interior of the Dhofar to complement in-depth interdiction activities. The concept and employment of barriers differed in each insurgency. In some cases they were envisaged as impenetrable obstacles and in others a disrupting and warning mechanism. Given the different concepts and lessons, this study examines the use of barriers in all three case studies.

Moving the population away from areas of instability, resettlement, or concentrating the population within the areas of conflict has featured in many broader counterinsurgency strategies. The proximity of border regions to external sanctuaries causes these areas to be particularly susceptible to insurgent influence. Population resettlement allows government forces to protect the civilian population, remove it from direct insurgent influence and deny the insurgents access to food, information and recruits. The Dhofar frontier was for the most part uninhabited, and so, resettlement did not feature as a border security initiative. Algeria and Rhodesia removed or concentrated populations primarily as part of a broader strategy, but in doing so contributed to border security. The border aspects of these strategies are included in this study.

External action encompasses a range of activity: self-defence, hot-pursuit, punitive action, shaping operations and denial of sanctuary. Self-defence can comprise simply returning fire across an international border or conducting pre-emptive actions that require incursions into neighbouring countries. Hot-pursuit is an opportunist event to attempt capture or maximise attrition of an insurgent group seeking to escape across an international border. Punitive action against an insurgent group or host nation is generally in response to a transgression of an informal boundary or set of rules. Shaping operations can take the form of channelling insurgents into desired areas or seeking to reduce insurgent strength through attrition or striking key leaders. Finally, denial of sanctuary is the logical conclusion of external action. This activity is an operation or campaign in its own right, which the author considers to be beyond the scope of the paper. This study examines external operations in all three historical insurgencies with the Rhodesian conflict providing the most extensive range of action.

Auxiliary or tribal forces have historically complemented conventional security forces, providing the mass needed to defeat an insurgency. The use of tribal forces also allows the government to co-opt a given tribe or segment of the population to its cause. This study confines itself to the border elements of tribal or auxiliary forces, in particular the intelligence-gathering role in the Dhofar and use of auxiliaries to protect the concentrated population along the borders of Rhodesia. The use of auxiliary forces, known as *Harkis*, in the interior of Algeria is not considered.

The final subject of this study is in-depth interdiction. Border security as a whole is a component of interdiction, defined in U.S. Joint Doctrine as “*actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy an enemy’s surface capabilities before they can be used*”

effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.”⁵ In the context of a counterinsurgency, interdiction seeks to cut the lines of communication between the sanctuary and the operating area. This thesis uses the term *in-depth interdiction* to describe the ability to cut the lines of communication using air, airmobile or ground forces. This action achieves a similar effect to that of localised border security. The Algerian case study is not analysed as the relative success of barriers resulted in the interception of most insurgents near the border. In contrast, the relative failure of Rhodesian and Omani attempts to seal their borders required the use of extensive in-depth interdiction.

This study will determine the successful border control methods, the degree of border control attained and the unintended consequences of each measure. A comparison of the geographic, economic, political and societal issues of the historical conflicts with those of the Afghan-Pakistan border will determine the suitability and effectiveness of border security methods as applied to this counterinsurgency. This comparative process will remain cognisant of advances in technology and techniques, which may offer new opportunities.

II. Algeria (1954-62)

Background

On November 1, 1954 the newly formed Algerian nationalist movement, *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), launched a wave of bombings throughout Algeria and declared war on the French colonial regime. Up until these events, most French believed

⁵ U.S. Department of Defence, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-03*, May 3, 2007.

Algeria to be an integral part of France, separated only by the Mediterranean.⁶ One hundred and thirty years of colonial rule resulted in a million colonists, colloquially known as the *pieds noirs*, settling the country. At the time of the insurgency, they comprised 11 percent of the population.⁷ Concentrated mainly in the coastal city ports, the *pieds noirs* dominated local politics and the economy. They also owned the best agricultural land. The preponderance of wealth and power held by the minority increasingly marginalised the impoverished Arab-Berber Muslim population. An exploding birth rate amongst the latter, combined with their allotment of the poorer agricultural land, rapidly propelled the burgeoning Muslim population into urban slums. A lack of opportunity and high unemployment caused loyal Muslims, many of whom had served with the Free French Armies during World War Two, to become disillusioned with the French regime. In conjunction with these conditions, defeat by the *Wehrmacht* in May 1940 and the *Viet Minh* in 1954 discredited French leadership and suggested military weakness.

The geography and borders of Algeria remain the same today as during French colonial rule. The country has a landmass four times that of metropolitan France although the Sahara Desert covers 90 percent of the country. The Atlas Mountains, climbing to seven-thousand feet, separate the centres of population and agriculture in the north from the Sahara to the south. Algeria shares a 965 kilometre (603 mile) border with Tunisia to

⁶ Gilles Martin, "War in Algeria: The French Experience," *Military Review* (July-August 2005), 51.

⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 45 and 64.

the east and a 1,559 kilometre (974 mile) border with Morocco to the west.⁸ Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Niger and Mali border the Algerian Sahara region. With the exception of Libya and Western Sahara, Algeria's neighbours in 1954 were also French colonial possessions. Nationalist insurrections in Tunisia and Morocco, in conjunction with lesser French interests in these countries, facilitated their independence in March 1956. However, the French retained limited bases and significant influence.

The FLN offensive of 1954 was a speculative attempt at uniting nationalist ideals with popular discontent under the banner of an armed struggle. Initially the aims of the offensive failed to deliver the desired results; the majority of the Muslim population remained uncommitted. Motivated by the hard-line attitudes of the *pieds noirs*, the French Army increasingly overreacted to security incidents causing the indigenous population to suffer. Over time, these events gradually increased popular support for the FLN.⁹ Until 1956, the insurgency remained predominantly an internal affair with little outside help reaching the insurgents. The independence of Tunisia and Morocco, with governments broadly sympathetic to the FLN, allowed the creation of external sanctuaries. Following a tactical defeat at the Battle of Algiers, January to March 1957, the Tunisian sanctuaries played a significant role in allowing the FLN to recover.

Overland routes from Egypt through Libya and sea routes avoiding French controlled waters favoured Tunisia as the principle FLN sanctuary. From Tunisia, the FLN increasingly cultivated major arms suppliers including a nationalist Egypt with a

⁸ CIA, "The World Fact Book," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html#Geo> (accessed Jan 28, 2009).

⁹ Douglas Porch, "French Imperial Warfare, 1945-62," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 103.

pan-Arab agenda and the Soviet dominated countries of Eastern Europe. The use of Tunisia as a sanctuary was not without restrictions. In his comprehensive study of the conflict, Alistair Horne writes, "*Bourgiba* [the Tunisian Prime Minister] *was to remain unswervingly constant to his two principal ideals (although they were often thrown into mutual conflict): to gain independence for Algeria, while retaining a generally pro French and pro Western stance.*"¹⁰ The contradiction of Bourgiba's ideals resulted in an economic agreement between France and Tunisia, and the building of the Edjeleh to La Skhirra oil pipeline for the export of Algerian oil through Tunisia. At least one commentator credited the pipeline construction, and potential agreements to alter the border in favour of Tunisia, with influencing Bourgiba's opposition to FLN operations south of the Nemencha mountain range.¹¹ This limited FLN infiltration routes from Tunisia into Algeria to a three hundred-kilometre sector south from the Mediterranean coast. The FLN were able to bring considerable pressure on Bourgiba, not least through the presence of fifteen-thousand FLN fighters within Tunisia, but they were dependent on him to represent their case at international forums. Political support became increasingly central to the FLN's strategy as the insurgency faltered in its later years. Reluctant to disregard their host, the FLN largely complied with Tunisian demands to limit their infiltration routes to the northern part of the country.

In addition to the political constraints on FLN movement from the south of Tunisia, the northern fringes of the Sahara proved environmentally challenging. The

¹⁰ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 248.

¹¹ Jaques Frémaux, "The Sahara and the Algerian War," in *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images and Testimonies*, edited by Martin Alexander, Martin Evans and J. F. V. Keiger (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 81.

terrain confined insurgent movement to foot or camel and predictable routes between waterholes. With little cover from airborne reconnaissance and only a sparse population to hide amongst, French aircraft and airmobile forces readily identified and engaged the insurgents. The environment on the southern Moroccan-Algerian border was similarly hostile to insurgent ingress. Furthermore, large French garrisons and protected zones associated with the Ballistic Missile and Space Program at Colomb Bechar dominated the southwest border regions. For all practical purposes, infiltration from Morocco was similarly limited to northern areas.

The Mediterranean presented its own difficulties to insurgent movement. The French Navy dominated the seaward approaches, boarding suspicious vessels and making high profile arms seizures. Following an arms find aboard the Yugoslav vessel *Slovenija* in January 1958, the FLN made no further attempts to use maritime routes.¹² With both the Mediterranean and the Sahara proven impractical for ingress, a border length of only three-hundred kilometres on each flank remained open to insurgent infiltration. Despite this reduced border, the French estimated a requirement for 100,000 troops to control the frontier.¹³

The Morice Line

By 1957, the centrality of the external sanctuaries to the insurgency demanded French action. Faced with a considerable troop requirement to control the border through archetypal means, the French decided to fortify the Algerian borders. Starting with the eastern border, the French constructed the so-called *Morice Line*, named after the French

¹² Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 261.

¹³ Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, 63.

Minister of Defence André Morice.¹⁴ The French completed the first section in September 1957 and the line ran south from the Mediterranean for approximately 320 kilometres.¹⁵ A less comprehensive barrier on the Moroccan Frontier, the *Pedron Line*, eventually completed the fortification of the Algerian frontiers.¹⁶

General Bizard, a senior French Commander during the conflict, recalled the Morice Line consisted of two electric fences ten metres apart with barbed wire entanglements some thirty metres in front. The French placed approximately three-million land mines between the barbed wire and the fences to complete the physical obstruction. Each day, the border force ploughed a ten-metre strip inside the barricade to allow trackers to assess the size of any groups that successfully crossed the line.¹⁷ In places, the security forces cleared the civilian population to a depth of thirty to fifty miles, thereby simplifying the human geography and denying intelligence to the

¹⁴ André Morice served as the French Minister of Defence for the five months of the Bourges-Manoury Administration. Benjamin Stora, William B. Quandt, Jane Marie Todd, *Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History* (Cornell University Press, 2004), 56.

¹⁵ There is conflicting evidence over the exact length of the Morice Line. General Alain Bizard, a senior French Commander in Algeria, stated in a speech translated by Alexander J. Zervoudakis that the line ran along the length of the Bône - Tébessa railway for 290 kilometres. An additional 30 kilometres was constructed 'in-front' of this barrier at the southern end. Later, the French extended the line to Négrine, a straight-line distance of 110 kilometres from Tébessa. The overall distance would then be in the order of 430 kilometres. Alexander, Evans and Keiger, "Officer Corps Veterans," in *The Algerian War and the French Army*, 226. Alexander Alderson stated the line ran for 200 miles (320 kilometres). Alexander Alderson, "Iraq and its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency," *RUSI Journal* 153 (Apr 2008): 19. Paul Staniland provides figures of 250 kilometres. Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2005-06): 31.

¹⁶ The Algerian-Moroccan Barrier formed a triangle with the North point at Oujda, the central apex at Méchéria and the southern point at Figuig – some 360 kilometres in length. Jaques Frémaux, "The Sahara and the Algerian War," in *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62*, edited by Martin Alexander, Martin Evans and J. F. V. Keiger, 226-227.

¹⁷ Alexander, Evans and Keiger, "Officer Corps Veterans," *The Algerian War and the French Army*, 226-227.

insurgents.¹⁸ Sensors and alarms alerted mechanised reaction forces, whilst prepared tracks allowed for a rapid response to incursions. The French enhanced surveillance of the border region by transferring pilots from NATO-assigned Super-Sabre squadrons to man a force of three-hundred heavily armed propeller-driven Harvard aircraft. This transfer was not without controversy, Horne writes, “*the pilots complained it was like driving a Citroen 2CV, but they were able to observe and pounce on the tiny targets.*”¹⁹ The transfer represented one of many examples of conventional French forces reorganising for counterinsurgency.

¹⁸ Alexander Alderson, “Iraq and its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency,” *RUSI Journal* 153 (Apr 2008): 19.

¹⁹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 334-335.




Figure 1. The Algerian-Tunisian Border.

FLN attempts to breach the Morice Line culminated with the Battle of Souk-Ahras at the end of April 1958. The FLN chose a heavily wooded sector of the line to infiltrate, hoping this would provide cover once across. Eight hundred and twenty FLN managed to breach the line, but once alerted, the French forces rapidly encircled the insurgents. After a week of fighting, the French killed or captured three-quarters of the insurgents. In the seven months following its construction, experts estimated the Morice Line accounted for the loss of six-thousand insurgents and 4,300 weapons.²⁰ By the

²⁰ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 266.

FLN's own admission, this represented an attrition rate of 78 percent.²¹ Further efforts to cross the barrier continued sporadically with little success and the FLN's tactics migrated towards harassment, aiming to tie down substantial numbers of French troops on the border. Overall, the Morice Line isolated around 30,000 insurgents in Tunisia.²² In his speech of June 1960, the FLN leader *Ferhat Abbas* assessed the effect of the Morice Line, "*the rebellion within Algeria and that beyond her boundaries had been completely cut off from one another.*"²³

The Morice Line conformed to what Joseph Celeski, a retired U.S. Army counterinsurgency expert, characterises as the model for a fixed barrier: sensor technology, in-depth counter-mobility obstacles, reaction forces, garrison forces, flying checkpoints, aggressive patrolling combined with unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or in this case fixed-wing surveillance.²⁴ Despite its apparent sophistication, the French found the success of the Morice Line did not derive from impenetrability -- ingenuity always found a means to cross it -- but its ability to slow insurgents and warn of incursions.²⁵ The predominant means of detecting breaches of the line was the cutting and shorting of the electric fence, which necessitated a generator and company level post every fifteen kilometres. Extensive air and ground patrolling were required to support this system of

²¹ Douglas Porch, "French Imperial Warfare, 1945-62," in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 106.

