

AN ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT PUBLICATION ON RHODESIA



fire force exposed

the Rhodesian security forces
and their role in defending
white supremacy



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CONTENTS	Page
FOREWORD	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
WHO CONTROLS THE SECURITY FORCES?	2
MILITARY SPENDING	3
MANPOWER FOR THE SECURITY FORCES	5
CONSCRIPTION – WHITES, ASIANS & COLOUREDS	7
CONSCRIPTION – AFRICANS	9
THE ARMY	12
THE SELOUS SCOUTS	17
THE POLICE FORCE	20
THE GUARD FORCE	24
INTERNAL AFFAIRS	25
THE AIR FORCE	26
AIRFIELDS AND AIRSTRIPS	30
MERCENARIES	31
SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES	33
SOUTH AFRICAN COLLABORATION	36
THE RHODESIAN ARMS INDUSTRY	37
CHEMICAL WARFARE	39
RACISM IN THE SECURITY FORCES	40
DISAFFECTION AND DESERTION	42
CONCLUSION	45
Appendix I: ARMS SUPPLIES TO RHODESIA	46
Appendix II: INVENTORY OF RHODESIAN ARMAMENTS	50
Appendix III: RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHOT DOWN BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT	51
Appendix IV: SELECTED PRESS CUTTINGS	52

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FOREWORD

This book is being published at a time of heightening war in Southern Africa. While the future of the people of Zimbabwe is being debated at Lancaster House in London, events are taking place on the ground which, while they receive little coverage in the Western press and media, clearly reveal the aggressive and menacing character of the white supremacist regimes.

In the current discussions on the future of Zimbabwe, there is major division about the process of transition to genuine majority rule. The illegal regime in Salisbury and the British government both insist that the existing Rhodesian security forces should be used to "police" the transitional period. The Patriotic Front, however, has demanded that the transitional period be supervised by an impartial international force, followed by the establishment of an army and police force which genuinely serve the interests of a new and democratic Zimbabwe. In the process of transforming the present war situation to a peaceful society, it is impossible to conceive of

those forces which have upheld the system of white supremacy for so many years being "impartial" in any way.

This book gives details which are crucial to a proper understanding of the Rhodesian situation. It must also be remembered that the Rhodesian forces operate, in effect, as an informal extension of the South African armed forces, both in their repressive role inside Zimbabwe and in the attacks which they repeatedly carry out against the front line states. The retention of these forces will assure South Africa that its interests in the region will be more adequately protected, and that Pretoria will exercise substantial influence and control over the process of change.

Anyone who reads this book cannot but reach the conclusion that no genuine peace is possible without disbanding the existing forces.

Abdul S. Minty
Hon. Secretary,
Anti-Apartheid Movement

INTRODUCTION

In August 1979, Bishop Muzorewa was reminded by a British television interviewer that at the opening of the Geneva constitutional talks nearly three years before, he had delivered a hard-hitting speech in which he had accused the Rhodesian army of conducting a reign of terror and extermination against the rural population of Zimbabwe.

Interviewer: Do you think that's changed now you're head of the security forces?

Muzorewa: I believe it has been customary in the history of decolonisation by the British government, that the forces who were there before are taken by those who come to power. The only thing we must do now, and that I must do now, is (*to ensure*) that they behave in a relationship to the people (*which*) reflects that they are forces of a popularly elected government. And that is what we are doing, that is what I am doing as the head of these forces.

(Taken from a live television interview with Bishop Muzorewa, ITV "Face the Press", 5.8.79)

Bishop Muzorewa's revised opinion of the Rhodesian security forces is perhaps the most dramatic symptom of his decision to abandon the aims and ideals of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and to throw in his lot with the illegal regime. From the time of his entry on to the political stage in 1971, up to and even beyond the Geneva talks, Muzorewa was an outspoken critic of the brutal methods used by the regime's police, army and airforce to suppress popular support for the liberation struggle. But today, he and his colleagues in the "government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" do not simply argue that the security forces have been brought under their control, but that they have somehow undergone a far-reaching change in character and have emerged as a "army of the people", responsive to, and ready to defend, the interests of the Zimbabwean people as a whole. Part of the purpose of this publication is to examine the truth of this claim.

