


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ARMED FORCES

A Monthly Journal devoted to Defence matters

March 1981

75 cents
(Excl. GST.)



- What is communism?
- Will the U.S. meet RSA's Maritime Defence needs.
- "Incidents" of Rhodesia's War.

ARMED FORCES

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Cover Picture: A Buffel in the Operational Area
Photo by: H.R. Heitman

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EDITORIAL:

In this issue of Armed Forces we carry three articles that cover a very broad spectrum and recommend them to our readers.

- The four opinions on 'What is communism', each article takes a different approach but each concludes with the same opinion. Communism can be defeated!
- Dr S. Monick digs deep into the recent Rhodesian War and lifts the curtain on some of the background events that took place during those years. His article is intended to show what went wrong and how not to commit the same errors in the future.
- Mkaradzi Mine. The second in the series of "Contact Reports" from the same war but written on a Soldier to Soldier basis. As far as we know this is the first time that a series of this nature about incidents that took place in Rhodesia has been published and the writer hopes that the article will prove to be both of interest and value to our readers. We think they will.

The arrest, trial and subsequent conviction for murder of Second Lieutenant Jacobus Casparus Botha has been adequately covered in the media, as has the question concerning the methods used by the South African Defence Force for the selection of officers. However, there are two factors that could have been debated that appear to have escaped consideration, both are germane to the trial, and are, contingent to each other. The grave shortage of experienced professional instructors, NCO's and Junior Officers that exists within the South African Defence Force that becomes apparent in training and during the subsequent period of military service of National Servicemen. (A shortage that is the result of poor service conditions, pay, and the rapid expansion that the SADF has had to undertake to meet the current political trends in Southern Africa). The other factor is the trail of events that started at the Kimberley Base and culminated in the actual shooting near Bloemhof. Ammunition was available, in itself irregular, and together with an R1 Rifle was removed from the Base, possibly minor infractions in themselves, but both are acts that were committed.

Is there now a tendency to disregard regulations and is it a syndrome of small omissions that lead to criminal acts?

Are chances being taken in the belief that you will get away with it and in the event of being caught the worst that you can expect is a 'slap across the wrist'.

In our 'Letters' one of our readers poses a similar question.

This raises the question as to whether we are making the maximum use of the Military Police to apply Army Regulations and the MDC. The task of any disciplinary officer is not at any time an enviable job and the Military Policeman needs to be selected for his presence and ability. In these times when permissiveness has become a cult, should not additional attention be given to the Corps of Military Police with the objective of creating an elite unit drawn from the cream of the total available Manpower, that enjoys complete co-operation. It is only with the backing of the whole of the SADF that the 'Red Caps' will be able to perform their function of maintaining discipline.

Photographs of the attack by the SADF on African National Congress terrorists bases in Mozambique have come to hand, some of which are not suitable for publication. However, there is little doubt that they will be, and in fact have been published elsewhere. The photographs, which do not appear to have been retouched, show a South African Soldier's helmet with a Swastika, the German Cross and the words 'Sieg Heil' drawn on the camouflage cover. At the present time this is just about the best type of propaganda that we can supply to our many enemies.

Something must be very wrong if a South African Soldier is allowed to disfigure his uniform with the symbol of the Swastika.

THE EDITOR

MKARADZI MINE

Incidents from the Rhodesian War

In the early days of the Rhodesian War, Mount Darwin-Centenary were synonymous with "where the action was." The little village of Mount Darwin lay near the mountain (grid ref 522358), which had been named supposedly in honour of Charles Darwin the great Naturalist.

Mkaradzi Mine, seven miles south-east of Darwin, is really a misnomer. Way back in the Twenties, the Lonrho Company had milled a few thousand tons of ore, and recovered a little gold. All that remained now, were some prospecting trenches, the caved in shafts and the sands and waste dumps.

The mine simply supplied the District Administration with a reference point – Map Sheet 1631 D3 grid ref 545388 – for the local kraal of nearly 60 inhabitants. Half of these people were children. Their cluster of small thatched huts nestled up against the hill, above the old mine, and near the Nyakaranga Wells, which formed a watering point.

Their life was little different from thousands of other Makorekore in the Chesa District. They kept cattle and goats, grew maize and sorghum, and had a cultivated garden with quite an astonishing array of vegetables. In between the huts were mango and avocado-pear trees. Such a tranquil appearance belied a more sinister disposition. The kraal formed one of many supply bases for a group of Zanu Terrorists.

One evening, as the sun disappeared behind the hills, three women were chatting aimlessly, and crouched round a fire, pre-

These incidents are true – names, dates, places are sometimes changed as the persons involved may not want attention drawn to themselves.

pared the evening meal. Long shadows indicated the coming night. Involuntarily they looked up in surprise as a complete stranger greeted them – no-one had seen his quiet approach to the flickering flames.

At his appearance, all talk ceased – a heavily built African, he wore dark boiler type overalls, which although they could not distinguish the colours, were of dark blue-green flecked in brown. A web-belt with magazine pouches, a small pack on his back, and an old Chinese style combat cap completed his attire – except for one other item. In his right hand he carried an AK 47 assault rifle. His dress, seemed incomplete without any footwear at all – rather like the photographs one sees of Colonial Askari drum and bugle bands in their bare feet.

The stranger, named Ncube, told the women that he would be coming back again in two hours, and further be requiring food for a total of five men. He left as silently as he had arrived.

Trackers of the Rhodesian Security Forces who provided the information that was vital to most follow-up operations.



None of the menfolk were in the village that particular evening. The three women, after a few brief words of consultation, stopped their talking. Two hours was little enough time to prepare the sort of meal those strangers required.

Ten minutes after the two hours were up, Ncube together with another man reappeared. Greetings were exchanged and they nodded approval at the mealie meal, fish, vegetables and local brew which had been prepared. This they carried away in the darkness.

The pattern was repeated another four times over a period of nearly a month. By now the terrorists were well known, and even the children made a great fuss of these people, who seemed to live a harsh existence in the hills.

On this fifth occasion, the headman Shadreck, called Ncube aside, and told him that some friends who had been away for a while, were now back. They were in the same business. Could a meeting be arranged? Ncube expressed doubt, saying he was surprised to hear of another group of Freedom Fighters in the vicinity. He added, that before he brought his men along, he wanted a three way meeting – himself, Shadreck and the leader of the other group. This was agreed, and a meeting organised for two evenings hence.

Ncube crawled like a snake up to the little village to watch. He eventually saw Shadreck talking to a very tall African – who had the unmistakable outline of an RPD machine gun slung across his chest. He studied him carefully, and a smile of recognition flashed momentarily across his lips. The leader of the other group was none other than Levson Sakala – he had spent some time with him at the Lithuli Camp (Phiri's Farms) near Lusaka, and had in fact started to become fairly friendly with him, before their ways parted.

Ncube, carrying his AK 47, went down to the village and shouted greetings to Sakala. The latter puzzled for a moment, looked up, and then laughter – so it was Ncube and his men who were the mystery ones. He certainly had no idea that they were in the area. Very well – a good omen.