²² Alexander Alderson, "Iraq and its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency," *RUSI Journal* 153 (Apr 2008): 19.

²³ Alexander, Evans and Keiger, "Officer Corps Veterans," in *The Algerian War and the French Army*, 229.

²⁴ Joseph Celeski, "Attacking Insurgent Spaces: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction." *Military Review* 86 (Nov-Dec 2006): 51-57.

²⁵ Austin Long, *On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006.

detection, which alone proved manpower intensive. Following discovery of a breach, the French placed great emphasis on tracking, isolating and destroying the insurgent groups within the first twenty-four hours before they could disperse amongst the population. The need to respond to multiple breaches and feints again required a significant troop deployment. Figures for the total number of personnel assigned to the Morice Line vary between 40,000 and 80,000 troops, Horne claims this was “*the most powerful concentration of French combat troops in Algeria.*”²⁶ The latter figure approaches the original estimate of 100,000 personnel required to guard an unfortified frontier. To be effective, the Morice Line proved manpower intensive and tied down substantial forces on the border for a prolonged period.

In addition to requiring significant numbers of personnel, the fortified frontiers suffered a number of other drawbacks. Construction coincided with the French programme of *regroupement villages*, which sought to separate the Muslim population from the insurgents through their relocation and concentration in protected villages. A lack of investment and development in the villages resulted in them being little more than campsites where disease and malnutrition prevailed. Uprooted Algerians had few economic opportunities, and the social discontent served to legitimise the FLN and promote the nationalist cause.²⁷ A lack of foresight and concern, combined with limited French development capacity contributed to the initial wretched conditions in the

²⁶ Alderson and Celeski provide figures of 40,000 troops assigned to the Morice Line, whilst Horne’s authoritative account states 80,000. Alexander Alderson, “Iraq and its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency,” *RUSI Journal* 153 (Apr 2008): 19. Joseph Celeski, “Attacking Insurgent Spaces: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction,” *Military Review* 86 (Nov-Dec 2006): 55. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 264.

²⁷ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 221.

villages. It is probable that the priority awarded to the construction of the Morice and Pedron Lines contributed to the lack of French capacity to deliver better conditions. The French *Challe Plan* sought to redress the conditions of the *regroupement villages* and deliver wider economic development for the Muslim population as a whole. However, the plan did not commence until March 1959 and the results were not apparent until after 1960. By this time, it was too late to repair the damage to French legitimacy.

One final problem created by the Morice Line was the fixing of troops in known defensive locations with predictable patterns of employment. A number of senior French Officers, including the prominent *Colonel Trinquier*, believed the line encouraged a defensive mentality.²⁸ Predictability and defensive attitudes left French forces open to attack and ambush by insurgent groups able to mount their approach and withdrawal from the safety of Tunisia. Frustration with such attacks prompted the French to mount an external operation.

External Operations: The Bombing of Sakiet

During the second half of 1957, the number of attacks originating from Tunisia against the French border positions rapidly increased. The French Government acceded to requests from the army for the right of pursuit across the international border, but failed to specify the type and scale of action permissible. The FLN attacks culminated with a major operation in January 1958, which resulted in the death of fifteen French soldiers and four more taken prisoner. A few days later, the FLN, operating from within Tunisia, shot down a French aircraft and followed this with further surface to air fire.²⁹ Believing

²⁸ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 226.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 248.

the FLN to be concentrated in the Tunisian border village of Sakiet, the local French Air Force Commander authorised a squadron of medium-bombers to conduct a reprisal raid. The attack, made without consultation with Paris, resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties and damage to the local Tunisian school and hospital. The outraged Tunisian authorities were quick to rush the international media to the scene of the incident ensuring maximum publicity.

The punitive attack on Sakiet achieved little tactical success for the French, whilst at the strategic level it proved a diplomatic and domestic disaster. Bourgiba took the incident to the United Nations Security Council, where the French were heavily criticised for their actions. In the face of international condemnation, the French Government distanced itself from the military, exacerbating internal divisions. The French Government blamed local commanders, and the army felt disenchanted with the politicians. Bourgiba demanded the withdrawal of the remaining French garrisons in Tunisia, and bilateral relations remained damaged for many months. The attack also prompted questions in the U.S. over the French use of American military aid in a colonial war. Anglo-American political interference in North Africa prompted the fall of the French Government in April 1958, further increasing political instability within the country.³⁰

A number of commentators attribute to the attack on Sakiet, the publicising and internationalizing of the war, which over time “*strengthened French sentiments that an*

³⁰ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 269.

end to the Algerian imbroglio could only come through withdrawal."³¹ It is overstating the case to claim that this attack had a direct causal relationship with the French withdrawal from Algeria. However, it was one of a number of events that exposed the true financial and moral cost of remaining in Algeria. At the strategic level, the attack escalated the war by promoting the Algerian nationalist cause and undermining the French willingness to remain. The external attack on Sakiét proved a tactical irrelevance with strategic consequences.

Summary

The extreme environment of the Sahara in conjunction with economic agreements between France and Tunisia considerably reduced the length of the Algerian border available to FLN infiltration. The reduced distances, although still considerable, allowed for the successful use of barriers to isolate insurgent sanctuaries. The barriers made an important contribution to French operational success in Algeria, although other factors ultimately resulted in French withdrawal and defeat. Despite significant investment, the Morice Line did not create an impenetrable obstacle. The strengths of the line lay in its ability to slow infiltration and warn of incursions. For the most part, the French rapidly dealt with successful insurgent crossings near the border. In order to be effective, the Morice Line required substantial numbers of personnel, who were unavailable for operations elsewhere. The barriers absorbed considerable funds and construction capacity, which potentially denuded and delayed French development efforts for the Muslim population.

³¹ Alexander, Evans and Keiger, "The War without a Name," in *The Algerian War and the French Army*, 29.

The French resorted to external operations on one notable occasion, bombing the Tunisian border village of Sakiet. The attack incurred a number of civilian casualties and served further to publicise the war amongst the wider international community. Increased awareness of the true nature of the conflict eventually undermined the French willingness to remain in Algeria. In summary, barriers contributed to operational success, whereas external operations politically escalated the war and played a part in strategic failure.

III. Dhofar / Oman (1965-75)

Background

The Dhofar province of Oman forms the southwest part of the country and encompasses an area the size of Wales or Massachusetts. In 1970, the population of approximately 50,000 lived mostly in coastal villages, although a number of tribes inhabited the hinterland.³² The Indian Ocean to the south and the *Rub al Khali* (the empty-quarter) to the north geographically bound the province. During the period of the conflict, Dhofar shared its western border with the Marxist regime of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).

A coastal monsoon lasting from the end of June until September interrupts the typically Arabian climate of the Dhofar. Brigadier John Akehurst, Commanding Officer of the Dhofar Brigade in the years 1974-76, described the effect of the monsoon:

*cloaking the coastal fringe in cloud and fog and dropping some thirty inches of drizzling rain, which turned the narrow strip of land [between a few hundred metres and thirty kilometres inland] it covered into a muddy, cold, insect-ridden, murky gloom but at the same time nurtured grass and other vegetation.*³³

³² John Akehurst, *We Won A War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975* (Wilton, UK: Michael Russell (Publishing), 1982), 5.

³³ *Ibid.*

The geography of the province comprises a coastal fringe of greenery, nurtured by the monsoon, and followed by a flat rock strewn plain rising towards the mountains, known as the *Jebel*. The mountains rise to between 2000 and 4000 feet and parallel the coast for some 300 kilometres.

During the 1960s, Oman remained an impoverished country anchored in tradition. Despite the first oil exports in 1967, Oman's ruler Sultan *Sa'id* remained determined to isolate the country and avoid the social unrest and excesses experienced elsewhere in the Arab world. Denied development opportunities and with a strong separate regional identity, elements of the Dhofar populace opposed the Sultan's rule through an armed insurgency. In 1970, the insurgent groups had coalesced into the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), renamed after 1974, The People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO): the term Front describes both. The Front received support from the PDRY, using the border towns of Hauf and Al Ghayda as sanctuaries, while regular Yemeni forces provided artillery support from their side of the border. At various times both China and the Soviet Union supplied and trained the Front, whose numbers totalled two-thousand full-time and four-thousand part-time insurgents.³⁴

By 1970, the Front had successfully restricted the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces (SAF) in the Dhofar to the provincial capital Salalah, the main airfield and a small number of isolated locations. This proved to be the apogee of insurgent control. An internal coup in July 1970 replaced Sultan *Sa'id* with his progressive son Qaboos, who instigated military and social reforms using Oman's increasing oil wealth. As a result, the

³⁴ Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 30.

strength of the SAF and the numbers deployed in the Dhofar gradually increased. The latter figure reached around ten-thousand personnel in 1974.³⁵ British loan service officers and contractors bolstered the SAF, which also included two battalions of infantry hired from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan.³⁶ In addition, Iranian and Jordanian forces assisted Oman at various stages of the counterinsurgency.

Operation Simba

The increasing availability of the SAF within the Dhofar first allowed the contemplation of a major offensive against the Front towards the end of 1971. A directive, from Commander SAF, tasked the Dhofar Brigade with operations in the extreme Western Sector to cut off insurgent supply lines from the PDRY. The upshot of this directive, Operation Simba, envisaged the seizure of a prominent ridge at Sarfait on the frontier between the Dhofar and the Yemen. The SAF deemed possession of the high ground vital to protect airborne re-supply and prevent the enemy from gaining direct fire vantage points. Following the seizure of the ridge, the SAF planned to erect a barrier between the escarpment and the sea, approximately fifteen kilometres in a straight line. The barrier would prevent insurgent movement along the coastal paths that provided direct access from the sanctuaries at Hauf and Al Ghayda to the Dhofar.³⁷ The coastal route had proved to be the most difficult to interdict from the air, with the monsoon clouds and associated vegetation providing cover for the infiltrating insurgents.

³⁵Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 33.

³⁶ Oman has extensive historical ties with Pakistan not least through the possession of the coastal enclave of Gwadar in Baluchistan. Sultan Sa'id sold Gwadar to Pakistan for £3 million in 1958. Calvin Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee II, *Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 29.

³⁷ J. E. Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies: The Sultanate's Struggle for Supremacy* (London: Saqi, 2007), 288.




Figure 2. Western Dhofar.

The Sultan's forces seized the ridgeline at Sarfait on April 16, 1972 with no resistance. Torrential rain subsequently denied further helicopter movements and delayed the descent off the escarpment. This delay allowed the Front to reinforce their positions and oppose any further advances. The ensuing problems of SAF movement, which required either a helicopter insertion or a roped descent in the face of enemy resistance, resulted in a stalemate between the opposing forces. Furthermore, the forces used for Simba weakened SAF garrisons elsewhere. The Front exploited these weaknesses, fixing the SAF in the interior of the province and indirectly preventing the reinforcement of

Sarfait.³⁸ The inability of the SAF to move down from the escarpment prevented control of the low-lying coastal supply routes. Furthermore, the nature of the terrain denied observation of these routes. Despite its negligible influence on infiltration and the requirement to garrison Sarfait with troops better employed elsewhere, the Omani leadership proved reluctant to abandon the position for political and prestigious imperatives.³⁹

Deep inside insurgent territory and with no surface lines of communication or mutual support, the Sarfait garrison relied on fixed-wing and rotary airlift for sustainment. With up to 115-rounds of indirect-fire per day, air re-supply proved hazardous. The crash of a Caribou aircraft on the runway and the loss of an AB-205 helicopter at Sarfait exposed both the garrison's vulnerability, and its drain on aircraft better employed elsewhere.⁴⁰ The aircraft losses led to the formulation of plans to withdraw, and only the arrival of Iranian helicopters in support of the SAF allowed the retention of the position.⁴¹ This marked the start of a substantial contribution from Imperial Iran aimed at halting the spread of Marxism in the Middle East. Oman maintained a garrison at Sarfait throughout the insurgency, although it made little contribution to border security until the SAF established greater presence in the Western Dhofar in late 1975.

³⁸ In particular, Peterson states the SAF weakened the garrison at Akut to find forces for Simba. Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 288.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 310.

⁴¹ Akehurst, *We Won A War*, 21.

Operation Simba and the garrison at Sarfait provide an example of how mountainous terrain and an over-extension of the security forces can thwart attempts at border control. The complex terrain at Sarfait absorbed an entire battalion of troops, yet exerted little influence on a fifteen-kilometre stretch of the border.⁴² Control of the high ground did not enable freedom of movement or the domination of the low-level routes. At the strategic level, Operation Simba had a positive impact by portraying Oman on the offensive. This encouraged outside support, in particular from Iran. Following the marginalisation of the Sarfait border garrison, the SAF resorted to in-depth interdiction, including physical barriers in the interior, to achieve the same effect as border security.

In Depth Interdiction

The insurgent lines of communication consisted mostly of camel trains moving supplies and ammunition from the PDRY to the Front's operations in the centre and east of Dhofar. To counter the camel trains, the Sultan issued a *diktat* forbidding their movement and declaring them legitimate targets. Although driven by economics rather than ideology, the majority of camel trains in the Dhofar supported insurgent activity.

Brigadier Akehurst described the dilemma of attacking such targets:

*This offensive policy against camels raised the question of cruelty, with the added complication that the owners might be so alienated that they would never cooperate with the government . . . The arguments in favour were that camels represented the only means the enemy had of transporting weapons and munitions, and that the civilians' hate could be turned against the enemy whose use had brought this slaughter upon them. The Arab is a great respecter of power and strength and the Jebali was no exception. Any relaxation of this policy would almost certainly be seen as weakness.*⁴³

⁴² Ian Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency* (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2006), 64.