Bishop Muzorewa's present position is not, however, a particularly surprising one, in the light of the role that the Rhodesian security forces have always played in defending the colonial system. From the earliest days of white conquest, Rhodesia enjoyed a significantly different status from that of Britain's other African colonies, in that the white settlers were able to build up and control their own police, army and airforce. As such, the security forces have always been the guarantee of white power and privilege. For decades they have been responsible for enforcing a mass of racist and exploitative laws and practices, and for suppressing African opposition to colonial rule, both through peaceful means and in recent years through the armed liberation struggle.

They have committed crimes in clear contravention of the Geneva Conventions on the international laws of war, and against all basic tenets of human rights. (*See for example the publications of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia*).

The fact that the Salisbury regime, by mounting bombing raids and commando strikes, is today able to bully and intimidate the population not only of Zimbabwe but of the front line states, owes much to decisions which were taken by the British government at the time of the break-up of the Central African Federation in 1963. During the period of the Federation, responsibility for the defence of the three territories (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia — now Zambia, and Nyasaland — now Malawi) was exercised by the Federal government. The Rhodesian Light Infantry, for example, now the main all-white unit within the Rhodesian army, started life in 1961 as a Federal force deployed on Zambia's northern border (*see THE ARMY*). In June 1963, a conference convened by the British government at Victoria Falls to plan and implement the dissolution of the Federation formally decided that when the Federal government ceased to exercise responsibility for defence, the position should revert to that which obtained before 1953 — i.e. when Southern Rhodesia had responsibility for its own defence and Britain had operational control of the forces in the other territories. In practice, however, and in consequence of subsequent manoeuvres in Salisbury involving British and Southern Rhodesian government officials, most of the Federal forces were handed over to the white Rhodesian settlers.

This deal, under which powerful and well-equipped military forces were handed over lock, stock and barrel to a government which was clearly committed to white supremacy and racist exploitation, provoked a storm of protest internationally. The arrangements meant that the white settlers ended up with much more than they had originally put into the Federal defence pool. The Federal air force, in particular, comprising Canberra bombers, Hunter fighters and Alouette helicopters, was one of the most advanced in Africa at the time. The widespread concern that these forces would be used not only to suppress the Zimbabwean population but also to terrorize neighbouring states was expressed in a Security Council resolution of 13 September 1963 calling upon Britain "not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia the armed forces and aircraft as envisaged by the Central Africa conference of 1963". In response, Britain used its Security Council veto for the first time since the Suez crisis in 1956 — thereby also rejecting a Security Council appeal not to transfer to the white settlers "any powers or attributes of sovereignty until the establishment of a government

fully representative of all the inhabitants of the colony". The British permanent representative at the United Nations denied that the situation in Southern Rhodesia represented "a threat to peace and security" and dismissed fears about the use to which the white settlers would put their air force as "irrelevant, untrue and wildest flights of the imagination". He also assured the Security Council that the British government would retain control of the use of Southern Rhodesia's forces outside the frontiers of Zimbabwe for as long as Britain's responsibility in relation to Southern Rhodesia remained unchanged. (*Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, Croom Helm 1978, pp. 15-16*). In practice, events have proved the majority of United Nations member states right, and the Rhodesian security forces, strengthened through regular sanctions-busting injections of military hardware and spares, have developed to a point where they are now violating international borders on a daily basis.

The role of the Rhodesian security forces has not essentially changed under the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978. Bishop Muzorewa and those other African personalities who have been coopted into the regime are well aware that military superiority remains crucial to their survival. For this reason, it continues to be safe to assume, as the Anti-Apartheid Movement pointed out in 1978, that "if there is any area in which the regime will not be prepared to compromise it is that of its security forces". (*Guardians of White Power - The Rhodesian Security Forces, AAM, 1978*)

In that publication, the Anti-Apartheid Movement attempted to present the first comprehensive and factual account of the composition, character and strengths of the different units which go to make up the illegal regime's armed forces. The AAM concluded:

Such "cosmetic" changes as have taken place in the Rhodesian security forces, however, can never fully disguise their crucial role in maintaining the white minority in power. In the months to come, and assuming the reported agreement on an 'internal settlement' begins to be put into effect, their function will be to defend and enforce that agreement through terror, intimidation and military might. (*Guardians of White Power, op.cit.*)