Yes, indeed they should bring the boys together. He had 11 men only a little way off. Ncube suggested they meet back here, at the village, as soon as possible.

The headman was most enthusiastic – he overstated his importance to the cause, and said that even now the women were preparing a feast for the Freedom Fighters. No of course not, there were no Rhodesian Police or Army Patrols this side of Darwin.

Ncube went off to fetch his men – Sakala likewise, and the headman turned to the villagers – every bit of beer would have to come out – they were not going to have enough.

Ncube led his men back to the kraal. They didn't go in, but merely waited in the shadows. About fifteen minutes later, Sakala's line of men came up the eastern path. Ncube motioned his group, and they moved to meet them.

Sakala's gang paused, and the men behind the leader peered curiously at the strangers they had been told about. Two of them came up and stood alongside Sakala.

Ncube moved slowly forward. For what seemed like an eternity the whole world stood still.

Sakala put one hand onto the wooden butt of his RPD – did he sense something wrong with these men in front of him at three paces distance.

A grenade arched over, thrown by the last man in Ncube's group of five, and burst in a brilliant flash of light. Ncube stepped to his left, and the second man behind him, Lionel van Heerden knelt down and pressed the trigger of his AK. He swung the muzzle from left to right across the chests of the three men standing in front of him. While he did this, he was only conscious of, and kept his eyes on the drum magazine of Sakala's RPD. The three front men collapsed in the hail of lead.

The other members of Ncube's group tossed more grenades down the path ahead of them, emptied their magazines into the darkness, and dropped flat – changed their magazines, and then springing to their feet disappeared up the hill. The screams of the injured and the yells from the men at the rear of Sakala's file, filled their ears.

They retreated 400 yards up the hill, to where their packs and the A 60 radio were hidden in some rocks.

“Mount Darwin base – this is Zebra Two – contact at our rendezvous – anticipate at least one charlie tango dead, others wounded – request sticks for follow-up at first light”. (charlie tango – communist terrorists)

Support Commando, 1 RLI, the standby force at Mount Darwin received their orders in fifteen minutes. Thirty men piled into their trucks – two members of the Tracker Combat Unit accompanied them. A constable from Police was also woken up – about the only person on hand who knew the Mkaradzi Mine kraal.

Morning revealed the result of the night's activities. Three dead bodies, including Sakala's, lay on or just off the pathway, where they had died in the withering gunfire. From the front of their clothing, one could hardly see where the bullets had gone in or how they had died. On turning them over, it was a different story. Sakala himself had collected one bullet through his spine – a three inch hole out of which spewed an unidentifiable mass of blood and bone.

Strange that there was no-one at all in the village – only the chickens pecking about, and the inevitable yelping dogs. The locals themselves intended leaving in a hurry. Half packed suitcases were strewn about, but they had given up the hopeless task of trying to make such an organised mid-night move. They had merely fled the scene.

The trackers scouted round and gave their assessment of the situation. They discovered a fourth body some 60 yards down the path, and affirmed that at least another two terrorists had been wounded – one of them particularly badly. The latter was losing large quantities of blood, and walking between two of his comrades. Other members of the gang had presumably suffered various burns and shrapnel wounds.

The RLI followed the spoor for nearly two miles to the terrorists' hideaway – a well camouflaged position in a thicket. They recovered an arms cache. It seemed that once the gang survivors had arrived back there, they stayed for about an hour – presumably discussing their future course of action. During this time too, they made a stretcher for the badly wounded man and he had been carried off.

Despite further intensive searches for tracks and sweeps of the area, nothing more was found, and the RLI returned to Darwin that evening, disappointed and tired. For them it had been another lemon. (waste of time)

Sequel to this contact. Another loss to the gang was the member standing nearest the point where the first grenade exploded. Somehow he received no injury, apart from severe concussion from the blast. No-one would ever know how he travelled, but at 6 a.m. the morning after the contact, he was 20 miles away, in a complete daze, and walking along the main Darwin-Rusambo road. He couldn't speak, and with his SKS slung over his shoulder, looked fixedly ahead of him. A South African Police patrol took him into custody – heartened by their first success in a three month border stint.

The wounded terrorist did die, and his body was buried in a shallow grave. This was only revealed some six months later, when one of the two stretcher bearers was caught and retraced the evening's event for the Special Branch Investigation team.

The value of pseudo-terrorist groups had been demonstrated in the Kenyan Mau Mau Campaign from 1955-58. Both Ian Henderson in his book “The Hunt for Kimathi”, and Frank Kitson “Gangs and Counter Gangs” – showed how, only through the use of terrorists who changes sides to the Government Forces, and white men who had grown up and spent their lives speaking and living with the Kikuyu, and dressed as Africans, were the remnants of the Aberdare Forest gangs eliminated.

It is a facet of warfare calling for great calm and cool courage in moments of crisis. In fact one of Ncube's-van Heerden's gallant group ran off back to Darwin Military Camp, the moment the contact was initiated. There he was, very lucky not to be shot by the gate guards, because of his attire.

The Rhodesian War.

The war of the Zambezi Salient: the Portuguese and Rhodesian responses to insurgency.

By S. Monick, OLJ, MA, PhD, ALA, FSA (Scot.), FRSA.

In this continuation of his analysis of the Rhodesian War, Dr. Monick covers areas that have up till now been ignored by writers on the subject. As he writes "It is the writer's contention that the Rhodesian conflict has never been objectively analysed; or, indeed, properly understood". This three part article will throw a great deal of light on what is not generally known about the Rhodesian conflict and will also provide an insight to what actually took place, manoeuvres often hidden from the public at large.

In the first part of this study (1), divided into two sections, the insurgencies within the Zambezi salient – as appertaining to both Rhodesia and the Portuguese Lusophone provinces – were compared according to a universalized pattern. In other words, the Rhodesian and Portuguese insurgencies (within both Africa and metropolitan Portugal) were discussed in the light of common determinants shared with insurrectionary movements in other parts of the world; more specifically, the extent to which all insurgencies – including Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola – manifested important aspects of both interior and exterior manoeuvre. It will have been observed that Rhodesia has remained somewhat in the background of the discussion in the first part. In so far as the wars of the Zambezi salient have been included in the generalized discussion in Part 1, the focus has tended to remain on the Portuguese African provinces and metropolitan Portugal. In this part it is hoped to rectify this imbalance by focusing the discussion preponderantly upon Rhodesia. The paper is divided into 3 sections. Sections A and B are concerned almost entirely with the Rhodesian conflict. Section C reverts to a more universalized approach, as it endeavours to illustrate how the Rhodesian conflict vindicates important general characteristics of both insurgent movements and the responses to them. The discussion of the Rhodesian insurgency is largely concerned with the years 1965-76; the years in which the white government sought to maintain its control of society in the face of the insurgent assault. (However, the period 1976-1979 is also discussed.) The memory of this conflict appears to be already fading. This is a most paradoxical state of affairs, in so far as the implications of the white defeat may well have the most far reaching and profound implications for South Africa, as was discussed in the first part. It is the writer's contention that the Rhodesian conflict has never been objectively analyzed; or, indeed, properly understood.