⁴³ Akehurst, *We Won A War*, 68.

The rules of engagement (ROE) allowed the Sultan's Air Force to hit all camel trains as targets of opportunity. Transiting aircraft, of whatever type, acted as reconnaissance platforms reporting enemy movement. Once located, *Strikemaster* light attack aircraft armed with a combination of 500-pound bombs, unguided rockets and machine guns attacked the camel trains. Suspected movement around fixed ground locations resulted in requests for localised air reconnaissance and interdiction. Apart from confirming the absence of friendly security forces, there was little need to verify who or what was moving, leaving plenty of opportunity to engage fleeting targets.

The geographical confines of the Dhofar, where no position was greater than fifteen minutes flying time from the base at Salalah Airfield, allowed a single squadron of *Strikemaster* aircraft to provide ubiquitous air support. One of the greatest successes came in September 1974, when the monsoon clouds lifted early, exposing large herds of camels in the Western Dhofar. During the next two days, *Strikemasters* accounted for over two-hundred camels killed.⁴⁴

From 1974, the SAF enhanced their interdiction efforts with a barrier system constructed in the interior of the country. The *Hornbeam Line* ran north from the coast for some fifty kilometres, linking seven hilltop strong points with barbed wire and minefields.⁴⁵ It bisected the insurgents' shortest lines of communication along the coast and marked the boundary between an increasingly pacified central and eastern Dhofar from the Front dominated west. Manned by a battalion of troops and extensively

⁴⁴ Akehurst, *We Won A War*, 68.

⁴⁵ The Hornbeam Line positions included Whale (1150ft) Ashawq (1900ft) Killi (2000ft) Reef (3600ft) Kumasi (4000ft) Bole (3300ft) and Oven. Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 79.

patrolled, the line slowed insurgent infiltration and increased the chance of interception.⁴⁶ Ian Gardiner, a loan service officer in the SAF, described the effect of the Hornbeam Line, “*While the adoo [enemy] might try and bypass these positions by taking their camel trains further north, the effort for them to do so became exponentially greater.*”⁴⁷ Camel trains forced north took longer to reach the insurgent groups and increased their exposure to attack from the air.

The Hornbeam Line, in conjunction with aggressive patrolling, progressively prevented the flow of large camel trains. Denied mortar ammunition and *Katyusha* rockets, the Front’s efforts in the centre and east of the Dhofar gradually diminished. At the end of 1974, the build-up of Imperial Iranian forces in the Dhofar allowed the construction of a similar barrier, the *Damavand Line*, fifty kilometres to the west. Manned by the best part of a brigade, the Damavand Line further increased the area of Omani control and the combination of both lines delivered the results originally envisaged for the border barrier at Sarfait. In contrast to Sarfait, the Hornbeam and Damavand Lines contested an area where logistic resupply favoured the SAF and not the Front. With these fixed lines, the SAF advanced towards the border in a supportable manner, effectively implementing a clear, hold and build strategy.⁴⁸

The sparseness of the civilian population and the lack of legitimate cross border trade provided discrete insurgent targets during infiltration and resupply. The separation

⁴⁶ The Hornbeam Line was manned by a Battalion sized force and the Damavand by an Iranian Battlegroup. Gardiner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 78 and 161.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴⁸ Clear, Hold and Build is a doctrinal COIN construct. U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency* (Headquarters Department of the Army, Dec 2006), 5-18.

of the insurgents from the civilian population allowed the use of airpower with permissive ROE to interdict insurgent lines of communication. The geography of the region narrowed the sector open to insurgent infiltration and enabled the effective use of barriers in the interior. The lines absorbed considerable numbers of troops over a relatively small distance, but enhanced the effectiveness of air interdiction and mobile ground forces over the full length of the insurgent lines of communication. In addition, the fixed lines advanced Omani control towards the border in a supportable manner.

Tribal Forces: Firqat

A final element of Omani border security in the Dhofar was the use of tribal forces known as the *Firqat*.⁴⁹ The size of the SAF had proven a significant limitation to the prosecution of the counterinsurgency during the early years of the conflict. In 1970, the surrender of thirty-six insurgents in one operation prompted the local British Special Air Service (SAS) Commander to propose the formation of a tribal force, formed from surrendered enemy personnel and other Dhofari tribesmen.⁵⁰ The Omani Government supported the proposal and the British provided additional SAS personnel to recruit, train and control the Firqat. Organized into units between platoon and company strength, the exact number of personnel in the Firqat proved difficult to assess. Ian Gardiner observed, *“It was best not to be too rigorous with the arithmetic when counting them as there were always ghosts on the payroll and it was not easy to see what the Sultan was getting for*

⁴⁹ Firqat is the plural form of Firqah, a term used to describe the paramilitary groups recruited by the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces during the Dhofar insurgency.

⁵⁰ The SAS contribution to Oman was under the auspices of the British Army Training Team (BATT). Gardner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 159.

his money."⁵¹ Despite these problems, the Firqat numbered seven-hundred men at the end of 1972 rising to around three-thousand by the end of the war in December 1975.⁵²

In terms of border security, the principal role of the Firqat was the provision of intelligence on enemy movement. Firqat stationed on the Dhofar-Yemen border occupied positions at Habarut, sixty kilometres north of Sarfait, and Makinat Shihan, a further twenty kilometres north.⁵³ Both positions overlooked a confluence of camel trails and important waterholes, which offered alternative routes to the more heavily interdicted coastal paths. In 1975, the SAF installed a Firqah at Sarfait to develop routes off the ridgeline and increase the utility of the garrison. Tribal connections on both sides of the border facilitated the gathering of information by the Firqat, which resulted in intelligence used to cue interdiction.

The development and employment of the Firqat posed numerous difficulties. Initial units were composed of mixed tribes, but following internal disagreements, a third of the original Firqah walked out.⁵⁴ This necessitated the formation of subsequent units along tribal lines, which provided greater unit cohesion, but promoted disputes between clans and tied Firqah to their tribal areas. Within individual Firqah, the tribesmen quarrelled, refused to follow orders, and had dubious leaders with suspect loyalty to the

⁵¹ Gardner, *In the Service of the Sultan*, 157.

⁵² Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 296 and 430. Akehurst places the Firqat strength at 1000 in mid-1974, which helps corroborate Peterson's figures. Akehurst, *We Won A War*, 42.

⁵³ The Mahri Firqah operated along the border. Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 287. Akehurst, *We Won a War*, 69.

⁵⁴ Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 259.

Omani State.⁵⁵ On at least one occasion, local commanders suspected the border Firqah of allowing insurgent provisions to cross the border.⁵⁶ As the Firqat were dressed and equipped in the same way as the insurgents, their employment also increased the difficulties of combat identification.

Firqat operations required considerable effort and resources to overcome these problems. During the critical build up phase, the British provided two SAS squadrons for the task of training and mentoring a relatively small number of Firqat.⁵⁷ The lack of conventional support, small unit operations and the necessary patience to negotiate with the tribesmen required Special Force (SF) mentors. Even with a high ratio of SF mentors, it took some eighteen months of training before the Firqat conducted an independent action. Subsequently, SAS personnel continued to accompany them on major operations.⁵⁸ Additional examples of the special attention required by the Firqat included the establishment of a dedicated Firqat headquarters and the repeated engagement by the Governor of the Dhofar and the Sultan to settle internal disputes. Perhaps the most costly example of the support provided to the Firqat was the medical evacuation of a leader with a broken finger, at the expense of one aircraft lost and another damaged.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ The death of a Firqah Leader and an NCO, on 12 October 1974, resulted in its removal from the field for investigation. Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 343-344.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 337.

⁵⁷ The two SAS squadrons provided around 100 mentors for approximately 500 Firqat in the period 1971-72. The author arrives at the figure of 500 by interpolating Akehurst and Peterson's figures. See footnote 52.

⁵⁸ Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 304.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

In terms of border security, the Firqat provided local knowledge and vital intelligence, which the SAF used to interdict the insurgent lines of communication. However, this tribal force required constant engagement and a considerable number of highly qualified mentors. When removed from close supervision, elements of the Firqat proved self-serving and counterproductive. Additionally, the use of the Firqat and the SAF on the border with the PDRY left them vulnerable to insurgents supported by regular Yemeni forces. Attacks by the latter prompted external operations.

External Operations: Restraint against Yemen

Throughout the conflict, Oman was careful not to respond to Yemeni support to the Front for fear of extending and intensifying the conflict. Following an attack by insurgents and regular Yemeni forces against the border garrison at Habarut, Oman replied with cross-border air attacks and artillery fire. This response caused limited damage to the Front's storage areas in the Yemeni border town of Hauf. Oman issued a press release coinciding with the attack, justifying its action to the wider international community. In addition, Oman made a strong representation to the UN and the Arab League, requesting the PDRY accept impartial observers along the international border. Yemeni refusal to accept this proposal weakened its position within the Arab world, whilst international criticism discouraged the PDRY from further escalation.⁶⁰ External action in conjunction with Operation Simba reinforced the perception that Oman was now winning the war. This perception further encouraged support from Iran and eventually Jordan.

⁶⁰ Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 293.

The second significant external operation occurred towards the end of the insurgency in October 1975. After suffering three years of Yemeni artillery fire onto the border position at Sarfait, the availability of Hunter ground attack aircraft offered Oman the opportunity to retaliate with greater force. In addition to the Hunters, Iranian Chinook helicopters airlifted heavy artillery forward to support the attack. Despite disabling one enemy artillery piece and causing others to move position, the attack failed to stop the Yemeni bombardment.⁶¹ Fearing the attack on its territory and Omani successes in Western Dhofar were a prelude to ground operations in the Yemen, the PDRY increased its involvement.⁶² In light of this, the SAF unilaterally ceased cross-border operations and a Saudi-brokered agreement eventually stopped Yemeni artillery fire, although sporadic insurgent fire continued for a few more years. By this stage, the artillery fire had little effect on the insurgency. A combination of interdiction, the Firqat and economic development had all but beaten the Front.

The limited Omani external operations can be categorised as punitive action that had little tactical effect on border security. At the strategic level, the first operation against the Front's depots at Hauf strengthened the Omani diplomatic position within the region and discouraged greater Yemeni involvement. The second operation against PDRY artillery, in conjunction with Omani successes in Western Dhofar, threatened to escalate the war and necessitated a unilateral climb-down.

⁶¹ Akehurst, *We Won A War*, 161.

⁶² The PDRY reinforced their border and stepped up artillery support to the Front. In addition, the air war escalated with the Front obtaining SAM-7s. In addition, regular Yemeni Forces shot down two of Oman's eight operational Hunter aircraft in this period. Peterson, *Oman's Insurgencies*, 372.

Summary

An over-extension of the SAF and complex terrain defeated initial attempts by Oman to block insurgent infiltration through the geographic choke point at Sarfait. Domination of the high ground did not guarantee freedom of movement or control of the low-lying routes. Difficult terrain absorbed large numbers of troops for little return. Oman responded by applying increased airpower, ground forces and fixed interior barriers to interdict insurgent lines of communication, achieving the same effect as border security. Geographic circumstances similar to those in Algeria, a desert on one side and an ocean on the other, restricted the insurgent infiltration routes and facilitated the success of fixed barriers. Although limited in length, the Hornbeam and Damavand Lines required relatively large forces. Tribal forces in the form of the Firqat played a broad role in the counterinsurgency and in terms of border security contributed to intelligence gathering activities. The Firqat required considerable investment in mentors and close control to ensure their effectiveness. Finally, external operations had little tactical effect, but at the strategic level proved both escalatory and de-escalatory. The Dhofar insurgency overlapped in time and to a small degree influenced the methods used in the final case study.

IV. Rhodesia (1965-80)

Background

The Rhodesian conflict broadly consisted of separate African nationalist movements, influenced by Soviet and Chinese revolutionary theory, resorting to an insurgency to overthrow a white minority government. The nationalists comprised of the

Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA),⁶³ principally backed by China, and the Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA),⁶⁴ supported by the Soviet Bloc. The two movements generally reflected their sponsors. ZANLA adopted Maoist tactics, cultivating local support before conducting *guerrilla* operations. ZIPRA's structure was that of a conventional army. The two movements also reflected the ethnic divisions within Rhodesia, ZANLA comprised mainly of the majority *Shona* peoples and ZIPRA the *Ndbele* from the west of the country.

The self-governing colony of Rhodesia, governed by a sizeable European population, rejected the handover of power to African nationalists, and unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. Subject to various international sanctions and blockades, Rhodesia received support from *white* South Africa and, until 1975, cooperation from the Portuguese regime in neighbouring Mozambique. Opposing the insurgents, the Rhodesian security forces consisted of a small regular army, an air force and a police service built on the British model and complemented by a larger number of reserves.⁶⁵ The size of the security forces was restricted by an initial reluctance to

⁶³ ZANLA was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led from 1975 by Robert Mugabe. Wikipedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZANU> (accessed Dec 1, 2008).

⁶⁴ ZIPRA was the armed wing of the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union led by Joshua Nkomo until its merger with ZANU in 1988 to form the Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimbabwe_People's_Revolutionary_Army, (accessed Dec 1, 2008).

⁶⁵ The Rhodesian regular army in 1972/3 consisted of 3,500 regulars and 10,000 reserves. The Rhodesian Air Force was 1,200 strong. Anthony Wilkinson, "Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment," *Adelphi Papers* (Number One Hundred, 1973): 36-37. The number of personnel increased throughout the insurgency and at its height, Gann and Henriksen estimated the regular forces comprised of 15,000 personnel and the total force some 46,000. The impact of taking reservists out of the civilian economy resulted in only 25,000 fielded for any length of time. Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*, (New York: Praeger, 1981), 65.

maximise recruitment from the African population, combined with a numerically small European population and limited financial resources.⁶⁶





Figure 3. Southern Africa circa 1972.