The Anti-Apartheid Movement believes that that conclusion has been overwhelmingly vindicated by events. *Fire Force Exposed* is intended to illustrate, through facts and figures, that the security forces perform the same function as they have always done. This is despite a concerted propaganda drive by the regime to convince the world that the leopard has somehow changed its spots, and that the Rhodesian army and its sister units, through the judicious introduction of black faces into the lower echelons of the military hierarchy and a succession of diplomatic statements by the supreme commander Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, now command the trust and respect of the African majority. By their very nature, the Rhodesian security forces as presently constituted and controlled are incapable of playing any role other than a destructive one. They can therefore in no way

be considered to contribute to a genuine transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. For this reason the AAM has always argued that they must be disbanded and the individuals involved brought under the control of democratic forces.

Fire Force Exposed, furthermore, shows how the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978 has been used by the regime to buy time in which to recoup its military strength, and to update and expand its armed forces, particularly the airforce. The regime has, in short, made a concerted bid to become even more destructive, a bid which has been put into effect not only in the increasingly ruthless prosecution of the war against the African population inside Rhodesia, but also in a continuing and systematic wave of attacks against the neighbouring front line states. This aggression, which has been enthusiastically endorsed by Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues, has prompted little or no censure from Britain and the major Western powers. On the contrary, the regime has been actively assisted in its military operations. In a blatant series of sanctions-busting coups, to which the British and US governments have by large turned a blind eye, arms and ammunition, sophisticated military equipment, mercenaries, fighter aircraft and the aviation fuel to fly them, have continued to flow into Rhodesia.

The illegal Salisbury regime, supported as it is by South Africa, is daily violating the peace of the entire region. It continues to pose as serious a threat to human rights and self-determination as ever before. Any attempt to lend credence and recognition to the regime at this stage, particularly by the lifting of United Nations mandatory sanctions, can only lead to a further escalation of the war, with consequent suffering and loss of human life.

WHO CONTROLS THE SECURITY FORCES?

The question of who commands and controls the security forces during any transitional period preceding the granting of full independence, has once again emerged as a crucial issue at the Lancaster House talks. Bishop Muzorewa, having appointed himself as Minister of Defence and Combined Operations as well as Prime Minister, claims to be in ultimate control of the war. In reality, the situation is very different.

Prior to the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978, overall control of the regime's counter-insurgency operations was vested in a War Council presided over by Ian Smith, as Prime Minister. This body, which was set up in September 1976 as a small streamlined group equipped to meet at short notice and to take quick decision, enabled Ian Smith, rather than his administration, to exert considerable influence over the conduct of the war. Besides the Prime Minister, the War Council included the Ministers of Defence, Law and Order and Internal Affairs, and the Commanders of the various security forces. The posts of Minister of Combined Operations (currently held by Bishop Muzorewa) and Commander of Combined Operations (Lieutenant-General Peter Walls) were

created in March 1977 in a drive to streamline the war effort and coordinate civilian with military activity. Under the system of combined operations or Joint Operations Command (JOC), the army takes precedence over the other services and is given priority in the deployment of conscripts.

In March 1978, immediately prior to the induction of the transitional government's Executive Council (comprising Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau), the regime moved to forestall any claim by the black parties to the 'internal settlement' agreement to be represented on the War Council. It announced that the Prime Minister's chairmanship of the War Council was being abolished, and that the Council was being reduced to five members only — the Commander of Combined Operations (who would also take the chair), the Commanders of the Army and the Airforce, the Police Commissioner and the Secretary for Internal Affairs. Such responsibilities as were previously reserved for Cabinet Ministers with seats on the War Council (and which Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole, Chief Chirau and/or their colleagues would otherwise have assumed), were to be delegated to (white) civil servants. In other words, while the War Council remained formally answerable to the Executive Council, Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues were effectively excluded from having any say in military decision making. Ian Smith, on the other hand, who over the years had developed close personal links with the various security force Commanders, was clearly well placed to continue to influence events behind the scenes.