SECTION A

The former Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, repeatedly stated during January, 1979 and late 1978 that victory against the insurgent forces was impossible; the terrorist offensive, it was argued, could be contained only, never conquered. Certainly, the events of late 1978 and early 1979 appeared to confirm this prognosis. The serious restrictions upon movement expressed in escorted convoys was extended to the third dimension as a result of the shooting down of two Viscount airliners on 3 September, 1978 and 12 February, 1979. Similarly, the destruction of oil refinery tanks in Salisbury on 11 December, 1978 and the mortaring of Salisbury airfield on 20 February, 1979, powerfully suggested terrorist penetration encircling the

cities. It is the purpose of Sections A and B of this paper to probe the reasons for this failure to conquer insurgency. One may justifiably argue that the factors usually attributed as the source of this failure are of less significance than more fundamental, and subtle factors. It is commonly argued that defeat could not have been averted in view of:- the almost insuperable problems involved in policing hostile terrain which so readily lends itself to evasion; the presence of extensive training bases in Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania, injecting a constant stream of infiltrators along an increasingly vulnerable frontier; the political isolation of Rhodesia which crippled the flow of essential raw materials; above all, the extremely limited manpower resources available to a small white population of only a quarter-of-a-million. However, the central theme of this paper is that such problems – whilst certainly serious – could have been surmounted had an alternative response been adopted at the juncture at which these factors emerged (attendant principally upon the Portuguese collapse in Mozambique). The factors quoted above – centreing upon manpower resources, material and bases – are the results of a predictable response by the society under attack; a response which permits the evolutionary dynamics of insurgency to proceed to the point at which the pressure upon the resources (psychological, social, economic) become insupportable. The question of policing hostile terrain was not an insuperable problem in the 1960s, due to the constant stream of intelligence available to the Rhodesian Security forces. Within such a context, the process of infiltration could be countered with the limited numbers of security personnel available. When the intelligence position deteriorated – the consequence, it is argued, of an altered political stance – then it became necessary to mobilize increasing numbers of the white population. The first decade of insurgency within Rhodesia – originating in the early 1960s – witnessed the successful response to armed infiltration based on extremely limited numbers and, above all, the suppression of the political/administrative nucleus of the insurgent movement. However, during the early 1970s, the response to the insurgent assault pursued the ideal programme prescribed by Mao Tse Tung, and discussed in an earlier paper (2). The society under attack was tempted, and succumbed, to a war of attrition, in which its economic and psychological resources were increasingly drained to the point of exhaustion. During the first phase of the insurgency, in the 1960s, the strength of the Rhodesian response lay as much in the volunteer, militia, para-military commitment as in the regular armed forces. Intensifying military commitments during the 1970s, with resultant violent and traumatic disruption of the socio-economic fabric (delicately balanced due to the combined effects of a small white population and economic sanctions) eroded the enthusiasm implicit in the volunteer commitment.

The Maoist programme was particularly relevant in Rhodesia's instance, as the climate of sanctions had imposed the overriding necessity to conserve and husband its resources. This programme was compounded and facilitated by two other important characteristics of insurgency. First, the directing civil/political/administrative apparatus of the insurgency forces was permitted to enhance its credibility; and, secondly, the terrorist assault received a tremendous psychological initiative from the failure of confidence in the ideological programme which had motivated UDI (independence founded upon resistance to black majority rule). This lack of confidence was expressed in increasing modifications within the political-social fabric, with the avowed objective of creating a "climate of negotiation". The escalation of terrorism which accompanied such a programme (the ultimate and inevitable consequence of which was the acceptance of majority rule) is certainly not coincidental. As will be discussed in Section C, within the contexts of Aden and Ulster, concession to the avowed insurgent political programme will intensify the terrorist offensive, in view of the encouragement

been removed. This part of Africa can only be defended from this part of Africa and at present there are large gaps in the region's area of Maritime Defence. In the past South Africa has tried to obtain tailor made defence equipment and has accepted the long delays that are involved in the planning and building of maritime equipment. During the years of waiting political pressures were generated against the suppliers with the net result that the contractors and their government wshed on their agreements and the South African Navy and the Republic have been left holding an empty sack. Due to these actions fleet planning has had to be revised and the SAN has had to accept the planning role of an inshore navy using small vessels. Apart from leaving vast areas of sea wide open, the change over to small ships has had an adverse effect on the Navy by reducing the chances of sea commands for middle and higher ranking officers and restricting them to the prospects of sailing a desk in Pretoria.

Now Moscow and the Soviet Navy has opened the door for Pretoria to press for the urgent need to strengthen the South African Navy, as a matter of extreme urgency. The ships needed to meet this requirement are afloat and in Commission with the United States Navy, there is no other source of supply.* After previous experiences, to place orders for a long term foreign building programme can not be done. The only answer is for the Navy to accept ready-made ships and effect any necessary alterations and additions in the shipyards of the Republic. The cancelled French A69 type Destroyer Escorts could well be replaced with the US Patrol Frigates made by Bath Iron works, who in a single contract built 18 of this class for the USN. The supply of conventional submarines with the switch to Nuclear power by the US does pose a problem but there are still some of the older boats available. Normally navies do not like to take over second-hand equipment and when they do often carry on like a youngster with his first car tarting it up and adding additional equipment while the vessels spend months or even years in a shipyard, but this is an instance when the priority is urgency. Our shipyards are

quite able to change or add missile and communications systems if absolutely necessary, while we develop our existing building capacity. Maritime specialists are of the opinion that the minimum additions that the SAN needs to bring its fleet to a strength to be able to meet the Republic's needs are two submarines (if available) and five Destroyer Escorts to add to the remaining 3 Frigates of the SAN which apart from the 3 Daphne class submarines and the logistical ship Tafelberg are the only deep water ships left to the Navy. No doubt local production of the Minister class Missile Boats will continue but in themselves they are no answer to the Soviet actions in the seas touching the Republic.

**It has been reported the British Navy is to sell or breakup 6 of its Tribal class frigates as part of the recent defence cuts.*


The Soviet Navy has a number of ships operating in the Indian Ocean. This photograph is of the 40 000 ton Kiev. The Kiev is one of a class of three ships designed as a helicopter and VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) carrier. Although this class has an angled flight deck of 185 metres they are not expected to be equipped with conventional aircraft but VTOL's. The ships are carrying 10 Forger (VTOL) aircraft and 25 Kamov-25 helicopters. The Kiev is heavily armed with various missile systems and can reach a speed in excess of 30 kts.



Which it receives that the process of psychological-economic attrition is bearing fruit. Hence, oft reiterated statements by white Rhodesians expressing amazement that escalating white concessions were only paralleled by escalating terrorism simply reflect a total ignorance concerning the nature of insurgency. (Such statements are usually attendant upon comments by white politicians within Rhodesia, to the effect that terrorism must inevitably cease once their white opponents have totally abdicated power.)