The European population of Rhodesia was concentrated in the urban areas and the central *high veld*. The latter comprised the best farmland, some three-thousand to five-thousand feet above sea level, running northeast to southwest within the country. The Rhodesian borders adjoining Zambia and Mozambique, with the exception of the central-

⁶⁶ Lewis Gann and Thomas Henriksen state the European population of Rhodesia in 1978 was 260,000, out of a total population of 6,930,000. Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, xii.

eastern border,⁶⁷ were African Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) or unoccupied national parks. Within the European lands, the African population still formed the majority, however, there was little permanent European presence in the TTLs.⁶⁸ To an extent, Rhodesian policy attempted to fight the insurgency in the TTLs and National Parks, keeping the violence away from the cities and European owned farms.



Source: Modified from, Wilkinson, "Insurgency in Rhodesia: 1957-1973," 46.

Figure 4. Rhodesian land and population distribution circa 1969.

⁶⁷ The border region south of Umtali (now Mutare) for approximately 200 kilometres was predominantly European owned. Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 135.

⁶⁸ The 1969 census states only 2,200 Europeans lived within the TTLs and African Purchase Lands out of a total population of three million. Kees Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe: The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*, (London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1975), 191-192.

Throughout the insurgency, both ZANLA and ZIPRA relied heavily on external sanctuaries in neighbouring African states, recruiting extensively from the 200,000 refugees who had fled Rhodesia.⁶⁹ During the early phases of the conflict, Zambia provided the only sanctuary, and the limited border between the two countries proved difficult to infiltrate. The shortest routes to the main European areas lay to the east of Lake Kariba, itself a three-hundred-kilometre barrier along the northern frontier. Insurgents were required to cross the Zambezi River and an arid plain before mounting an escarpment some four-thousand feet above sea level.⁷⁰ The border area itself was national land and sparsely populated. In the early stages of the conflict, the insurgents failed to indoctrinate the local population and received little support. In such conditions, each insurgent was required to carry all his food, ammunition and water amounting to seventy-five pounds in weight. The limited number of approaches and physical exhaustion of the insurgents made them easy to observe from a combination of airborne surveillance and ground observation. The early phase of the insurgency, prior to 1972, can be categorised as Rhodesian control of its northern border and containment of the insurgency.

To the east of Rhodesia, in Mozambique, a similar insurgency was underway between FRELIMO⁷¹ and the Portuguese Administration. By 1972, FRELIMO controlled the northwest *Tete* province of Mozambique and increasingly allowed ZANLA to transit through and use bases in this region. This new phase required the Rhodesian security forces to concentrate on their northeast border. Portugal's sudden decision to withdraw

⁶⁹ Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 78.

⁷⁰ Reid-Daly describes the difficulties of infiltrating along the route by foot and in particular, the lack of water sources once away from the Zambezi. Ron Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War* (Cape Town: Printpak Cape Ltd, 1982), 234.

⁷¹ FRELIMO translates as Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or the Liberation Front of Mozambique.

from Mozambique in 1975, handing control to FRELIMO, opened Rhodesia's entire eastern border to insurgent infiltration and once again changed the dynamic of the insurgency.




Figure 5. Rhodesia's North and Eastern Borders.

Cordon Sanitaire

In response to the insurgent threat on its northeast border, Rhodesia started construction of a physical barrier, called the *Cordon Sanitaire*, in May 1974. The initial

section ran for 179 kilometres (111 miles) along the border adjacent to Tete Province. The purpose of the Cordon was ill defined: one commentator believed its role was to channel infiltration towards areas more favourable for interdiction.⁷² The Cordon consisted of a twenty-five metre deep minefield, enclosed between game fences equipped with alarm systems, and cleared of vegetation. By the time the Rhodesians completed the initial section, the entire eastern frontier was open to infiltration, allowing insurgents to route around it. The Rhodesians responded by continually lengthening the Cordon Sanitaire until it eventually extended 1063 Kilometres (664 miles) along the eastern border.⁷³ By extending the Cordon, the Rhodesians compromised on its sophistication and upkeep. Later sections consisted of only a minefield and the absence of game fences resulted in wild animals detonating some 30 percent of the mines.⁷⁴ The heavy sub-tropical rain also readily exposed the mines and trip wires, which combined with inadequate maintenance, reduced the effectiveness of the obstacle.

The extension of the Cordon represented a change in its role. Instead of an attempt to channel insurgents, elements of the security forces now viewed it as a means of sealing the border. This new purpose arose from the fact that the Rhodesian security forces were effectively too small to cover the border. The subsequent deepening of the minefield element of the Cordon represented an attempt to create a more formidable obstacle to seal

⁷² J. K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London: Crook Helm, 1985), 115.

⁷³ Cilliers states the original Cordon Sanitaire was 179 kilometres long; the *modified Cordon* an 18-kilometre reinforcement of the original; the *modified modified Cordon* a further extension of 20 Kilometres; and a simplified border minefield of 864 Kilometres. The total length of the Rhodesian-Mozambique border was 1,231 kilometres. *Ibid.*, 105-113.

⁷⁴ Ian Beckett. "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972-1979." http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/rhodesian%20army%20coin%2072_79%20part2.htm (accessed Aug 15, 2008), 2.

the frontier.⁷⁵ The insurgents, however, rapidly learned to cross the inadequately maintained minefield using very simple techniques. Lieutenant Colonel Reid-Daly, commander of the specialist counterinsurgent-regiment, the *Selous Scouts*, claimed the minefield only slowed the insurgents down by three hours.⁷⁶ On many occasions, by the time a reaction force reached a breach, the insurgents were long gone. The Rhodesian security forces credited the Cordon with killing 8,000 guerrillas during the insurgency. Even if correct, this attrition had little impact on an insurgency with no shortage of recruits.⁷⁷

The Cordon Sanitaire was a paradox for the Rhodesians. Built to compensate for insufficient numbers of security personnel, the lack of manpower to keep it under surveillance, in good repair, and respond to incursions, severely limited its effectiveness.

Reid-Daly was a strong critic:

*An obstacle is not an obstacle if it is not under constant observation and covered by firepower . . . it obviously must be futile to even contemplate mine belts if one does not possess the means and ability to keep the complete mine belt under continuous surveillance.*⁷⁸

Additional problems with the Cordon included the canalising of Rhodesian cross-border operations and the lifting of claymore anti-personnel mines by the insurgents for their re-use against the Rhodesians.⁷⁹ Furthermore, Reid-Daly criticises the Cordon's consumption of valuable funds and resources. The scheme cost around fifteen-million

⁷⁵ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 115.

⁷⁶ Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 255.

⁷⁷ J. Wood, "Countering the Chimurenga: The Rhodesian Counterinsurgency Campaign, 1962-80," in *Counter Insurgency in Modern Warfare*, 195.

⁷⁸ Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 255.

⁷⁹ Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army," 2.

U.S. dollars to construct and additional money to maintain. This represented a large proportion of the defence budget and denied funds to other lines of operation.⁸⁰

The Cordon Sanitaire provides a number of new lessons for the use of barriers, and reinforces those previously identified. Localised barriers can be simply by-passed or displace the problem elsewhere. The construction and upkeep of long distance barriers is expensive, and the absorption of resources risks denuding other counterinsurgency efforts. The cost of construction and upkeep of lengthy barriers risks compromising their overall sophistication and effectiveness. The value of a barrier is severely limited if it does not have a sufficiently large force to monitor it, maintain it, and respond to incursions in a timely manner. The relative failure of the Cordon required the Rhodesian security forces to employ additional methods of border security.

In-Depth Interdiction

The ethnic distribution and geography of Rhodesia shaped the infiltration routes of ZANLA and ZIPRA and the interdiction campaign fought against them. The TTLs, especially those along the northeast border, proved useful to the insurgents. They provided a continuum of African dominated areas with the external sanctuaries in the neighbouring *Front Line States* of Zambia and Mozambique.⁸¹ This continuum facilitated

⁸⁰Cilliers provides a figure of \$R10 million to establish the Cordon. This does not include maintenance costs, of which the only figure provided was that for 1978/9, which amounted to \$R4 million. The currency exchange rate between 1972 and 1978 fluctuated between US\$1.5 - 1.773 to \$R1, a total construction cost in US\$ of between \$15 and \$17 million. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 105. The Rhodesian defence budget for FY 1978/79 spiked at US\$ 242 million. This represented a rise of 610% over the 1971 figures, suggesting a 1971 figure of US\$39. Interpolating an unrealistic straight line between these figures, the 1975 defence expenditure would be US\$ 101 million and therefore construction costs represented around 15% of one year's defence budget. Figures sourced from, Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-insurgency," 3.

⁸¹ The semi-official term *Front Line States* collectively describes those southern African nations who opposed white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa. The composition of the grouping changed over time, but broadly consisted of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.

infiltration and influence over the local population, the latter assisted by the close connection of the ZANU leadership with the region.⁸² Furthermore, Reid-Daly states that the geography of the TTLs aided deeper penetration of the European centre, “*the Chiweshe TTL could be likened to long fingers thrust deep into the European farming areas of the Umvukwes, Centenary and Mount Darwin.*”⁸³ ZANLA infiltration into the northeast region required the Rhodesians to evolve a means of identifying insurgents amongst a denser and increasingly supportive African population. Early identification and location was key to Rhodesian efforts to interdict insurgent groups as early as possible within the border regions, and for this, they relied upon Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

Initially, the Rhodesians followed the traditional British model of sourcing HUMINT through a network of paid informers run by the British South African Police Special Branch.⁸⁴ The establishment of the Selous Scouts in 1974, essentially pseudo-terrorist gangs, enhanced this means of intelligence gathering. Infiltrated as small units into areas of insurgent activity, the Scouts contained a mix of African soldiers, turned insurgents and European handlers. The Selous Scouts deceived the local population into believing they were genuine insurgents and subsequently obtained information from villagers and local contact men as to the whereabouts of real terrorist groups - activities termed pseudo-operations. After locating an insurgent group, the Selous Scouts called for

⁸² Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 106.

⁸³ Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 147.

⁸⁴ Lecture given by Dr. Paul Melshen entitled, “Low-Intensity Conflict: Old War/New War; The War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980,” U.S. Joint Forces Staff College, Oct 1, 2008.

airmobile reaction forces, known as *fireforces*, to engage the insurgents.⁸⁵ By not participating directly in the engagement, the pseudo-gangs sought to conceal their identity. In addition, the Scouts staged mock attacks against regular security forces or civilian targets to deepen or prolong their cover story.

To enhance the interdiction campaign, the Rhodesians directed insurgent infiltration through areas where the Selous Scouts and fireforce were most effective. Air and Special Forces attacked the road and rail network in southern Mozambique,⁸⁶ funnelling insurgents into the central eastern border region. Reid-Daly describes the region as “*savannah country, dominated by hills . . . ideal for good observation points, and for the guiding in of Fireforces.*”⁸⁷ These external shaping operations maximised the efficiency of Rhodesian interdiction efforts, but created strategic consequences discussed later.

The use of Selous Scout derived HUMINT, combined with a fireforce response, proved a tactical success. The Directorate of Rhodesian Military Intelligence attributed 68 percent of insurgent casualties to the Scouts.⁸⁸ Without the HUMINT provided by them, fireforce employment and interdiction would have been inefficient and reactive. An additional benefit of the Selous Scouts’ subversive activities was the level of distrust

⁸⁵ The Fireforce consisted of one Dakota aircraft able to deliver up to twenty paratroopers and four Alouette III helicopters, three *G-cars* with four soldiers each and one ‘killer’ *K-car* armed with cannon and containing the Fireforce commander. The rotary borne troops with support from the K-car would act as a sweep driving the insurgents onto the paratrooper backstop. Light attack aircraft could also augment the Fireforce. Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 463-466.

⁸⁶ The Rhodesians destroyed the rail line in Mozambique from Malvern on the Rhodesian border to Maputo. Between Nov and Dec 1977, they also destroyed six road bridges in Mozambique between Espungabera and Dombe. *Ibid.*, 508.

⁸⁷ The region described was around Mtoko and south of Umtali. *Ibid.*, 506.

⁸⁸ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 132.

created amongst the insurgents. Reid-Daly provides an example of one insurgent group that had been engaged in twelve firefights since crossing the border, but only two of these had involved Rhodesian security forces.⁸⁹ Rhodesian capacity, however, constrained the success of the interdiction campaign. Limited numbers of helicopters and trained personnel combined with the high cost of flying hours resulted in the fielding of only four fireforces. In addition, the rapid expansion of the Selous Scouts compromised their standards and capabilities. Towards the end of the conflict, the scale of the insurgency increasingly overwhelmed the Scouts and the fireforces.

The tactical success of Rhodesian HUMINT-gathering was in part a result of the unique circumstances of the conflict. One hundred years of European settlement combined with the loyalty of large sections of the African population provided the counterinsurgents with a deep understanding of the geography, languages and tribal dynamics of the country. These advantages facilitated the use of pseudo-operations, although their widespread use incurred a penalty at the strategic level.

The main problem with pseudo-operations was the technique used to establish the credentials and cover of the pseudo-terrorists. The Scouts were required to use a level of violence expected of real insurgents, which placed them outside the normal legal framework. On numerous occasions, the Selous Scouts publicly executed insurgent contact men in front of the local population, claiming them to be government informers. Independent reports alleged that many victims were innocent civilians and by 1979, the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department had opened a number of murder cases

⁸⁹ Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Pamwe Chete, Nyadzonya Raid and Reid-Daly interviews*, DVD, (Wilmington USA: Memories of Rhodesia, 2004).

against members of the Selous Scouts.⁹⁰ Extensive use of pseudo-gangs resulted in their existence and methods becoming common knowledge. This served to create distrust between the rural populace and the security forces, and lost the Rhodesian Government the support of the moderate African population. In the eyes of the African majority, the Rhodesian Government increasingly lacked moral authority and legitimacy. Control of the African population relied more and more on naked power.⁹¹

In-depth interdiction, although limited by capacity, proved tactically successful as a border security method. It made best use of limited Rhodesian resources and allowed the insurgency to be contained for a number of years. HUMINT obtained through pseudo-operations provided the intelligence that allowed for effective and efficient interdiction. Pseudo-operations proved a tactical expedient with negative strategic consequences. The widespread use of such operations lost support amongst the African population and further undermined the legitimacy of the Rhodesian State. The security forces used external operations to shape their interdiction efforts, but these also featured in a wider context.