There is little evidence that this position has essentially changed since the coming into force of the new constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Bishop Muzorewa's appointment as Prime Minister and the phasing out of the transitional government arrangements. It is generally well known that under the terms of the 3 March 1978 agreement and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution, the police, army and airforce, like the public service and the judiciary, are to be maintained "in a high state of efficiency and free from political interference" under "independent" commissions comprising senior civil servants and other persons considered to be appropriately experienced and qualified (i.e. excluding the vast majority of blacks). The arrangements are such as to leave effective command and control over all branches of the security forces in white hands for at least the next decade. No person shall be deemed qualified to occupy the post of Commander of the army or airforce, for example, unless he has held the rank of colonel or group captain in the existing security forces, or higher, for at least five years. (*Constitution of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Section 103(2)*)

The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution is somewhat ambiguous on the relationship between Bishop Muzorewa, as Prime Minister, and the various security force Commanders. *Section 103(3)* states that the Prime Minister "may give to a Commander... such general directions of policy with respect to the defence of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as he may consider necessary and that Commander shall comply with such directions or cause them to be complied with"

(*emphasis added*). *Section 103(4)*, however, states that apart from this provision, a commander "shall not, in his command of the branch concerned and in the exercise of his responsibilities and powers in relation thereto, be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority". While Bishop Muzorewa has over the past year reacted with enthusiasm on learning of the security forces' latest raids into neighbouring countries, massacres and so forth, it is evident that he is not consulted in advance about these exploits. Alternatively, he may be informed, but he clearly is not in a position to veto them.

Since the signing of the 'internal settlement' agreement, furthermore, the powers of the police and military vis-a-vis the government have been even further strengthened through the introduction of martial law and its extension to virtually the entire country. Under the martial law regulations, promulgated by the regime in September 1978, the security forces (who are defined so as to include members of private armies and foreign mercenaries), together with other "servants employed to assist the Government", are "vested with full and complete powers and authority to do all things in their judgement proper and necessary for or toward the objective of suppressing and dealing with... hostile actions and for restoring and maintaining good order and public safety". In particular, they are empowered to establish special courts martial entitled to impose the death sentence for political offences, to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely without charge or trial, and to confiscate and destroy property, livestock and food supplies on a mass scale. (*Rhodesia Proclamations Nos 19 and 20 of 1978*)

Bishop Muzorewa has repeatedly claimed, particularly in the context of the Lancaster House talks, that a democratically elected, majority rule government is now in power in Zimbabwe. In reality it is much more accurate to describe the country as being essentially run by a military regime over which there is no political control. In fact, the Muzorewa administration is a subservient part of the white power structure which persists in Rhodesia and which is dominated by the armed forces.

MILITARY SPENDING

The Muzorewa-Smith regime, by its own admission, is spending nearly £¾ million a day on fighting the guerilla war. Defence and security spending have risen dramatically since UDI and have increased more than five-fold since the onset of the current phase of the armed struggle in 1972. Introducing the budget for the financial year 1979-80, the Minister of Finance in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government, Mr. David Smith, stated that the regime's immediate aim was to increase the military superiority of the armed forces. "To this end the budget is unashamedly a war budget", he said. (*BBC Monitoring Service, 28.7.79*)

The regime's estimates of expenditure on defence and security measures for the year to 30 June 1980, as placed before the House of Assembly on 26 July 1979, include the following:-

	1979-80	Rhodesian dollars (Rh\$)	(1978-79)
Defence	212,647,000		(171,047,000)
breaks down into:			
Defence	388,000		
Army	131,043,000		
Air Force	49,300,000		
Guard Force	14,847,000		
Security Force	17,069,000		
Auxiliaries			
British South Africa Police			
Combined Operations	91,114,000		(72,748,000)
(includes the salaries of Commander and Minister, and administration of headquarters)	181,000		(288,000)
Treasury — unallocated reserve			
(set aside for transfer to the appropriate vote as required. 6m of the 9m is earmarked for "security operations", and 3m for "youth and rehabilitation")	9,000,000		(3,495,000)
Transport and Power			
Security at civil airports			
Repair and replacement of government vehicles destroyed in landmine explosions, and mineproofing of others	21,800		(21,000)
Agriculture	4,973,000*		(1,750,000)*
Loans for the purchase of mineproofed vehicles			
Security measures in rural areas	2,350,000		(1)
Internal Affairs	5,842,000		(1)
Protected villages			
Security measures and civil defence	614,700		(1,550,000)
Manpower & Social Affairs	9,301,000		(11,361,500)
Security manpower (call-up)	286,000		(298,900)
Prime Minister			
Special services	3,566,000		(15,507,000)

*In 1978-79 expenditure on this item was spread among a number of Ministries; this largely explains the discrepancy.