One may thus observe that the "raison d'être" of the insurgency forces' success, propounded by their apologists, is based upon essentially false premises. There is no concept of "inevitability" implicit in either the successes of the PAIGC, FRELIMO, the MPLA, or the Patriotic Front. This becomes apparent when one examines the progress of these forces in the decade following Macmillan's sinister "Winds of change" speech of 1960 (sinister in so far as it implied Western support for anti-white movements in Southern Africa). However, for over a decade such movements exercised virtually no impact whatsoever upon the power structures in South Africa, SWA, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola. Throughout the areas under attack, resistance was both futile and exile based. The insurgency forces in

the Portuguese territories failed to exercise any serious impact upon either Portugal's determination to retain the territories, or upon Portuguese society's attitude towards the wars (i.e. the central and fundamental psychological assault failed). South Africa's security apparatus destroyed the essential political and administrative nucleus of insurgency. In Rhodesia, ostensibly the most vulnerable of all, with a tiny European population and with an active and articulate African opposition, internal subversion was eradicated, compelling the nationalists to pursue the "war of liberation" from exiled bases. The 1970s, however, present a marked contrast to this situation. With reference to Rhodesia and the former Portuguese territories, the success of the insurgents' assault possesses essentially the same root; the psychological erosion of the society under attack, yielding a profoundly unimaginative military response which fully accorded with the insurgent concept of attrition. In Portugal's instance, the war of attrition generated a dissident factor within the society, centred upon the intelligentsia, which, translated into the armed forces via conscription, provided the revolutionary movement with a power base (cf. Chapter 1, Section 2). In the case of Rhodesia, the war of attrition undermined the social and economic fabric of the society to the point where it could no longer survive. It was this



exhaustion which was a powerful motivating factor in the quest for a political resolution which, it was (vainly) hoped, would nullify the insurgent thrust.

The ensuing discussion will assume the following pattern, in order to elucidate and substantiate the train of thought contained within the introduction:-

(i) The pattern of the Rhodesian response to insurgency in the 1960s, founded upon suppression of the internal apparatus of the insurrectionary forces and selective but aggressive and highly mobile military action.

(ii) The contrasting approach to insurgency during the 1970s, pivoting upon the policy of escalating concessions to the African population and, more specifically, to the political agencies of the insurrection. It is argued that the first major regeneration of the insurgency offensive occurred in 1972, following upon the collapse of the Smith-Home agreement of the year previously; the most important consequence of which was not its collapse but the clear implication that the white administration was prepared to concede eventual majority rule, combined with the proven power of the ANC to veto political developments. These factors lent themselves to the important conclusion that the psychological fabric of the white administration was being eroded, when contrasted with the determined stance following UDI. Insurgency thus received an important incentive to intensify the conflict. This escalation was paralleled by the spiral of white concessions which characterize the years 1974-8; the release from detention, in 1974, of Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo; the acceptance of black majority rule within two years in September, 1976; and the March agreement of 1978 which absorbed Sithole, founder of ZANU, into the governmental structure, thereby reflecting powerful political acknowledgement of an important section of terrorist opinion and foreshadowing universal franchise elections in 1979. This last concession has been paralleled within the military context by the absorption of "reformed" terrorists within the security forces. This policy is simultaneously reflected in the increasing modifications effected within the Rhodesian social fabric in 1971 (culminating in the absorption of the Land Tenure Act in 1976, following upon the recommendations of the Quenet Commission on Racial Discrimination).

It is indeed ironic that South African born Maj Gen J.R.J. Putterill, who commanded the Rhodesian Army from shortly before UDI until his retirement in 1968, in attacking the proposed Constitution (finally promulgated in 1969) for not granting majority rule, stated:-

"By creating this disaffection between the races, as I believe the new constitution would, fertile ground would be prepared for terrorism. At present the armed forces are doing a first-rate job of containing terrorist incursions. But should the African people lose their goodwill towards Europeans and start to harbour terrorists, the forces' job would be immeasurably harder." (3)

The escalation of terrorism, particularly after 1974, does have its roots in the increasing "domiciling" of infiltrators within the midst of the indigenous population, but, it is argued, for precisely opposite reasons to that proposed by Maj Gen Putterill. The process of infiltration into the rural areas owes its impetus to the increasing acceptance of the concept of majority rule by the Rhodesian political administration, lending weight to the political viability of the insurgency forces (despite their manifest weaknesses).

Throughout this study, the political dimension will be analyzed only within a strictly military context; i.e. the extent to which it is related to the success and escalation of the insurgency movement. The particular political motives and pressures which resulted in the concessionary policies adopted is not within the brief of this study. The central determinant of this discussion of the Rhodesian insurgency is to illustrate the extent to which Rhodesia exemplifies the fundamental pressures which stimulate the successful mechanics of insurgency; psychological erosion yielding an intensified terrorist offensive and a resultant war of attrition.

1. The frustration of insurgency: The Rhodesian response in the sixties:

The nationalist movement in central Africa in the 1950s was patterned upon the organization and tactics of the South African

National Congress, but faced a far less adamant opponent in the British, who were in the process of rapidly dismantling their Empire. The African objective as to dismember the Central African Federation, dedicated to bi-racialism rather than majority rule, into three independent African states – Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia). Unwilling to maintain control by force and eager to reduce imperial responsibilities – (the roots of this attitude were discussed in Part 1, Section B) – Britain co-operated, facilitating an unexpectedly swift transition to full independence for Malawi and Zambia. However, the Southern Rhodesians, with constitutional control comparable to Dominion status, desired independence on European terms – not majority rule. Agitation for "Zimbabwe" was thus designed as much to influence London as to intimidate Salisbury. The troubled confrontation led to increasing restraints being placed upon the political instruments of African nationalism; the ANC (African National Council) was banned in 1962, and its successor, the National Democratic Party, in 1961. Its successor, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was banned in 1962 also, together with a number of its leading members. When Nkomo returned in October, 1962, he was restricted. Sithole remained in Dar-es-Salaam and established the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as a wing of ZAPU. The nationalists had essentially created a great protest movement geared to political confrontation that could only be effective against a government such as Great Britain, willing to negotiate. The Rhodesian government might reluctantly be willing to grant certain subsidiary concessions, principally to gain British consent to independence, rather than placate the Africans, but was not willing to accept "real partnership", much less minority status. The African organization might – probably would have been – effective in an area under British control (as it was in Zambia and Malawi), but the Salisbury government was independent in all but name and controlled the entire civil/military apparatus of control. The Africans were not organized to effect a serious insurgency programme, having depended upon "world opinion", British intercession, and ideological commitment by Britain to the "winds of change." Salisbury fully realized, however, that "world opinion" and the "winds of change" were myths, largely manufactured by a leftist news media (as they still are), whilst Britain was antipathetic to the assertion of its authority to the point of physical intervention. Thus, it was not intimidated by the nationalist movement.