External Action: Rhodesian Escalation

If you continue the war there will be no end. You will finish up raiding deeper into Zambia and Mozambique. – Henry Kissinger⁹²

Rhodesian external action initially comprised small-scale reconnaissance and ambushes, usually involving small patrols of four men.⁹³ Prior to 1975, external

⁹⁰ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 129.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 131.

⁹² Comments made by Henry Kissinger to the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, Pretoria Sep 19, 1976. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 250.

operations in Mozambique received tacit Portuguese approval. The independence of Mozambique resulted in the exposure of Rhodesia's entire eastern flank and marked an escalation of the insurgency. By October 1975, commentators estimated that around one thousand nationalist volunteers were crossing the border into Mozambique each week.⁹⁴ At the end of 1976, the Commander of the Rhodesian Army estimated the returning rate of insurgents was sufficient to sustain 1,700 active fighters in the east of the country.⁹⁵ Training and staging camps in Mozambique presented large concentrations of insurgents, in contrast to the small, dispersed eight-man cells within Rhodesia. The relative failure of the Cordon Sanitaire to stem infiltration and the finite interdiction capability forced Rhodesia to adopt external operations against insurgent camps. These operations were not so much an attempt to deny sanctuary - the Rhodesians lacked the capacity - but a means of maximising attrition.

In August 1976, the Selous Scouts attacked the insurgent camp at *Nyadzonja / Pungwe* in Mozambique. The attack resulted in the destruction of a ZANLA brigade-sized formation and marked a substantial escalation in Rhodesian cross-border activity.⁹⁶ Rhodesia sought to maintain a policy of plausible deniability, using the Selous Scouts with their high proportion of African soldiers, disguising vehicles with FRELIMO

⁹³ Charles Melson, "Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 16 (Mar 2005): 63.

⁹⁴ Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 205.

⁹⁵ Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 80.

⁹⁶ Reid-Daly lists ZANLA casualties at Nyadzonja as 1028 killed, 309 wounded, and 1000 missing. He also provides a figure of 1200 ZANLA personnel killed at Chimoio. Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 396. Gann and Henriksen provide a slightly lower estimate of 670 ZANLA and camp followers killed at Nyadzonja. Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 80.

markings, and denying direct air support to the operation.⁹⁷ These actions made little impression on the subsequent United Nations investigation into the raid: the UN clearly held Rhodesia responsible. Already the subject of ineffective sanctions and censure, the Rhodesians increasingly used conventional ground and air forces to support external action. A subsequent attack by the Rhodesian Special Air Service and Rhodesian Light Infantry against the *Chimoio Base* in Mozambique resulted in little covert effort.⁹⁸ The Rhodesian Government justified external operations as either pre-emptive or retaliatory action.

Despite the tactical success of eliminating the equivalent of an insurgent brigade, the Rhodesian attack on Nyadzonia strengthened external support to the insurgents. ZANU and FRELIMO claimed Nyadzonia was a refugee camp, whilst the Rhodesians maintained it was a terrorist base.⁹⁹ Regardless of its true status, ZANU used the attack and the large number of casualties sustained to provoke outrage within the region and the wider international community.

In the period prior to the attack on Nyadzonia, Zambia had sought to reduce its support to the insurgency. Zambia had endured the brunt of the financial costs associated

⁹⁷ Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Pamwe Chete, Nyadzonya Raid and Reid-Daly interviews*, DVD, (Wilmington USA: Memories of Rhodesia, 2004).

⁹⁸ U.S. Joint Publication 1-02, defines a *covert operation* as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02*, Oct 17, 2008.

⁹⁹ Martin and Johnson visited the Nyadzonia camp six-months prior to the attack and saw no sign of military activity. A UNHCR report also accredited the camp with refugee status. Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 241-242. The refusal by ZANU and FRELIMO to allow a UN sponsored ‘Truth Commission’ to investigate the true role of the camp seems to support the Rhodesian position. Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 396.

with Zimbabwean independence until 1975.¹⁰⁰ Economic decline and in fighting between and within the various insurgent movements resulted in Zambia's engaging in a period of *detente* with South Africa and, by extension, with Rhodesia. Acquiescing to South African pressure, Zambia limited its support to ZANU and ZAPU, detaining 1,300 ZANLA personnel and effectively removing them from the insurgency. In the aftermath of the Nyadzonia raid, the Tanzanian President, *Nyerere*, negotiated the release of the detained ZANLA fighters and facilitated their return to action. Pressure on Zambia to abandon its *detente* policy increased at a regional summit in 1977. The delegation from Mozambique showed a film of the aftermath of a recent Rhodesian external attack and presented the statistics of two-hundred Rhodesian incursions into their country that had resulted in the death of two-thousand civilians.¹⁰¹ Rhodesian external operations contributed towards Zambia's eventual restoration of full support to the insurgency.

The raid on Nyadzonia also strengthened Tanzanian support to the insurgents. Discussions amongst the Front Line States resulted in Nyerere allowing ZANU and ZIPRA the use of the *Nachingwea* training complex in southern Tanzania. These facilities, previously used by FRELIMO, had a capacity for five thousand recruits.¹⁰² Furthermore, it increased Chinese and Soviet access to the insurgents and facilitated better training and arms supplies. Fifteen months after this decision, five-thousand trained insurgents graduated from Nachingwea and moved to Chimoio in Mozambique.

¹⁰⁰ Gann and Henriksen estimate the voluntary closure of the Zambian-Rhodesian border between 1973 and 1978 cost Zambia US\$1 Billion. Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 80.

¹⁰¹ Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 286.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 246.

The progressive destruction, by Rhodesian forces, of the road and rail infrastructure in southern Mozambique further escalated the conflict. These actions tactically disrupted ZANLA, but failed to deter support from the FRELIMO Government. A measure of this failure was the presence of regular Mozambiquan forces supporting ZANLA operations within Rhodesia's borders.¹⁰³

The re-engagement of Zambian support for the insurgency resulted in Rhodesian air raids against insurgent camps north of its border. This in turn prompted the acquisition of surface to air missiles, which brought down two Rhodesian civilian airliners on the Rhodesian-Zambian border. This action stopped peace negotiations and resulted in retaliatory air raids with the best part of the Rhodesian Air Force.¹⁰⁴ The eventual scale of Rhodesian raids, described by Gann and Henriksen as "*sanctuary grinding*,"¹⁰⁵ had escalated, for all intensive purposes, to state-on-state war.

Rhodesian external action provided a greater efficiency of insurgent attrition than afforded by the interdiction of small infiltrating groups within its borders. This allowed the small Rhodesian security forces to contain the insurgency for a longer period than would otherwise have been possible. Rhodesia sought to secure its frontiers by defeating or reducing the threat beyond them. Various commentators attribute to external operations the raising and maintaining of the morale of the Rhodesian security forces and,

¹⁰³ Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 317.

¹⁰⁴ The attack on the ZIPRA/ZAPU Westlands Farm complex involved six Hunter aircraft flying CAP overhead Lusaka Airport and Mumbwa Airforce Base. These aircraft followed an attack by four Canberra light bombers against Westlands Farm. Additionally, four K-cars and a command and control Dakota were involved in the attack. Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 610.

¹⁰⁵ Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 81.

to a lesser extent, of the civilian population.¹⁰⁶ On the downside, tactical success drove the demand for larger external operations at the expense of other aspects of counterinsurgency. At the strategic level, external operations pulled an economically damaged *détente-Zambia* back into the conflict and failed to deter involvement from Mozambique. External operations deepened hostility between Rhodesia and the Front Line States, undermining the formation of a moderate nationalist government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.¹⁰⁷ In summary, external operations proved a tactical success, but a strategic failure.

Protected Villages: Population Resettlement in Rhodesia

The final component of Rhodesian border security was the resettlement and concentration of the African population along the eastern frontier and their protection with an auxiliary force. The first attempts at resettlement started at the end of 1973. The Rhodesian Internal Affairs Department moved the African population along the Zambezi Valley, adjacent to the insurgent sanctuaries in Zambia, into four protected areas. The scheme occurred in a sparsely populated region and involved the movement of relatively few people.¹⁰⁸ With the population removed, the areas allowed the security forces full freedom of action.¹⁰⁹ The Rhodesians sought to repeat this success in the Chiweshe and

¹⁰⁶ Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 81.

¹⁰⁷ Rhodesia reached an *Internal Settlement* with moderate African nationalists on Mar 3, 1978. This resulted in a power sharing agreement between the Europeans and Africans and renaming the country Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in Jan 1979. Elections in Apr 1979 resulted in Bishop Muzorewa heading the new Zimbabwean Government. This process excluded both ZANU and ZAPU, who continued to fight. *Ibid.*, 56-58.

¹⁰⁸ Cilliers provides a figure of 8,000 people moved from the Zambezi Valley. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 83.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Madziwa TTLs adjacent to Tete province in Mozambique. From July 1974, the Internal Affairs Department moved 63,000 Africans into twenty-nine *Protected Villages*. These villages consisted of little more than a surrounding fence with searchlights and a rudimentary guard force. Conditions inside the villages proved austere, with each family having to construct their own huts from material taken from their original settlements. The Chiweshe and Madziwa Villages eventually became the focus for Rhodesian Government economic development; although it remained doubtful whether they offered the population a better standard of living.

Population resettlement had immediate benefits at the tactical level. Denied help from the local population, the Rhodesian security forces estimated that only seventy insurgents remained in the northeast region at the end of 1974.¹¹⁰ Drawing on the success of the scheme, the Rhodesians expanded it along their entire border with Mozambique. The cost of expansion, however, required cheaper methodology in the form of *Consolidated Villages*. Located in more secure areas, Consolidated Villages grouped the African population, but offered no security fence or guard force. If the security situation deteriorated, the Rhodesians planned to upgrade the villages to protected status. At the end of 1978, the Rhodesian Government had resettled between 350,000 and 750,000 Africans into protected and consolidated villages.¹¹¹

The later schemes allowed tribesman to remain on their traditional farmlands, but forced them out of small *Kraals* and concentrated them into large Protected Villages with

¹¹⁰ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 87.

¹¹¹ Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army," 3.

populations ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants.¹¹² Located as close to the border as possible and along insurgent infiltration routes, the Rhodesians hoped the Protected Villages would deny the insurgents access to food, intelligence and a means of spreading propaganda. In conjunction with the Cordon Sanitaire, infiltrating insurgents were required to cross a barrier and then a *no-go zone* in which the re-grouped population offered no logistical help.

The unintended and negative consequences of such a massive population resettlement were many. Consolidated Villages proved to be prime targets for insurgents; moving the population highlighted their cooperation but offered no security. The Rhodesians improved the security of many villages only after repeated attacks. Aside from security concerns, the population begrudged a forced relocation from traditional homes without any substantial compensation. Economically, a lack of resources and political constraints denied government investment in the vast majority of villages.¹¹³ The villages themselves proved too large to be self-supporting; they required the population to walk too far to tend their fields.¹¹⁴ In addition, curfew restrictions prevented the tribesmen from guarding their crops from foraging animals. The growing population of the villages required greater equality of land distribution, but reform disempowered tribal leaders, whose authority the Rhodesian Government sought to reinforce. The sum of all these problems resulted in much of the arable land in African areas laying abandoned

¹¹² Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 86.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 97.

with a commensurate decline in living standards. Even in the most settled Chiweshe and Madziwa districts, some 40 percent of the land lay untended.¹¹⁵

Another significant problem with population resettlement proved to be the provision and composition of a guard force. Originally comprised of an Internal Affairs Force, essentially African auxiliaries, the guards lacked sufficient numbers and training to separate the population from the insurgents. Rhodesian moves towards power sharing with moderate African nationalists resulted in outside money becoming available to expand and rebrand the guard force as Security Force Auxiliaries and later as the *Pfumo reVanhu*.¹¹⁶ Recruits received a four- to six-week training package and eventually around ten-thousand auxiliaries were responsible for security in some 15 percent of Rhodesian territory, mostly along the borders.¹¹⁷

The size of the Rhodesian security forces resulted in little supervision of the auxiliaries after their initial training. To avoid fratricide, the Rhodesians deliberately excluded regular forces from the districts given over to the auxiliaries. Predominantly formed from unemployed urban youths, the Rhodesian authorities made little attempt to group the auxiliaries along tribal lines.¹¹⁸ Given these factors, the auxiliaries lacked

¹¹⁵ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 97.

¹¹⁶ Ian Beckett states Oman provided money for the expansion of the Security Force Auxiliaries after 1978, but offers no explanation why. Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972-1979," 5. Following moves towards free elections in Rhodesia, the author assumes Oman, influenced by British-expats, viewed the conflict as a struggle against Marxist expansion in Africa. Whilst only conjecture, Oman's donation may have been motivated by the success of the Firqat and its similar counterinsurgency against Marxist guerrillas in the Dhofar. *Pfumo reVanhu* translates from Shona the majority language of Zimbabwe as 'Spear of the People.' In Ndbele, the language of the Matabele province of Zimbabwe the group was known as *Umkonto wa Banns*.

¹¹⁷ Gann and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 68.