These items together amount to a projected expenditure of Rh\$ 339.9 million. (*Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1980, Government Printer, Salisbury*). Other items of expenditure relating to the war are concealed among the regime's figures, for according to the Minister of Finance, the armed struggle is in fact costing a total of Rh\$ 402 million per annum, or Rh\$ 1.1 million a day — about 37% of projected total government expenditure. (*BBC Monitoring Service 28.7.79*) There are certainly other costs which are attributable to the war, for example, that of re-routing imports and exports because of border closures and guerilla attacks; rebuilding roads, bridges, railways, power lines and other strategic targets attacked by guerillas — such as the fuel storage tanks in Salisbury; recruiting mercenaries overseas and so on.

The grant for "special services" under the Prime Minister's Office is believed to cover items such as the operations of Special Branch II of the Rhodesian police — a "dirty tricks" unit, and possibly the Selous Scouts. In 1978-79 it also included Rh\$ 12 million for setting up private armies, or "security force auxiliaries". The 1979-80 allocation, which followed the appointment of Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister, showed a sharp drop to less than 25% of the

previous year's total — a fact which provoked some controversy in the House of Assembly. On being pressed by backbenchers, Bishop Muzorewa disclosed that the budget for security force auxiliaries had been transferred to the Ministry of Defence. (*BBC Monitoring Service 3.9.79*)

Defence and security expenditure are a massive burden on the white Rhodesian economy. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the figures produced by the regime for the estimated cost of the war, and how it is proposed that this should be met, are only a small part of the whole story. In July 1979 the Minister of Finance claimed that the 1979-80 war budget would be paid for by various taxes on the Rhodesian population, but such statements appear patently absurd in the light of the scale and intensity of the regime's aggressive operations. The illegal regime could obviously not have survived until today without massive sanctions-busting loans and grants from various external sources.

According to ZAPU (Patriotic Front):

The war in Rhodesia is costing the Smith regime about two million dollars a day in arms, transport, fuel and other war accessories. By all accounts Rhodesia is bankrupt. National income has fallen a second year running. What the regime's books

now show as income is fictitious. The capital outlay is now made up entirely of international capitalist loans, and heavily mortgaged plant and machinery. . . It has become clear that someone else is paying the war costs. . . South Africa was the first to give loans and also outright grants to Rhodesia. South Africa meets part of these grants by paying its own soldiers serving in the Rhodesian forces. . . **America now pays in kind 23% of war budget.** American money is being brought in in two forms; loans laundered through the CIA, and arms sent through a relay of countries to try to obliterate their trail. It is estimated that the US has made available through the CIA approximately 23% of the Rhodesian war budget. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 6.1.79)

In October 1979 the South African government was said to be funding the Rhodesian war to the tune of £30 million a month, (*Guardian* 6.10.79) Speaking in an interview on British television, a white Rhodesian economist, Eddie Cross, said that 50% of the cost of the war was financed externally. He would not say by whom. (*BBC 2, The Money Programme*, 21.10.79)

MANPOWER FOR THE SECURITY FORCES

The regime's ability to recruit manpower for its security forces has been crucial to the survival of the white supremacist system. In a country in which blacks outnumber whites by 22 to one, it is a problem which the regime has never fully resolved. Smith's military planners have gone to great pains, particularly in the last seven years, to not only increase the numbers in the security forces but to deploy them in the most effective and efficient manner. Top priority in both respects has been given to the infantry and to those in a combatant role. As the war has intensified, men deployed on reserve or rearguard duties

have been shifted directly into combatant positions, both in the police and in the army, while efforts have been made to improve the mobility of infantry units by converting them to paratroop or heliborne divisions.