The inability of the nationalists to launch a policy of immediate and widespread terror, assassination, and orchestrated chaos was largely due to the profound disunity with their ranks (which persists to this day). Nkomo and other restrictees/detainees were released in 1963, following upon the victory of the Rhodesian Front Party under the leadership of Winston Field. In July, 1963, a group of militants under Sithole broke with Nkomo and the following month formally established ZANU as a separate and alternative party to ZAPU. (Robert Mugabe together with other leading nationalists allied himself with Sithole. Nkomo established the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) as a legal arm of the banned ZAPU. Nationalist loyalties traversed tribal factions and representatives of both ethnic groups subsequently served in the same battle groups. However, as Nkomo's power base resided principally among the Matabele, whilst Sithole's rested primarily among the Mashona, the ZANU-ZAPU schism possessed the character of a tribal dissension. The assumption of ZANU was that ZAPU would wither and die, but it did not. ZANU and the PCC fought out in the streets a bitter battle for domination. The internecine struggle with petrol bombs, intimidation, blackmail and murder lost the support of much of the innocent African population, who were dedicated to the nationalists' objectives, but suffered by their violent means. Neither the PCC nor ZANU emerged triumphant, as the conflict was successfully exploited by the Rhodesian government. In 1964 Ian Smith succeeded to the leadership of the RF, and within days of his taking office, leaders of the PCC and ZANU were detained or restricted, Nkomo being sent to the remote Gonakudzingwa area near the borders with South Africa and Mozambique. Sithole was detained in August, 1964, and on 21 January, 1969 was indicted for conspiring to murder Ian Smith. He was found guilty and sentenced to six years hard labour. In August, 1964 both parties were banned, thus eliminating the remaining African leadership

the country. The nationalists decided to resort to armed struggle, as the only instrument remaining with which to seize power.

Armed infiltration:

In 1964, therefore, with their organization within Rhodesia destroyed, much of the leadership interned, and the African population still unsettled after the year of violence, ZANU-ZAPU had to depend upon infiltrating their increasing number of trained men across the Zambezi river in order to initiate a guerilla campaign. The military wings of the ZANU-ZAPU factions were known as ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) and ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army) respectively. The exile headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia) arranged for military training in sympathetic states. Between January-March, 1965, 54 members of ZANU received training in Ghana. Sent into Rhodesia in May, 1965, 34 were eventually arrested. 76 ZAPU personnel were trained in the period March 1964 – October 1965 in Moscow, Nanking, and Pyonyang (North Korea). At least 24 were arrested soon after they crossed the Rhodesian border. By November, 1965, the Salisbury government could feel confident that both external infiltration and internal subversion were closely controlled. At this juncture both ZANU and ZAPU were substantially and almost solely organized to direct the armed struggle. Moreover, both parties had been recognized by the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam and promised funds. The extensive international contacts of ZANU and ZAPU had gained them not only moral support but offers of aid and training from the radical Arab states (Algeria and the United Arab Republic) and the Communists, both eager to win new African friends and sympathetic to revolution against established power structures in the non-Communist orbit.

The recommended tactics were to infiltrate well trained, well armed personnel across the Zambezi river. The Zambezi border, 500 miles of river interrupted by the vast lake formed by the Kariba Dam, possessed both assets and liabilities as an infiltration route and very serious disadvantages for a guerilla base area. Crossing into Rhodesia was relatively easy and, once having entered the country, the infiltrators were assured, during the rainy season at least, of ample cover in the almost impenetrable bush. Movement, however, was very difficult, the climate appalling, and the steep escarpment complicated further penetration. The area was largely uninhabited and uninhabitable; a wild, inhospitable frontier glacis rather than a friendly ocean for guerilla "fish". Once through the border area into Rhodesia proper, the guerillas were to carry out sabotage, organize local resistance networks, and train a further generation of insurgents. Although the Salisbury government had been alerted by the first wave of infiltrators, the nationalists hoped that swift action in 1966 would gain momentum before the Rhodesian Security Forces could react.

In April, 1966, ZANU opened the campaign by infiltrating several groups across the border. One battle group of 20 betrayed its presence by an unsuccessful sabotage operation, and the Rhodesian Security Forces located the group, claiming to have killed 7. ZANU made extensive counter-claims. Elsewhere, another ZANU group split into three sub-groups. One group killed a European farmer and his wife, but Rhodesian Security Forces killed or captured all 6. The other two sub-groups, totalling 7 men, were captured. Between April and December 1966, the Rhodesian government claimed to have killed or captured approximately 100 ZANU/ZAPU guerillas, almost the total number of infiltrators. The course of events over the following two years followed this pattern. ZANU-ZAPU volunteers were despatched for training, mainly to Tanzania but further afield for the more "promising", slipped back to their base camps in Zambia, and then sent across the Zambezi in variously sized battle groups. The most impressive intrusion was a joint effort of ZAPU and the ANC, linked in a formal alliance, across the Zambezi near Victoria Falls and into the Wankie game park. Fragmentary reports estimated 79 ZAPU-ANC men involved and their losses as 29 killed and 17 captured. (This ZANU-ANC group containing several important leaders, evaded Rhodesian Security Forces for some time, and when contact was made presented stubborn resistance). The Rhodesians consistently claimed that ZANU-ZAPU casualties were very heavy, with few escaping back to Zambia or disappearing inside Rhodesia, and that most ZANU-ZAPU Headquar-

ters insisted that the Rhodesian casualties were far heavier than admitted, that many of the infiltrators reached their objectives and went underground, and that many of the clashes occurred deep within Rhodesia. Disinterested opinion has largely accepted the essence of the Salisbury communiqués, partly because of the public evidence produced during the terrorists' trials.

Infiltration, 1968-70:

Published figures released over several weeks listed ZAPU casualties for the July, 1968 intrusions as 36 killed and 39 captured, although even these may be something of an under-estimate. There was a further intrusion of 14 in August, which resulted in 4 killed and 10 captured. Not until January, 1970, did ZAPU attempt further infiltrations. Random figures published concerning the January-February, 1970 intrusions indicated that in general ZAPU tactics had not significantly altered. By early February Rhodesian sources reported that 12 guerillas and 2 Rhodesians had been killed. An unspecified number of guerillas were claimed as captured, together with arms, ammunition, and equipment. Apparently, during January and February, 1970, the Rhodesians were not as immediately successful in repelling ZAPU infiltrators, but there was no indication that the guerillas were able to maintain coherence or filter substantial numbers through the border defences.

Surveying the period of insurgency which spans the period 1965-70, what conclusions can one arrive at concerning the strength of the insurrectionary movement and the skill of the Rhodesian Security Forces in repelling infiltration?

(i) The insurgency forces in 1970:

At this point in time, it appeared that the insurrection was clearly losing momentum. In a periodical article, J. Bowyer Bell writes: (4)

"... few in the late sixties have seen any reason to support ZANU-ZAPU and in fact have many reasons to oppose them. – (The writer is speaking of the African population's attitude) – The international programme of sanctions, as Salisbury predicted, has harmed the Africans most, not just slowing their economy but stalemating it at a 1965 level while the African population multiplies. Economic security is fragile indeed and not worth risking in a demonstrably lost cause. Secondly, whatever capital the leaders of ZANU-ZAPU once possessed, the internecine struggles of 1963-64 dissipated most of it. Furthermore, the historic tribal bitterness between the Xhosa and Ndebele may well have persuaded the latter that a government of the former would not be more appealing than that of Ian Smith. If ZANU-ZAPU had appeared on the lip of power, the people might have tolerated terror or given their active support; but once Smith came down with the boot, shattered the two organizations and put an end to terror, only the bad memories of violence in a losing cause remained. For most Africans ZANU-ZAPU are a lost and not particularly creditable cause, a real danger to present security and fragile African economic sectors."