¹¹⁸ Reid-Daly provides only a single example of attempting to align one Mangula based group with the Wedza Tribal areas they emanated from. Reid-Daly, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War*, 569. The recruitment

knowledge of the rural environment and had few connections with the population, on whom they started to make demands and abuse their position of authority. Observers documented the widespread conduct of atrocities by auxiliary forces against the civilian population.¹¹⁹ On at least one occasion, regular security forces were required to eliminate rogue auxiliary units.¹²⁰

Unsupported and unsupervised, the auxiliaries attempted to hedge their position with one foot in the government camp and the other in the insurgents'. The formation of parallel ZANU Government structures in areas supposedly held by the Security Force Auxiliaries clearly illustrates the limitations of the force.¹²¹ In other parts of the country, the different auxiliary forces acted as the personal militias of the various African leaders engaged in the transition to majority rule in the years 1978-79. The establishment of alternative and disparate power bases further destabilised the country and undermined the counterinsurgency.

In recognition of the unpopularity of resettlement, the decline in living standards of the regrouped population, and the failure to provide adequate protection from insurgents, the Rhodesian authorities *opened* many of the Protected Villages in 1978. Criticism of the scheme centred on its poor execution rather than the concept itself. Commentators suggested a greater involvement of the local population in the protection

of urban African youth, although only a generation removed from the countryside, de-emphasised the tribal aspects of auxiliary forces.

¹¹⁹ Gann and Henriksen. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 68. Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972-1979," 5.

¹²⁰ Beckett states Rhodesian Forces eliminated an SFA unit loyal to Sithole in the Gokwe TTL in Jun 1979. Beckett, "The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972-1979," 5

¹²¹ Gann and Henriksen. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 68.

of the villages, combined with earlier and substantial development, could have overcome the problems.¹²² However, the scale of the programme and its drawbacks required a level of investment that was likely to have exceeded Rhodesian means. In economic terms, the level of investment needed to be sufficiently high to offset the inherent unpopularity of resettlement. A smaller, less ambitious scheme would have allowed resources to be concentrated, but would not have provided comprehensive coverage along the border. In the absence of adequate economic investment and protection, the resettlement of the population proved counterproductive.

Summary

The Rhodesian State employed a wide variety of methods to control its borders. The Cordon Sanitaire illustrated that localised obstacles simply displace insurgent infiltration routes, and effective barriers are personnel intensive. Intelligence-led in-depth interdiction using airmobile forces proved an efficient means of providing border security, although Rhodesian capacity limited its success. The use of pseudo-operations effectively cued interdiction; however, these activities undermined the legitimacy of the Rhodesian Government. Extensive external action against insurgent and state facilities in Zambia and Mozambique proved tactically successful, but increased support for the insurgents and escalated the conflict. Finally, the resettlement and concentration of the population in the border regions lacked adequate protection measures and economic development. The scheme alienated the African population and further undermined the legitimacy of the state.

¹²² Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, 98.

Many of the problems associated with securing the Rhodesian border resulted from insufficient resources divided between too many initiatives. The scale of the forces and technology ranged along the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan border is different to that of 1970s Rhodesia, but resources remain a significant factor.

V. Afghan-Pakistan Border

Background

The 2,430 kilometre (1,518 mile) Afghan-Pakistan border encompasses the extremes of topography. In the northeast, the Hindu Kush rise to 15,000 feet giving way to the Shinkay Hills in the centre before finally running into the Rigestan Desert and the Chagai Hills that stretch towards the Iranian border. The topography creates five principal crossing-points between the two countries: the Khyber Pass between Nangahar Province and the Khyber Agency; the Kuram Pass between Nangahar Province and the Kurram Agency; the Gomal Pass between Paktika Province and South Waziristan; Spin Boldak between Kandahar Province and Baluchistan; and Baram Cha between Helmand Province and Baluchistan. In addition to the main routes, many smaller crossings exist,¹²³ although those at high altitude are often impassable during the winter months.

¹²³ Reporter Janine di Giovanni provides a first-hand account of the Afghan-Baluchistan border: “*There are nearly 1,000 border posts placed strategically along the 1,500-mile Afghan-Pakistani border, with curfews and fences in key areas. But on the ground you can see how easy it is for Taliban fighters or leaders to slip in and out.*” Janine di Giovanni, “Pakistan’s Phantom Border – Gateway to Jihad,” *Vanity Fair* (10 Jun 2008): 10.



Figure 6. Afghan-Pakistan Border Region.

The international border, known as the *Durand Line*, is a product of British colonial rule in India and remains disputed and poorly demarcated. The somewhat arbitrary nature of the line results in a border that does not follow a single or set of distinctive geographic features. Straddling both sides of the border is the Pushtun population, forming nearly 40 percent of the Afghan population, and concentrated in the North-West Frontier Province, FATA and Northern Baluchistan regions of Pakistan. Pushtun allegiances outweigh nationalist sentiments and the population has little regard for the border.

A differing consensus exists as to the importance of Afghan-Pakistan border security. The ISAF 2007 Campaign Plan recognises the requirement for border security, but does not categorise this activity as decisive. Regardless of its relative significance, the North Atlantic Council has not approved the resources required for border security.¹²⁴ The U.S. funded Combined Security Transformation Command (CSTC-A) is delivering an Afghan Border Police capability. In early 2009, Colonel John Johnson commander of U.S. Task Force Currahee in Eastern Afghanistan stated, “*The Afghan Border Police have traditionally lacked the capacity to operate outside their fixed posts.*”¹²⁵ With an established strength of only 17, 676 personnel and a responsibility for all entry points, the Afghan Border Police lack the numbers and capability to secure the borders in the midst of an insurgency.¹²⁶ Another U.S. initiative is the Security Development Plan, which aims to increase the capability of the Pakistan Frontier Corps and to build Border Coordination Centres (BCCs) as a mechanism for sharing intelligence and coordinating cross-border action.¹²⁷ This initiative complements the Pakistan Government’s Comprehensive

¹²⁴ HQ ISAF, “ISAF X Campaign Design,” Power Point Brief, Nov 20, 2007.

¹²⁵ Joanna Wright, “Interview: Colonel John P Johnson, Commander, Combined Task Force Currahee, Regional Command (East), Afghanistan,” *Janes Defence Weekly*, Feb 25, 2009.

¹²⁶ The Afghan Border Police (ABP) has jurisdiction over all international borders and entry points including a Border Security Zone 55 Kilometres deep. The ABP has an authorised strength of 17,676 personnel and as of Jan 2009 an actual strength of 11,754. CSTC-A, “Afghan Border Police Undergoes Intensive Reform,” *The Enduring Ledger*, Jan 2009, <http://www.cstc-a.com/News/enduring%20ledgers/2009endledger/January2009EL.pdf>, accessed Feb 9, 2009.

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Pakistan’s FATA Challenge: Securing One of the World’s Most Dangerous Areas*, John Negroponte testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 20, 2008, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/pakistan/State/105041.pdf>, accessed Feb 18, 2009.

Approach to the FATA, which emphasises economic and social development as a means of increasing governance and security in the border regions.¹²⁸

Border security initiatives remain nascent, and any requirement to exert greater control entails increased activity. Calls for such a course of action are mounting. The Afghan Governor of Kunar Province recently argued, “*We don’t need ISAF in our cities. . . We need those troops along our frontiers: if our frontiers are secured, our cities will be.*”¹²⁹ This study examines the functional border security methods used in the case studies and the lessons derived, in order to determine their applicability for the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Border Barriers

The application of a comprehensive barrier system along the Afghan-Pakistan border poses numerous problems. The total length of the frontier is comparable to that of the Algerian border (2,524 kilometres), but unlike the case study there are no political restrictions limiting the length of border open to insurgent infiltration. Severe environmental conditions hampered insurgent passage around the edges of the Morice and Hornbeam Lines. Limited to movement by foot or camel and reliant on known waterholes, the Algerian and Dhofari insurgents were susceptible to surveillance and interdiction. The contemporary Baluchistan border presents a similar environmental

¹²⁸U.S. Department of State, *Pakistan’s FATA Challenge: Securing One of the World’s Most Dangerous Areas*, John Negroponte testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 20, 2008, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/pakistan/State/105041.pdf>, accessed Feb 18, 2009.

¹²⁹ Brooks Tigner, “Afghan Provinces Call for Coalition Troops to Focus on Pakistan Border,” *Janes Defence Weekly*, Jan 5, 2009.

challenge to Taliban movement. However, the availability of four-wheeled drive vehicles somewhat reduces the difficulties.¹³⁰

Barriers designed to deflect or displace insurgent infiltration along the Afghan-Pakistan border would reduce the Taliban freedom of movement and increase the logistics of infiltration. However, the case studies all indicate that successful barriers require significant numbers of troops to ensure their effectiveness. The Morice line required up to 80,000 troops to police a 350-kilometre barrier, the Damavand Line around one thousand troops and the Hornbeam Line some five hundred for a fifty-kilometre sector. Despite the availability of modern sensors, including unmanned seismic sensors and aerial vehicles, a modern barrier would remain personnel intensive. The inherent difficulty of discriminating between insurgent, civilian and false alarm requires a manned response. Patrolling and maintenance also increase the need for a large force. Furthermore, sensors themselves are high demand items for coalition bases and operations in the interior of Afghanistan.

Given the historical figures for the number of personnel to man effective barriers, Coalition and Afghan forces lack the mass to provide even limited barriers at geographic choke points. Mountainous terrain restricts and canalises insurgent movement, but also creates problems for the counterinsurgent. The Hindu Kush and Shinkay Hills that dominate sections of the Afghan-Pakistan border are far more imposing than the four-thousand foot ridgeline at Sarfait in the Dhofar. Seizure of the high ground at Sarfait was essential to protect from direct fire and allow airborne re-supply, but it did not enable

¹³⁰ In his study, Ahmed Rashid reports the Taliban using one hundred Toyota Landcruisers to travel from Quetta to Helmand Province in Afghanistan during Jun 2006. Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (New York: Viking, 2008), 361.

freedom of movement or the domination of the low-level infiltration routes. The rugged terrain contributed towards the failure of a battalion of troops to secure and fence a fifteen-kilometre section of the Dhojar border. Forces holding the high ground along the Afghan-Pakistan border face similar difficulties in mounting a timely reaction to movements along the valley floors. Airmobile reaction-forces remain in short supply, whilst the terrain and altitude limit helicopter operations and increase their vulnerability to hostile fire.¹³¹ Control of choke points with barriers requires forces in direct support of the obstacle and forces on the high ground to dominate the area. This would incur an unacceptably high personnel requirement for the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Much of the Afghan frontier, in particular the south, is at or beyond the extremities of government control.¹³² A similar situation existed in Western Dhojar. Attempts to establish limited barriers along the Afghan-Pakistan border risk logistic and sustainment problems comparable to those experienced by the Omani forces at Sarfait. The Omani Government also proved reluctant to abandon Sarfait for reasons of prestige. In a similar manner, the Afghan Government would be reluctant to abandon a border position, regardless of its effectiveness or viability. Furthermore, the Taliban would portray any withdrawal from the border as a defeat. The Sarfait case study demonstrated

¹³¹ C. J. Chivers provides an account of the vulnerabilities of Helicopter operations to resupply a Forward Operating Base on the border with Pakistan. C. J. Chivers, "G.I.'s in Remote Afghan Outpost Have a Weary Job, Drawing Taliban Fire," *New York Times*, Nov 10, 2008. Col Johnson describes the lack of Helicopter support and the effect it has on mobility along the border. Joanna Wright, "Interview: Colonel John P Johnson, Commander, Combined Task Force Currahee, Regional Command (East), Afghanistan," *Janes Defence Weekly*, Feb 25, 2009.

¹³² The limit of Afghan and Coalition control in Helmand province extends only as far south as Garmsir, 80 Kilometres from the Pakistan border. "Afghan Border Police on Patrol with U.S. Marines," Reuters, www.reuters.com/article/latestcrisis/idUSISL65655?sp=true, dated Jul 12, 2008. Forces in Kandahar Province are limited to the border crossing at Spin Boldak, whilst no forces are present along the uninhabited Nimruz-Baluchistan border.

that an over-extension of logistics resulted in the culmination and the ineffectiveness of a unit on the border. These lessons remain applicable to the Afghan-Pakistan border.

An additional problem with the contemporary use of barriers is the sourcing of an acceptable counter-mobility obstacle. Landmines formed the principle impediment to infiltration in all the case studies, but their use along the Afghan-Pakistan border presents major difficulties. The Government of Afghanistan and most ISAF partners, although not the U.S. and Pakistan, are signatories to the *Ottawa Treaty*, which bans the use of land mines.¹³³ Given that Afghanistan remains one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, a reversal of its treaty obligations is unlikely.¹³⁴ The Afghan Government's rebuff of a Pakistani proposal to mine sections of the border supports this supposition.¹³⁵ In part motivated by a lack of consensus on border delineation, it also represents a rejection of the weapon. Furthermore, in terms of development, independent reports conclude that:

*Through the loss of agricultural land, livestock, loss of trading routes and the burden of mine victims on families engaged primarily in manual work, landmines result in societies atrophying and becoming ever more dependent on aid.*¹³⁶

Although mitigated by clearly marking any new minefields, the use of such weapons seems counter to international development initiatives in Afghanistan.

¹³³ The Ottawa Treaty signed in 1997 banned the use of anti-personnel land mines. As of 15 Aug 2007, 157 countries had signed the treaty and 155 had ratified. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottawa_Treaty (accessed Jan 7, 2009).

¹³⁴ In 2002, the UN estimated land mines covered an area of 780 Kilometres² within Afghanistan. Adopt a Minefield, "Mine Action: Afghanistan," www.landmines.org/programs/afghanistan/background (accessed Nov 25, 2008).

¹³⁵ "Pakistan Pushes Border Fence Plan," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6229833.stm, dated Jan 4, 2007.

¹³⁶ Melissa Curley, Frank Faulkner and Lloyd Pettiford, "Does the Security Debate Have to Presented Polemically: Landmines and the Case for a Micro-security Approach," *Low Intensity and Law Enforcement*, 18 (Autumn 99).