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, the strengths of the various units within the Rhodesian security forces in July 1979 were as follows:-

Army	
Regulars	6,000
Conscripts and territorials	14,000
Airforce	1,500
British South Africa Police	
Regulars	8,000
Reservists	35,000
Guard Force	3,500
Security Force Auxiliaries	6,000

(*The Military Balance 1979-80*)

(In its 1977-78 edition, *The Military Balance* gave figures for the Army as regulars - 5,000; conscripts (full-time national servicemen) - 3,250; territorials (called up on an intermittent basis) - 55,000; Reserve Holding Unit (men over 38) - 3,000. The figure of 14,000 given in the 1979-80 edition is presumably the number of conscripts and territorials whom the Institute believes are deployed on active service at any one time.)

These figures from the Institute, which might be said to represent a British establishment view of the situation, underestimate the numerical strength of the regime's armed forces in a number of significant ways. A more realistic picture is presented by the estimates in the following table, which has been drawn up on the basis of facts and figures given in subsequent sections of this publication:-

	Whites, Asians & Coloureds	Africans	Total
Regular army			
Rhod. Light Infantry	1,000	-	1,000
Rhod. African Rifles	-	4,000	4,000
Special Air Service	750	-	750
Grey's Scouts	300	150	450
Selous Scouts	300	1,500	1,800
Other*	2,700	not known	2,700
Conscripts	3,250	1,750	5,000
Territorial Force**	58,000	-	58,000
Air Force	1,500	not known	1,500
British South Africa Police			
Regulars	2,500	5,500	8,000
Reservists	32,000	3,000	35,000
Guard Force	500	3,500	4,000
Security Force Auxiliaries	-	20,000	20,000

*includes: Military Police, Rhodesia Women's Service, Rhodesia Intelligence Corps, Corps of Signals, Medical Corps, Education Corps, Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment, Rhodesian Artillery Corps, Pay Corps, Service Corps, Corps of Engineers, Special Intelligence Branch, regular army personnel attached to Territorial Force regiments, and miscellaneous, including Staff Corps.

**includes: Rhodesia Regiment, Rhodesia Defence Regiment, Independent Companies, and territorials serving with regular army units and other units under the umbrella of Combined Operations.

These figures suggest a total potential strength of the regime's armed forces of 142,200 personnel. The experience of the April 1979 elections in Rhodesia shows that the regime is capable of putting a force of around 120,000 men in the field (including private armies), in an emergency, although such a drastic mobilisation could obviously not be sustained for any length of time. (See section below on CONSCRIPTION — WHITES, ASIANS AND COLOURED).

The system of call-ups has put extreme strain not only on the white community as such, but on the military administration. In April 1978 an official committee set up by the regime under the Rhodesian Front chairman Colonel "Mac" Knox to report on call-up procedures and the utilisation of manpower recommended that call-ups be abolished and replaced by a well-paid standing army. In June 1979, the Commander of Combined Operations Lt-General Peter Walls promised that the existing call-up system would be phased out. Whether this reflects genuine official thinking or whether Walls was simply trying to appease white bitterness at call-up obligations, is not clear. In August 1979 however, the Patriotic Front reported that the Muzorewa-Smith regime was implementing a massive mobilization plan with the aim of recruiting more than 70,000 regulars. According to ZAPU (Patriotic Front), "reliable sources in Salisbury reveal that a fierce door-to-door campaign is in process in Salisbury and other major towns to recruit every able-bodied person aged 16-60". (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 25.8.79/1.9.79) Further reports from the Patriotic Front in October 1979 spoke of attempts by the regime to strengthen its army by setting up additional "special army units" to stage attacks on civilian targets in towns and settlements, and against the front line states. According to ZANU (Patriotic Front), "the backbone of these units is staffed with Western mercenaries, armed with a variety of NATO military hardware. . . The Salisbury regime is also reported to be striving hard to raise the numerical strength of its army by forcing in as many African young men as possible". (*BBC Monitoring Service, reporting Voice of Zimbabwe radio from Maputo and Revolutionary Voice of Zimbabwe from Addis Ababa*)