In a filmed television interview in London on 1 January, 1970, it was put to ZAPU representative James Chikerema that his followers were faring "very badly indeed". (This comment by the interviewer is all the more noteworthy in so far as it emanates from the BBC, renowned for its leftist pro-insurgency viewpoint, particularly with regard to Southern Africa). After various internal squabbles it became generally known that the ZAPU military wing had deteriorated considerably. There had been many desertions, heavy drinking and, in one of the ZAPU camps (C2), even a serious mutiny. Chikerema admitted to:

"... the depth and height of decay, corruption, nepotism, tribalism, selfishness, and gross irresponsibility on the part of the military administration from top to bottom." (5)

The writer's statement commencing, "If ZANU-ZAPU had appeared on the lip of power ..." is of crucial significance in analyzing the success of the Rhodesian insurgency movement during the 1970s. It points to the central motivating power of all successful insurrectionary forces; viz. the political-administrative nucleus, to which the military wing is subordinated. Throughout the 1970s ZANU-ZAPU-ANC have moved significantly towards

the "lip of power", due to the concessionary policy of the white administration. This increasing political relevance has a profound bearing upon the success of armed infiltration and domination of the rural areas. As the writer further states:

"While most guerillas obviously prefer a sympathetic population, they can operate successfully if simply tolerated. In Rhodesia they are not tolerated but actively opposed; not merely reported to the security forces but attacked. As long as this situation exists, neither ZANU-ZAPU nor any new successor within the country has very promising prospects." (6)

The inter-relationship between political viability and the military facets of infiltration will be expanded below.

(ii) The Rhodesian Security Forces:

By the close of 1968 and largely before, the Rhodesian Security Forces had evolved a most effective anti-insurgency apparatus. Operational control was vested in a committee of senior members of the Army, Air Force, and Police. J. Bowyer Bell further comments:

"Because of the relatively small size of the European population and the long intimacy of the men involved, the formal means of control have been less significant than the unstated organizational chart of friendship and mutual understanding. The police have had far greater control and influence than in most anti-insurgency operations. Many have spent their entire careers in the Special Branch concentrating on the areas of subversion and the detailed knowledge of those concerned is encyclopaedic. Hence the Special Branch, buttressed by Rhodesian Intelligence plays a major and often leading role in operations." (7)

The BSAP had an active strength at this time of 6 400 (one third European), and reserves of 28 500 (three-quarters European), the BSAP Reserve representing a highly dedicated volunteer para-military force. In the 1960s a highly mobile COIN offensive, centring upon intelligence, was necessitated by the extremely limited numbers of the Security Forces. The strength of the BSAP has been commented upon above. In 1970 the Regular Rhodesian Army's frontline combat units comprised a total strength of 3 400; consisting of the RAR (European officers, African NCOs and ranks), the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and the elite tracker unit, the Selous Scouts. The Air Force, numbering some 1200 personnel, had three squadrons of combat aircraft, some reconnaissance and transport aeroplanes, and a squadron of Alouette III helicopters. There were total army reserves of some 4 000. These limited manpower resources militated against the concerted approach evident in Mozambique (centring upon mobile columns). The tendency during this period was to establish areas of control where either the Rhodesia Light Infantry (RLI) or RAR operated in co-operation with the BSAP. Patrols, constant in the border areas, seldom involved more than five or six men who occupied an ambush position at night. With prior information on prospective intruders, a relatively depopulated border area, and the insistence of ZANU-ZAPU in infiltrating substantial numbers of clearly recognizable guerillas, the prospects of infiltration through the defence perimeter were poor at best. To reiterate, the African population were not protective towards the infiltrators, and their discovery – sooner rather than later, even if the patrols did not make contact, was almost certain. After contact, the guerillas fragmented. Hence, good intelligence, skilled patrolling in the field, the nature of the border country, and the co-operation of the population, rendered infiltration all but impossible in column strength and relatively difficult even for single men crossing the frontier illegally.

Moreover, the Southern African Europeans made common cause, in marked contrast to the "liberation movements" of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. (In the 1960s the closest alliance was that between the South African ANC and ZAPU, announced on 17 September, 1960.) In 1967 the South African Police moved into the Victoria Falls area of Rhodesia in order to resist deep penetration. Rhodesians co-operated with the Portuguese within Mozambique. Three-way contact for the purposes of intelligence and analysis were regular. The Rhodesian co-operation with the Portuguese continued until the loss of Mozambique in 1974. By the end of 1972 it had been reported that Rhodesian forces were operating in conjunction with the Portuguese in Tete province. (8) In his

book, "In camera" (9) (the contents of which claim to be extracted from the verbatim reports of his "in camera" trial under the Rhodesian Official Secrets Act), Peter Niesewand claims that a senior Rhodesian official, Mr. John Fleming, (then) Secretary for Law and Order, had conceded at Niesewand's trial that Rhodesian forces were active inside Mozambique. As Michael Morris (10) writes:

"As 1973 progressed it became clear that the Rhodesian/Portuguese co-operation was sweeping each other's quarries into well-prepared hot receptions. A powerful Portuguese drive between Christmas, 1972 and New Year 1973 along the Zambezi above the Cabora border to the Rhodesian border accounted for well over 150 FRELIMO dead and the destruction of much of the infrastructure from which Rhodesian terrorists had been operating southwestwards. Those terrorists Rhodesian and Mozambiquan who were washed across the border in the van of the Rhodesian drive found Rhodesian units carefully placed to receive them."

The interaction between the effects of the Portuguese evacuation and the impact upon the Rhodesian security position reinforces the impression that the subversion of Southern Africa by Communist-inspired insurgency embodies a grand design. The insurgent conquest of Mozambique is significant not only from the viewpoint of the inclusion within the Soviet sphere of influence of vital strategic resources (i.e. the crucial location of Mozambique vis-a-vis the oil route, discussed in Section A of Part 1); but also in so far as it destroyed the concerted bri-partite anti-Communist bloc of southern Africa, which regarded the conflict as essentially political (i.e. as one opposed to Marxist penetration) rather than racial. This concept that the insurgency movements in the Portuguese Lusophone provinces, SWA, SA and Rhodesia are essentially strategic in origin, rather than motivated by any sense of racial injustice (although this *raison d'être* is undoubtedly created by Communist propaganda) is confirmed by the observation that the social structure of the societies under attack were based upon different principles (the greatest dichotomy existing between South Africa and the Portuguese provinces, with Rhodesia representing an ill-defined compromise between the two), yet the insurgent assault is identical in all the areas of attack.