Finally, the building of any barriers in Afghanistan would compete with civilian development projects for finite construction capacity and funds. Although not directly proven, construction of the Morice Line potentially delayed development projects for the Algerian Muslim population and contributed to the loss of support for the French administration. Development is a key element of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, psychologically separating the civilian population from the Taliban and helping to maintain public support for the coalition. Efforts that undermine civilian development are likely to enhance the standing of the Taliban and reduce public support for operations in Afghanistan.

In summary, the length of the Afghan-Pakistan border precludes a comprehensive barrier system. More limited schemes to displace and deflect Taliban infiltration, in particular through the control of geographic choke points, also suffer from numerous difficulties and limitations. Sensors are costly high-demand items and do not fully reduce the requirement for large forces to maintain a barrier, monitor it, and react to any incursion. Complex mountainous terrain further increases the personnel requirement. Coalition and Afghan forces lack the sufficient mass to create effective barriers. In addition, the problems with sourcing an acceptable counter-mobility obstacle and the potential deflection of resources from civil development towards the construction of barriers create further difficulties. Accounting for all these factors, barriers are not an applicable means of securing the Afghan border. The use of barriers also affects trade and divides tribes. Population resettlement has similar consequences, and these are analysed in the following section.

Population Resettlement

The Pushtun and Baloch people of Afghanistan and Pakistan straddle both sides of the international border. In only a few cases, such as the Mehsud of East Waziristan, does the border neatly divide the tribes. More common are the Wazir with lands on both sides of the border.¹³⁷ The Durand Line remains disputed, while the concept of *Pakhtunistan* (or Pushtunistan) overshadows Afghan and Pakistan deliberations over border demarcation. Pakhtunistan means different things: uniting the Pushtun people within a greater Afghanistan, a separate Pushtun state, or, more recently, an autonomous Pushtun quarter within Pakistan. Measures that seek to resolve the Pakhtunistan issue risk alienating large sections of society within both countries. Hence, an ambiguous border suits both the Afghan and Pakistan Governments. Without an agreement on the border, it is unclear whether the populace of the region is Afghan or Pakistani. This represents a fundamental problem to the use of resettlement for border security.

The Rhodesian case study provides historical precedent that resettlement is unpopular with local populations. Even if it were possible to correct Rhodesian mistakes, such as lack of economic development and inadequate protection, it is unlikely that such a scheme would gain support from the Pushtun population. Resettlement is associated with control of the population and movement restrictions, actions that would separate the Pushtun tribes in a similar manner to a barrier or a fence. The Afghan Government, Pushtun bodies and the general population have strongly condemned Pakistani attempts

¹³⁷ Wazir tribes dominate North Waziristan in the FATA and Paktika, Khost and Paktia provinces in Afghanistan. Ilyas Khab, "The Afghan-Pakistan Militant Nexus," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm, published Sep 10, 2008.

to fence sections of the border.¹³⁸ These attempts resulted in demonstrations and clashes between Afghan and Pakistani security forces. The Afghan Governor of Paktika Province summarised the problem:

*For Solving the Durand Line issue, the problems of [ethnic-Pashtun] tribes living on both sides should be considered and they must be consulted. So it is a very complicated issue and must be determined by the tribes living on both sides of the line.*¹³⁹

The clear Afghan denunciation of fences also translates into a rejection of a resettlement programme that by its very nature divides Pushtun tribes. The minority Rhodesian Government was not accountable to its African population, which allowed the implementation of unpopular resettlement schemes. Such plans would be politically unacceptable in Afghanistan.

Concentration of the population of the Afghan frontier and the associated movement restrictions would also damage the economic structure of the region. Conservative figures from 2006 estimate that 60,000 Pakistanis work in Afghanistan, one million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan, and over ten-thousand people cross daily through the controlled border posts at Torkam on the Khyber Pass and Spin Boldak.¹⁴⁰ The numbers of uncontrolled crossings associated with the economy of the region can only be a matter of conjecture. Afghanistan has historically been a major trade route

¹³⁸ “Pakistan Pushes Border Fence Plan,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pt/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6229833.stm, dated Jan 4, 2007.

¹³⁹ “Afghan, Pakistani Troops Battle over Border Fence.” Radio Free Europe, <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1075982.html>, dated Apr 20, 2007.

¹⁴⁰ The figures for Pakistani workers and border crossings are sourced from, Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, Oct 2006), 17. Estimates for the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 2006 were 1,044,000 down from 2,200,000 in 2001. International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_HumanAndEconomicCost.asp?ConflictID=181&YearID=1062, accessed Dec 5, 2008.

between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Trade is of significant economic importance to a substantial portion of the Afghan people. Cross-border trade requires the ability to move freely and is incompatible with a *regroupement* that seeks to tether the population to a village. It is unlikely that sufficient development programmes could provide economic alternatives in the unstable border region.

An additional economic problem associated with resettlement is its impact on agriculture. Many of the Pushtun and Baloch tribes are nomadic, moving cattle or camels from the south and east of Afghanistan onto the high pastures in the summer. A nomadic system of agriculture is not compatible with fixed Protected Villages, further increasing the demand on the international community to develop alternative livelihoods. Where fixed communities exist along the Afghan border the land is often marginal, consequently farm and settlement distribution is low-density. Concentration of the population in Rhodesia reduced access to farmland, significantly decreasing the output of arable land. Concentration of low density farming communities in Afghanistan would similarly create land access problems. Given the already tenuous state of Afghan agriculture, any schemes that reduce productivity are not viable.¹⁴¹

Regardless of any economic development, the distinct peoples and tribes straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border are likely to resist any measures that seek to separate them and reduce their traditional rights of access. Furthermore, resettlement and concentration of the population is incompatible with the traditional economy and

¹⁴¹ In Jan 2009, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Kai Eide, called for the international community to make investment in agriculture a priority. The agriculture sector has received little investment since 2002 and Afghanistan has endured repeated food shortages during the winter months. UNAMA, "UN's SRSG Eide Urges Strong Support for Afghanistan Agriculture, Big Infrastructure," <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1783&ctl=Details&mid=1882&Itemid=3285>, accessed Mar 1, 2009.

agriculture of the region. It is unlikely that the international community could generate sufficient alternative livelihoods for the population of the border region. Adequate protection of a resettled population is also a significant factor, and is considered under Tribal Forces. In summary, population resettlement is not an acceptable method of border security for the Afghan-Pakistan border.

External Action

The historical case studies broadly support the premise that the strategic consequences of external operations overshadow their tactical utility. External operations internationalised, publicised and escalated the conflicts to the detriment of the counterinsurgent. The first Omani operation against the PDRY proved the exception; this attack garnered regional support for Oman. The countries in the case studies that provided insurgent sanctuary differ from modern Pakistan in their outright opposition to the counterinsurgent regimes. In contrast, Pakistan is broadly an ally of the U.S. led coalition although it conducts a contradictory policy towards Afghanistan. The Pakistan Diplomat, Husain Haqqani, describes the policy under President Musharraf as seeking to appease the U.S. in the War on Terror, whilst remaining “*tolerant of remnants of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, hoping to use them in resuscitating Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan in case the U.S.-installed regime of President Hamid Karzai falters.*”¹⁴² The threat to Pakistan posed by the *Tebrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) may achieve greater convergence of U.S. and Pakistani policy, but elements of the previous strategy remain. An example of the contradictory policy has been the sacrifice of 1,500 Pakistani security personnel fighting the Taliban in the border regions, whilst the Pakistan Intelligence

¹⁴² Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan; Between Mosques and Military* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 2.

Service remains implicated in assisting them.¹⁴³ The fragmentation of power within the Pakistani State also adds to the competing and inconsistent policies towards the Taliban. A lack of Pakistani capacity to secure and govern its own border regions further complicates the situation.

Prior to August 2008, U.S. external action in Pakistan was seemingly limited to self-defence by ground forces operating near the border and the occasional unmanned aerial strike against the al-Qaeda leadership.¹⁴⁴ The number of strikes escalated in the latter half of 2008, with the New York Times recording some eighteen strikes occurring up to twenty-five miles within Pakistani territory in the period 12 August to 23 October 2008.¹⁴⁵ In addition to Predator strikes, the U.S. mounted the first recorded ground assault on September 3, 2008 with Special Forces attacking a militant position in South Waziristan. The U.S. claimed to have killed at least twenty al-Qaeda militants in this raid, whilst the Pakistan Army and local journalists claim these were civilians.¹⁴⁶ The fallout from this attack was a high-level protest by the Pakistan Government and a speech from the Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, vowing to defend Pakistan's territory at all costs. Since this response, the U.S. has reverted to unmanned aerial strikes, with the New York Times claiming, "*Pakistani Officials have made clear in public statements*

¹⁴³ "A Wild Frontier; Pakistan's Tribal Areas," *The Economist*, Sep 20, 2008, 56.

¹⁴⁴ Mazzetti and Schmitt, "US Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan," *New York Times*, Oct 27, 2008.

¹⁴⁵ Mazzetti and Schmitt, "US Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan," *New York Times*, Oct 27, 2008. Trefor Moss quotes a figure of some thirty strikes in the period Aug 30, 2008 to Jan 29, 2009. Trefor Moss, "UAV Strikes in Pakistan Will Continue, Say U.S. Defence Secretary," *Janes Defence Weekly*, Jan 29, 2009.

¹⁴⁶ "A Wild Frontier; Pakistan's Tribal Areas," *The Economist*, Sep 20, 2008, 55-56.

*that they regard the Predator attacks as a less objectionable violation of Pakistani sovereignty.*¹⁴⁷

The evidence provided by some correspondents suggests the expansion of external attacks represents a migration from counterterrorism towards counterinsurgent operations.¹⁴⁸ Alternatively, it simply reflects a continued global counter-terror campaign fought in the same battlespace as the Taliban sanctuary. However, the nexus between terrorist and insurgent diminishes the distinction between these types of operations. The New York Times reported that *Baitullah Mehsud*, who allegedly orchestrated the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, was the target of U.S. missile strikes in Feb 2009.¹⁴⁹ Technically a terrorist, and one who is principally fighting the Pakistani security forces, “*Mehsud has admitted to sending his men to wage “jihad” against U.S., NATO and Afghan government forces in Afghanistan.*”¹⁵⁰ Whether intended or not, U.S. external action in Pakistan is part of the counterinsurgency with the Pakistan Government remaining outwardly opposed to such unilateral action.

The continuance of external action in the face of Pakistani opposition poses a number of risks. External operations magnify mistakes: the counterinsurgent does not

¹⁴⁷ Mazzetti and Schmitt, “US Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan,” *New York Times*, Oct 27 2008.

¹⁴⁸ Mazzetti and Schmitt reported, “*Predator is increasingly being used to strike Pakistani militants and even trucks carrying rockets to resupply fighters in Afghanistan.*” Mazzetti and Schmitt, “US Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan,” *New York Times*, Oct 27, 2008. Thom Shanker reports, “*American military commanders have declared the strikes successful in eliminating important Qaeda and TALIBAN figures.*” Thom Shanker, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied to Al Qaeda in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, Nov 23, 2008. These are two examples of recent reports that suggest the U.S. is targeting Taliban figures in addition to terrorist targets.

¹⁴⁹ Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger, “Obama Expands Missile strikes in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, Feb 21, 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part One – North and South Waziristan,” *Terrorism Monitor* (Vol 6, Issue 18), Sep 22, 2008.

control the site of the attack and the truth of a story is difficult to establish. In the aftermath of U.S. strikes in Pakistan, numerous media reports publicise the civilian casualties and stir anti-U.S. feeling. Parallels exist with the ZANU and FRELIMO exploitation of the Nyadzonia raid and the Tunisian authorities' reaction following the French attack on Sakiet. Analysts of the Rhodesian conflict observed that media reporting furthers the mindset that:

*Foreign observers and indigenous cultivators alike remembered the callousness or the injustice shown by the government soldier, but made allowances for similar conduct on the part of the insurgent, because the guerrilla was of the same culture as his victim.*¹⁵¹

These observations remain equally valid for the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan frontier and risk the loss of domestic and international support for the coalition.

The violation of Pakistani sovereignty and collateral damage risks the loss of support from the Government, security forces and broader society. A suggestion that the Pakistan Government is complicit with U.S. strikes risks marginalising it from the people.¹⁵² Loss of support imperils ISAF supply routes through Pakistan, while increased support for the Taliban represents an escalation of the conflict.

The tactical success of external operations in Pakistan also creates additional problems with this *modus operandi*. The number of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders killed appears to be driving both organisations out of the border regions and deeper into

¹⁵¹ Gann, and Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, 73-74.

¹⁵² Tom Coghlan, Zahid Hussain and Jeremy Page, "Secrecy and Denial as Pakistan lets CIA use Airbase to Strike Militants," *The Times*, Feb 17, 2009.

Pakistan.¹⁵³ The recent peace accord in the Swat Valley between the Government and the Taliban is an example of this displacement, which risks destabilising wider and more significant areas of Pakistan.¹⁵⁴ The Rhodesian case study demonstrated that deep raids into neighbouring countries, in particular Zambia, weakened these governments, who had little choice but to increase their support for the insurgents. U.S. external operations require measured constraint so as not to follow the Rhodesian paradigm.

A final consideration associated with U.S. external operations is their utility in applying pressure on the Pakistan Government. Despite considerable U.S. financial aid, Pakistan's contradictory policy towards the Taliban and security in the border regions fails to satisfy U.S. demands.¹⁵⁵ From the Pakistani perspective, protests against U.S. strikes into their territory indicate dissatisfaction with this activity. Therefore, external operations in the FATA provide the U.S. with an additional point of influence. External operations create an impetus for Pakistani action against the Afghan Taliban and greater government control in the FATA. A cessation of external operations or bilateral control is a reward for greater Pakistani efforts in the FATA.