There are in fact a growing number of reports suggesting that the mercenary presence in Rhodesia includes special contingents who are not integrated into the regular units of the Rhodesian army. This appears to apply particularly to Israeli, French and Portuguese nationals. A group of French mercenaries, for example, were reported to be housed in their own barracks, believed to be situated at Bindura, and to have undertaken operations separately from other units. This particular unit was even reputed to have raised the French "Tricolore" every morning alongside the Rhodesian flag. Units such as this do not figure in the table drawn up by the Anti-Apartheid Movement. (See also the section on MERCENARIES)

Also in addition to the figures in this table, employees of a number of departments and ministries which ostensibly have little to do with the security forces, are nevertheless armed and receive training

in weapons drill and anti-ambush procedure, and possibly in counter-insurgency tactics. They include personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (now renamed Ministry of Home Affairs in the government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia), which among other functions is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of protected villages; and workers engaged in road, bridge and airfield construction, and security fencing, in the operational areas.

Thirdly, it is standard practice for white farmers, firms and multinational companies, to employ security guards, often British, American and other overseas mercenaries, as vigilantes on their properties and to ride shotgun on convoys transporting goods. An American mercenary who visited Rhodesia in March 1979 later reported that a "British ex-RLI veteran" had told him that although the RLI was now made up of 50% foreigners, it was better not to join that unit because the Rhodesian officers treated foreign mercenaries "like dirt". Instead, it was preferable to work freelance. According to the American, the Anglo-American Corporation was offering Rh\$1,000 a month for riding shotgun on logging convoys between Melsetter and Umtali. "This doesn't include bonuses each time all vehicles make it through. The convoy boss is an ex-Marine, by the way". (*Soldier of Fortune, July 1979*) The contingent of guards on a white farm typically includes one or several white security supervisors, who oversee locally recruited Africans, who are trained by the police. In July 1977 the legal protection afforded to members of the security forces under the 1975 Indemnity and Compensation Act was extended to white farmers and their employees under a provision of the Emergency Powers Act. In other words such vigilantes enjoy official sanction to shoot and kill in attacks which can subsequently be explained away as in defence of the property they purport to be guarding, and in the knowledge that their victims have no legal redress. Under the martial law regulations promulgated by the regime in September 1978, furthermore, foreign mercenaries and farm guards appear to be included in the definition of those deemed to be "assisting" the security forces and thereby enjoy the same powers to take whatever action they feel to be necessary in defence of "law and order", as the regular police and army. (See also section on MERCENARIES).

Vigilantes and home guards from adjacent farms frequently join together in informal counter-insurgency teams to track down guerilla suspects, in liaison with the local Joint Operations Command. The past few years have seen considerable growth in this area of impromptu military operations. In March 1979, there were for example 15 licensed security organisations in Rhodesia, 10 of them in Salisbury, employing about 5,000 armed guards for supply to private houses, factories, industrial installations etc. (*The Herald* 15.3.79) This compares with a total of 3,500 security guards in service at the beginning of 1978. The increase of 1,500 over the year is likely to include a number of overseas mercenaries who have found this to be a lucrative source of employment. Just to quote one example, a company

called Sectra (Pvt) Ltd of Salisbury advertises itself as recruiting qualified, experienced personnel for armed and defensive tasks in the operational areas, at the request of clients in commerce, industry and the agricultural sector. Personnel may be deployed either on a temporary or a permanent basis, on guard duty, or "leading, training, operating or administering units of trained or semi-trained Africans or Europeans". While Sectra claims that it has no "international connections" its services are advertised within the US mercenary recruiting network. (*Soldier of Fortune*, September 1979)

White Rhodesian farmers and other "civilians" in the rural areas have for a number of years been organized into local militia units or neighbourhood defence units. There are now about 80 separate "defence committees" under the overall umbrella of a National Coordinating Committee comprising representatives of every major agricultural organization in the country. Such "defence committees", made up of local farmers with selected African employees, mount mobile patrols in armoured pick-up trucks or other mine-proofed vehicles, on motorcycles, or on horseback. They maintain quick reaction "sticks" in case of guerilla attacks, or incidents of cattle rustling, and maintain essential services such as water pumping stations, electrical pylons, telephone communications, farm roads etc. The scheme is paid for by government-allocated funds and by levies from farmers in an area, amounting to as much as Rh\$2,500-3,000 per annum. The scheme also provides for outside manpower, or mercenaries, to be brought in and paid to guard homesteads and farm complexes.