2. The Rhodesian response in the seventies:

By the end of the 1970s the position had undergone a profound transformation. What factors during this period so drastically changed the balance of advantage in the insurgents' favour? The fundamental factors which thus operated in the insurgents' favour are more subtle than those usually cited. The common assumption is that a number of factors rendered the Rhodesian position untenable. However, closer scrutiny of these developments reveals that these within themselves did not precipitate the failure of the Rhodesians to overcome insurgency, but rather the response of the controlling political administration. Smith was fond of invoking "realism" as the fundamental reason for capitulation to majority rule. However, politicians are notorious for creating the "realities" which then justify a particular course of action. In order to clarify and expand this argument, it is necessary to examine the nature of these adverse factors, and the extent to which they reacted upon the strengths and weaknesses of the antagonists in the Rhodesian insurgency.

(i) Portuguese defeat in Mozambique:

The Portuguese capitulation in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau was a most serious development from Rhodesia's viewpoint, particularly with regard to Mozambique. In all three states Marxist governments assumed power (FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola, and the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau). This new factor reacted upon the Rhodesian COIN offensive in two respects. First, the co-operation with the Portuguese which had permitted the pursuit of ZANU infiltrators into Mozambique ended. Second, and of greater significance, a vast segment of Rhodesia's border was exposed to infiltration by a terrorist movement which controlled the government of Mozambique. With regard to the first point, the (then) Portuguese C-in-C in Mozambique, General Basto Machado, stated in January, 1974 that:

"... occasionally and in opportune situations Rhodesian forces may operate in Mozambique when in pursuit of ZANU terrorist bands escaping from Rhodesia and trying to hide in Portuguese territory..." (11)

With regard to the second point, the FRELIMO success necessarily resulted in a new emphasis being placed in the north-eastern area, with regard to guerilla access into Rhodesia. FRELIMO would obviously place the new access routes at the disposal of ZANU. In point of fact, this menace had presented itself in 1972. From approximately mid-June of this year terrorists had been infiltrating into Rhodesia in small groups in the difficult terrain of the north-eastern area with its rugged Mavuradonha (also spelt Matusadona) Mountains. In the vast area to be patrolled these groups had remained undetected by moving backwards and forwards across the densely bushed frontier, establishing arms caches; and by subtle intimidation and propaganda methods, allied with the tactic of utilizing spirit media, were able to achieve a spiritual hold over primitive indigenous blacks scattered in pockets throughout the area. Some of these spirit media were abducted into Mozambique and held until they had been sufficiently intimidated and subverted; others were subverted within Rhodesia. The spiritual hold thus achieved resulted in information being volunteered to neither Security Forces nor District Commissioners. The expulsion of the Portuguese from Mozambique vastly increased the problem, in both a direct and indirect manner. In the direct manner, the infiltrators were now in possession of lines of communication extending through Mozambique into Tanzania. As a result, the manpower resources available to Rhodesia for repelling incursions were most seriously diluted, and the length of border in which the Rhodesian forces were involved was very considerably expanded. In the indirect manner, there was a very considerable incentive, on the part of the insurgent forces, to intensify their infiltration into other border areas, in view of the strains induced by the loss of the Portuguese ally with regard to the Mozambique border, and the correspondingly contracted resources available with which to repel incursions in these other sectors. Thus, between 1972 and 1976, four operational zones were established. "Operation Hurricane" was established in December, 1972, following an attack upon a Centenary farm. "Operation Hurricane" was principally

orientated towards repelling Mozambique-directed infiltration in the north-eastern border area. In 1976 a new operational zone, "Thrasher", was established to cover the Eastern Highlands. Shortly afterwards, the south-eastern portion of the country, through which the vital South African rail link at Beit Bridge passes, was declared an operational zone and code-named "Repulse". Finally, "Tangent", extending the length of the Botswana border and covering, inter-alia, the sensitive Victoria Falls and Wankie regions, came into existence.

(ii) Withdrawal of South African military participation in Rhodesia:

In August, 1975, South Africa withdrew its para-military police from Rhodesia (whence they had first been sent in 1966), although they had, in actual fact, been confined to their bases for some months previously. The Rhodesian security forces thereby suffered a further diminution in strength within the Victoria Falls/Wankie region which, to reiterate, subsequently developed into an operational zone.

At this point, one is compelled to confront the questions: Were these factors insuperable? Do they imply the inevitability of the Rhodesian defeat in the insurgency war? An objective, calculated appraisal of the military situation in 1974 leads one to the conclusion that, whilst certainly serious, the military situation could have been successfully countered by a revised approach. One may, indeed, justifiably argue that the response adopted in 1974 compounded the advantages which the insurgency forces derived from the altered circumstances. It is first necessary to examine the extent to which the situation was actually aggravated by the response of the Rhodesian authorities, and then to suggest alternative solutions. As intimidated above in Section A of Part 1, the Rhodesian response was founded upon two central determinants: an escalating policy of concessions, the result of the pursuit of a "political settlement" as a means of ending the insurgency; and the increasing commitment of manpower resources with which to counter the terrorist infiltration.

(i) The programme of concession:

As commented above, it is revealing that a major regeneration of the insurgent forces occurred in 1972. The date is significant,

A Rapier of the Omani Defence Force. The Rapier system has been in service in Oman since 1976 using the optical system for airfield defence. An order has now been placed for the blindfire Radar which will provide round the clock capability in all weather.



is being the year in which the Smith-Home agreement was rejected. The draft agreement, signed on 24 November, 1971, provided for eventual majority rule on a qualified franchise, with black Parliamentary representation increasing proportionately with the number of qualified voters. Constitutional amendments were to be dependent upon the majority votes of both black and white MPs. After the rejection of the "Tiger" proposals in 1966 and those proposed on "Fearless" (1968), this represented the first Rhodesian acquiescence to the concept of black majority rule. The psychological assault of the insurgents could justifiably be interpreted as bearing fruit. The "Pearce Commission", a 22-member Commission headed by the jurist, Lord Pearce, which was to test the acceptability of the Smith-Home agreement by the African population, permitted the African political opposition to exercise its power in rejecting the proposals. The ANC, under the presidency of Abel Muzorewa of the United Methodist Church, was formed with the specific object of "mobilizing" African opposition to the agreement. Following the rejection of the terms, ZANU established bases in eastern Mozambique, whilst ZAUP extended its network of bases in southern Zambia. Hence, it appears that the insurgent assault received a renewed impetus.