In conclusion, U.S. external action in Pakistan represents a significant strategic risk. Too much pressure jeopardises the Pakistan Government and cooperation from the security forces. Such a situation risks the historical precedent of escalation to the

¹⁵³ The New York Times reports that U.S. missile strikes have killed 9 out of 20 senior al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Pakistan. Eric Schmitt and Jane Perlez, "U.S. Unit Secretly in Pakistan Lends Ally Support," *New York Times*, Feb 23, 2009.

¹⁵⁴ Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, "Pakistan and Taliban Agree to Truce in Swat Region, Where Islamic Law will Prevail," *New York Times*, Feb 17, 2009.

¹⁵⁵ Dodd report to Congress provides a figure of \$750 million to support the Pakistani Sustainable Development Plan, which is part of the Comprehensive Approach towards the FATA, over the next 5 years. U.S. Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Jan 2009, 100.

detriment of the counterinsurgent. Nevertheless, measured external action appears tactically successful and somewhat forces Pakistan to acknowledge and address the Afghan Taliban. For these reasons, this study deems that external action is appropriate for the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Auxiliary / Tribal Forces

The use of tribal forces allows the government to co-opt a given tribe or segment of the population to its cause. In his speech of September 9, 2008, President Bush stated the U.S. would explore the use of Tribal Security Solutions in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁶ Gen McKiernan, subsequently remarked:

*the greater complexity in the Afghan system . . . Of more than four hundred major tribal networks inside Afghanistan, most have been traumatized by over thirty years of war, so a lot of that traditional tribal structure has broken down.*¹⁵⁷

These comments provide a degree of caution towards the adoption of tribal solutions in Afghanistan, although the U.S. plans a trial during 2009.¹⁵⁸ In terms of border security, the Firqat in Dhoafar provided intelligence as to insurgent infiltration and local knowledge of the border. The Rhodesian Security Force Auxiliaries guarded Protected Villages, in an attempt to deny the insurgents logistics and information during the early phases of infiltration. The case studies illustrate that tribal or auxiliary solutions require close control and resources to be effective; they are not a cheap expedient.

¹⁵⁶ President G.W. Bush, "President Bush Visits National Defense University's Distinguished Lecture Program, Discusses Global War on Terror," Sep 9, 2008, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080909.html> (accessed Mar 28, 2009).

¹⁵⁷ Mazzetti and Schmitt, "McCain and Obama Advisers Briefed on Deteriorating Afghan War," *New York Times*, Oct 31, 2008.

¹⁵⁸ U.S.-Afghan plans conceive a *Public Protection Force* of 200 recruits from each district. The first trials of which are planned for Wardak Province during 2009. Ian Pannell, "Can Militias Contain the Taliban," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7902093.stm, dated Feb 21, 2009.

The frontier of Afghanistan, like that of Rhodesia and the DhoFar, is the most infiltrated and least controlled region of the country. Given the disposition of Coalition and Afghan forces, around major areas of population and economic activity, any auxiliary or tribal force along the border would be predominantly beyond the areas of government control. An inability to monitor or control tribal forces risks the Rhodesian paradigm; indeed this model describes the methods historically employed on the Pakistan side of the border in the FATA. The *Frontier Crimes Regulation*, devised in colonial times, governs the interaction of the Pakistan State with the tribes of the FATA. Enforcement of the State's edicts occurs through a political agent who is empowered to raise levies from one tribe to punish another. This system of control has proven insufficient to exert Pakistan Government control in the FATA and deny the Taliban sanctuary.¹⁵⁹

Employment of tribal militias to resist the Taliban in the FATA continues to be a central tenet of Pakistani strategy. In areas beyond the support of the Pakistan security forces, lightly armed militia have suffered alarming losses. Subsequently many of these militias have been cowed into supporting the Taliban.¹⁶⁰ The lessons from the FATA and the case studies indicate that tribal militias require mentoring, control and mutual support from regular security forces. Subject to little or no central control, tribal forces are likely to be self-serving and diminish the writ of the central government. The number of ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams and Police Mentoring Teams remains a constraint on the development of Afghan National Security Forces. Reinforcements are

¹⁵⁹ Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, 5.

¹⁶⁰ "Pakistan Enlists Tribal Militias to Fight War against Terrorism," *New York Times*, Oct 24, 2008.

required for an already planned expansion of these forces.¹⁶¹ Given the capacity constraints and the risk associated with tribal forces, this study concludes it is safer to invest in national security forces.

The disposition of Coalition and Government forces in Afghanistan would place tribal forces along much of the border beyond the control and mutual support of the counterinsurgents. Existing capacity is insufficient to develop tribal forces in addition to Afghan National Security Forces. The use of tribal forces in Afghanistan to control the border is not appropriate for this stage of the campaign. Tribal forces may have utility in backfilling areas of relative stability as the Coalition and Government presence expands, this could eventually include areas of the border.

In-Depth Interdiction

In-depth interdiction, using intelligence cued air and airmobile forces, proved tactically successful in the Dhofar and Rhodesia. The case studies identified no fundamental problems with this methodology and there is nothing to suggest it is inappropriate for the Afghan-Pakistan border. The different circumstances of the contemporary environment indicate that interdiction is unlikely to achieve the same level of success and efficiency achieved in the historical studies.

A sparse civilian population and little cross-border trade resulted in discrete insurgent lines of communication that aided successful in-depth interdiction in the Dhofar. Furthermore, desert to the north and the Indian Ocean to the south geographically limited infiltration routes. In contrast, the population density of the Afghan-Pakistan

¹⁶¹ Janes Defence Weekly reports the authorised strength of the ANA has increased from 70,000 to 134,000. Anthony Davis, "Home-grown army: Afghan National Army," *Janes Defence Weekly*, Dec 12, 2008.

border region is much higher; the borders far longer and cross-border trade the cornerstone of the regional economy. The Taliban are able to infiltrate across the border by a variety of routes and means. Unarmed, the Taliban can use legitimate border crossings and receive weapons inside Afghanistan. After thirty years of conflict, weapons are readily available in Afghanistan, with landmines and artillery shells providing a ready source of explosives. In addition, the Taliban are able to use official border routes through the acquiescence, intimidation or bribery of officials.¹⁶² Away from the main trade routes, nomadic herdsman whose pastures straddle the border offer similar opportunities for the Taliban to intermingle with legitimate cross-border movement. The local population of the Afghan-Pakistan border form the insurgent support infrastructure, facilitating Taliban movement through the border region. The civilian population and Taliban lines of communication are interwoven.

Interdicting the Taliban within the civilian population presents major difficulties in terms of identification and strike. Regarding the latter, collateral damage and civilian casualties are of significant concern. In the first six months of 2008, the United Nations reported over 550 civilian casualties at the hands of Afghan or Coalition forces.¹⁶³ Large numbers of civilian casualties risks losing the support of the Afghan population and fracturing the coalition. To minimise casualties, interdiction must be precise and for this intelligence is required to find and track insurgent groups. A large number of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems are available in Afghanistan, but demand

¹⁶² Janine di Giovanni, "Pakistan's Phantom Border – Gateway to Jihad," *Vanity Fair* (10 Jun 2008) provides a 2008 perspective of the lack of control at official border crossing points, specifically the Chaman – Spin Boldak crossing from Baluchistan.

¹⁶³ Imogen Foulkes, "Afghan Civilian Casualties Soar," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7618906.stn, dated Sep 16, 2008.

exceeds availability.¹⁶⁴ In addition, sensors have difficulty distinguishing between insurgent and civilian. To find the insurgent and cue the sensors that track them, the counterinsurgent needs to operate at the same milieu as the guerrilla. HUMINT remains the foremost means of identification.

The Rhodesian security forces built an extensive HUMINT capability, but there are significant differences and problems in trying to emulate this model for Afghanistan. In contrast to Rhodesia, Coalition forces in Afghanistan conduct relatively short tours and lack an intimate knowledge of the country. The nationally recruited Afghan National Army, structured in a way to maintain a national ethnic balance, does not provide units with detailed regional knowledge.¹⁶⁵ The provincially engaged Afghan National Police have local knowledge and contacts. However, until now, a lack of training, suspect loyalty and corruption have marginalised the police. Reform programs will take some time before delivering a police service capable of providing sufficient and timely HUMINT.¹⁶⁶ Compounding this lack of capability is the absence of coalition or official

¹⁶⁴ It is likely that ISR demand will always exceed supply. The planned establishment of TF ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralise) in Afghanistan during 2009 is one example of increasing demand. Kris Osborn, "Army Sends ODIN to Afghanistan," *Army Times*, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/web_defense_121508_army_ODIN/, dated Dec 15, 2008. Project Liberty, the supply of 37 RC-12 Guardrail Surveillance Aircraft in 2009 is also indicative of ISR demand remaining unfulfilled. Marcus Weisgerber, "King Airs Take on USAF Surveillance Role in Iraq and Afghanistan," *Flight International*, Sep 9, 2008.

¹⁶⁵ The composition of ANA units is 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Uzbek, 9% Hazari and 13% other. Anthony Davis, "Home-grown army: Afghan National Army," *Janes Defence Weekly*, Dec 12, 2008.

¹⁶⁶ CSTC-A, "Reforming the Culture of the Afghan National Police," *The Enduring Ledger*, Jan 2009, <http://www.cstc-a.com/News/enduring%20ledgers/2009endledger/January2009EL.pdf>, accessed Feb 9, 2009.

Afghan presence in much of the southern border regions.¹⁶⁷ Without a pervasive presence, it is extremely difficult to build a network of informers.

The use of pseudo-operations to obtain HUMINT in the contemporary Afghan environment also appears impractical and unethical. The availability of mobile and satellite phones would allow the Taliban to verify the legitimacy of other units, reducing the counterinsurgents' ability to deceive. A comparison between the Taliban and the Rhodesian insurgents can only be subjective and generalist, but given thirty years of conflict in Afghanistan involving superpower protagonists, it would suggest better organisation amongst the former. More organised units prove more difficult to deceive. Finally, the brutality of the Taliban might require pseudo-gangs to emulate similar acts to pass muster as real insurgents. The illegality of such actions is unacceptable to the Coalition and furthermore risks undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan Government.

In-depth interdiction using intelligence cued airmobile forces appears to make best use of limited resources to control the Afghan-Pakistan border. The absence of discrete insurgent lines of communication necessitates the requirement for HUMINT to find the insurgents amongst the population. The lack of Coalition and Afghan forces in the border regions, the nascent police capabilities and the ethical problems associated with pseudo-operations hinders the development of HUMINT and the efficiency of interdiction. Over time, the availability of intelligence and the effectiveness of interdiction are likely to increase.

¹⁶⁷ In Helmand province, Afghan Government control extends only as far south as Garmsir, approximately eighty kilometres from the Pakistan border. Laurent Hamida, "Afghan Border Police on Patrol with U.S. Marines," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestcrisis/idUSISL65655?sp=true>, accessed Feb 9, 2009. Control in Nimruz Province is limited to a small area around Delaram in the Northeast, whilst forces in Kandahar province are restricted to the main border crossing at Spin Boldak.

VI. Conclusion

This thesis claimed that traditional methods of border security, even with the use of modern technology, are not applicable to the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan frontier and consequently a high degree of border control is unachievable. Furthermore, attempts at obtaining such control would prove counterproductive to the counterinsurgency. The traditional methods of border security include physical barriers, population resettlement, external action, tribal or auxiliary forces and in-depth interdiction. Although not the subject of this research, most of these methods have a broader application within a counterinsurgency strategy. This study examined the use of these methods in three historical counterinsurgencies and applied the lessons to the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan border.

This study found that barriers and population resettlement are both impractical and inappropriate for the Afghan-Pakistan border. The former incurs significant personnel requirements, whilst the unpopularity of both would prove detrimental to stabilisation efforts. The three remaining security measures have varying degrees of relevance. External action risks the loss of support from Pakistan, further destabilising the country and escalating the conflict. Nonetheless, it delivers tactical success and somewhat forces Pakistan to combat the Afghan Taliban in its border regions. Tribal forces have utility in a broader counterinsurgency strategy, but in order to be effective they require considerable investment and close control. The current and prospective resource limitations and force lay down do not provide these conditions along the Afghan frontier. Tribal forces have no immediate application for border security in Afghanistan. Finally, in-depth interdiction presents no adverse consequences and makes best use of limited

resources. A lack of intelligence, specifically HUMINT, is likely to limit the effectiveness of interdiction for the immediate future.

This analysis has been unable to prove that traditional methods of border security are not applicable for use along the contemporary Afghan-Pakistan border. Significant elements of these methods, not least in-depth interdiction, seem to be valid. Limitations with the employment and effectiveness of these methods demonstrate that a high degree of border control is unachievable. Acceptance of this premise allows for a rejection of calls to concentrate efforts on border security as part of a future strategy. Instead, these findings support the premise that border security, primarily using interdiction and limited external action, should remain an economy of effort in the counterinsurgency. Interdiction and external action create uncertainty, cause attrition amongst the Taliban, and are compatible with limited resources.

The rejection of a greater and immediate focus on the border allows for more investment in the current strategy. A deepening of control within existing areas followed by a gradual geographic expansion extends the writ of the Afghan Government towards the border in a supportable manner. This *inside-out* approach secures the major population centres and over time reduces the logistics of operating along the border. In conjunction, the Pakistan Security Development Plan and Comprehensive Approach towards the FATA seek to create a secure environment, squeezing Taliban sanctuaries on the other side of the border. The combination of these efforts is a reduction of ungoverned space and insurgent sanctuaries without the division and incitement of the Pushtun population. This offers a continuity of strategy and the ability to build on existing programmes.

In summary, a number of traditional methods of border security remain viable, but they are unlikely to achieve a high level of border security along the Afghan-Pakistan border. This study recommends that border security remains an economy of effort and that the Coalition focuses on increasing the level of control and stability within the interior of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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