This hypothesis may be substantiated by the decline in the intelligence available to Rhodesian Security Forces after 1972. In the period of the 1960s, as discussed above, the Security Forces had access to intelligence emanating from the indigenous population concerning infiltration. However, in 1972 this vital source of information had disappeared. One commentator felt that even if intimidation and dominance by spirit media could have held the majority in limbo

"surely one man out of the thousand affected would – at some time during the period – have come into contact with a white official into whose ear he could have whispered about the trouble facing his tribe". (12)

Moreover, the terrorists had progressed beyond the phase of successful initial infiltration. As a first step they had secured the establishment, by the indigenous population of the infected zone, of a passive attitude. This provided them with shelter, food, and assistance. From such a basis they moved to the second step. They persuaded a number of tribesmen to become active in their support in the role of porters, intelligence agents, and even recruits. How could such a situation have developed? Why should co-operation have been so forthcoming during the 1960s, when the Rhodesian authorities ruthlessly curtailed the organs of African political opposition, and yet have been so eroded after the same authorities had conceded eventual majority rule? The answer resides in the destruction of the political nucleus of insurgency during the previous decade, contrasted with the first major concession to avowed insurgent motives during 1971. A new political credibility had been bestowed upon ZANU/ZAPU; correspondingly, the authority of the Rhodesian government had been undermined. Whilst knowledge of terrorist movements were forthcoming, small and highly mobile units were sufficient to counter infiltration by a programme of pre-emptive ambushes; the pattern which characterized the 1960s. Where such knowledge was not forthcoming, however, increased numbers were necessary to effect "search and destroy" operations. In the hostile terrain of the Centenary region, the Victoria Falls/Wankie districts, and the north-western border, a group of half-a-dozen infiltrators can elude a company of regulars for weeks. The compliance of the indigenous population, moreover, secures for the infiltrators a shield of evasion and refuge.

The next major phase in the concessionary policy occurred in 1974. Vorster invited Smith to meet him in South Africa in October, 1974. A secret agreement was concluded, the terms of which, announced on Rhodesian television on 11 December, 1974, stipulated that:-

1. The Rhodesian government would convene a constitutional conference on the settlement issue.
2. Detained African leaders would be freed and invited to participate.
3. As a "quid pro quo" terrorism would cease immediately.
4. The released detainees would be permitted to engage in normal political activity.
5. The SA Prime Minister had the support of the governments of Zambia and Tanzania in these arrangements.

Detainees – including Nkomo, Mugabe, and Sithole, were released secretly, thus providing the insurgent forces with a powerful regeneration, in the form of a freed leadership. Hence, from the viewpoint of the insurgent forces, the most important stipulations were 2 and 4. This represented a clear acknowledgement of the political arm of the insurgent forces by the Rhodesian authorities, and thereby considerably enhanced the political and psychological leverage of the former with regard to the indigenous population. By 21 December, 1974, more than 400 of the officially listed 584 detainees had been released, but, predictably, the ceasefire remained unheeded. On 10 January, 1975, Lardner-Burke (then) Minister for Justice, Law and Order, announced that, as the black leaders had failed to stop terrorism, no more detainees would be released "for the time being". (On 4 March, 1975, Sithole was re-detained, an official government statement accusing him of planning the assassination of political opponents. However, the (then) SA Foreign Minister, Hildegard Muller, secured his release.)

Inevitably, the insurgents intensified their offensive. In March, 1976, Ted Sutton-Pryce (then) Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, announced that the war zone had almost doubled in extent since the beginning of 1976, with a sharp increase in terrorist activity since January. 1975 was a year characterized by profound divisions within ZANU and ZAPU, discussed in detail below. However, as these divisions were partially resolved in 1975 (especially with regard to the ZANU leadership), the foundation was laid for a resurgence in insurgent activity in 1976. Official estimates by the military authorities suggested that there were approximately 1500 guerillas in the country in December, 1976, compared with only 50 a year previously. The scale of operations had also altered, as guerillas entered the country in large groups, rather than in twos and threes, operating from bases in Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia. By July, 1976, the southern and western areas of Rhodesia, which had been free from guerilla activity for almost 18 months, once again became subject to attack. An official communique of 21 July announced a resurgence of terrorist action within these areas. On the day previous to the communique there had been grenade attacks in the centre of Salisbury.

In 1976, following his meeting with US Secretary of state Henry Kissinger, Smith announced on television his acceptance of black majority rule (24 September, 1976). He detailed the points of the "Kissinger package deal" as follows:-


1. Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.
2. Representatives of the Rhodesian government will meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with African leaders in order to organize an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented.
3. The interim government shall consist of a Council of State, half of whose members would be black and half white, with a white Chairman without a special vote. The European and African representatives would nominate their own representatives. Its functions will include:- legislation, general supervisory responsibilities and supervising the process of drafting the new constitution. The interim government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister. For the period of the interim government the Minister for Defence and for Law and Order would be white. Decisions of the Council of Ministers were to be taken by a two thirds majority, its functions including delegated legislative authority and executive responsibility.
4. The U.K. will enact enabling legislation, for the process to majority rule. Upon enactment of the legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation necessary to the process.
5. Upon enactment of the interim government sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including guerilla warfare, cease.
6. Substantial economic support will be made available to the international community in order to provide assurance to Rhodesians concerning the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organize and finance a major international effort to respond to the economic opportunities of the country and to the effects of the changes taking place.

The torturous fate of this agreement is not the concern of this paper. What is of interest, however, is the impossibility of stipulation 5, concerning the cessation of guerilla activity, being realized. Following the mechanics of insurgency (which will be elucidated in Section C of Pt. 11), it was inevitable that the vast dilution in the

power of the established government be accompanied by a further escalation and intensification of the insurgent offensive. Thus, a security force communique of 18 January, 1977, cited the death toll for the first fortnight of the new year as 57. The escalation of the insurgent offensive precipitated, predictably, a higher casualty rate on both sides, as well as among civilians. Since December, 1972, according to the same source, Security Forces had killed 2 247 insurgents. By 29 March, however, the number of terrorists killed was cited as being 2 717 with 164 killed in that month alone. The communique of 18 January, 1977, quoted Security Force casualties as being 254 (since December, 1972). 1 000 terrorists were reported killed in 1976 alone (excluding the raid into Mozambique in August, 1976, discussed below). 120 members of the Security forces were killed in 1976 alone, in addition to 59 white-civilians and 848 African civilians. It is certainly feasible that the high kill rate of the Security Forces during 1976 had undermined the morale of the insurgents and, even more important, undermined their own strength in the eyes of the indig-

enous population. This factor is evidenced by the increase – in both numbers and ferocity – of the atrocities enacted against the indigenous population; viz. mass-killings of African workers, incidents of cannibalism (representing the breaking of perhaps the most powerful taboos), large scale abduction of school children, etc. However, the important point to bear in mind is that the assault did not decline, and the insurgent presence within Rhodesia was maintained. The conclusion to which an impartial observer is led is that, despite the powerful counter-assault of the COIN forces, the psychological momentum of the insurgents was not decisively shaken. The dilution of European power in 1976, promising considerable further advance towards the “lip of power” must have been a powerful inducement in the maintenance of the psychological equilibrium, despite the erosion effected by the Security Forces.

This series by Dr S. Monick will be continued in the next issue of *Armed Forces*.



A Royal Navy squadron patrolling in the Gulf of Oman prepared to assist British merchant ships in the area. Leading are the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Olmeda (left), Tidepool (right), next come the frigate HMS Apollo and the destroyer HMS Birmingham and behind from left to right are HMS Ardent, the support ship Fort Austin and the frigate HMS Avenger. (Please credit CINC Fleet)