In early 1977 a unit known as the Civilian African Tracking Unit (CATU) was set up in liaison with army territorials. This is known to function in the south-east of the country, recruiting local Africans for tracking guerilla suspects, under the control and direction of white farmers. The African trackers are under full army regulations while on duty, and receive a short counter-insurgency training.

White farmers also receive special help from the regime in equipping themselves with weapons and the majority possess substantial private arsenals of rifles, pistols and submachine guns. Their properties are protected with sandbags, floodlights, electrified security fencing, electronic alarms and, increasingly, a variety of lethal homemade or manufactured grenades, booby-traps and other devices designed to be triggered off by intruders. In the event of any guerilla attack, all white residents in an area are "buzzed" over an *Agricalert* radio system through which immediate contact can be made with the local police station and Joint Operations Command.

In fact, virtually every adult white male in Rhodesia — and many females — is armed and capable of shooting to kill. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" is mainly of relevance as a propaganda weapon in the hands of the regime. Permits for guns and ammunition are freely available to whites and few would contemplate travelling far without a weapon at their side. In the cities too it has become common practice for white adults and children to learn how to handle a gun.

With the advent of the 'internal settlement' agreement, this militaristic way of life, and the attitudes that go with it, has inevitably had some effect on the small minority of African businessmen and professionals who are prepared to collaborate with the regime in the hope of sharing the privileged life-style of white Rhodesia. In August 1979 for example, the Minister of Law and Order in Bishop Muzorewa's government, Mr. Francis Zindoga, appealed to all black MPs to join the Police Reserve and work in their local area. (*The Herald* 4.8.79)

White Rhodesia, in other words, is a society that has been completely mobilised for war for many years, and the facts and figures relating to the security forces must be seen in this context.

CONSCRIPTION—WHITES, ASIANS AND COLOURED

Virtually every white, Asian and Coloured male Rhodesian resident, over school age and under 60, who is medically fit, has been given some form of military training by the regime. In contrast with Africans who are conscripted (*see below*), most have been trained for counter-insurgency combat duties, involving direct contact with guerillas or guerilla suspects. The regime has made massive organizational changes to ensure that more and more men are available for fighting roles in infantry units, both in the police and in the army.

("Europeans", Asians and Coloureds are for a number of purposes, including the call-up, all grouped together as "whites" under the regime's system of racial classification. In this publication, "whites" refers to Europeans only. In practice, most Asian and Coloured people in Rhodesia identify with the African population, and see themselves as part of the black majority, rather than with the white settler community).

This position has been reached over a period of many years during which the regime has pursued a consistent and meticulous strategy of gradually widening the call-up obligations to include more and more categories of the country's population. All white, Asian and Coloured boys in Rhodesia are required to register for national service within 30 days of celebrating their sixteenth birthday, and from that time are only allowed to leave the country with special permission from the authorities and after completing special "entry-exit" cards. To ensure that no one escapes the call-up net, the regime has instituted a system of periodic employer returns, whereby firms and businessmen are required to submit full details of their white, Coloured and Asian workers to the Directorate of Security Manpower in Salisbury.

(With the introduction of conscription for Africans, employers have been required to submit details of their African workers as well — *see the section on CONSCRIPTION OF AFRICANS below*)

The demands of the war have put considerable strain on the regime's call-up system. In February 1977 the then Minister of Defence and Coordination, Reginald Cowper, was obliged to resign over the issue

of conscription. The regime's announcement shortly before, that conscription was to be extended to the 38 to 50 age group (many of whom, in the context of their industrial and commercial careers, have played a key role in fighting the regime's sanctions war), brought criticism from the business community to a head. The sight of senior white executives and skilled industrial workers being conscripted for menial tasks in the lower ranks of the armed forces, their talents unrecognised, had aroused considerable resentment. Cowper, for his part, produced figures at the time of his resignation showing that in 1976 alone, some 6,500 people had evaded their call-up commitments by obtaining exemptions and deferments, and that at least 3,000 eligible men were not registered for call-up at all. (*Parliamentary Debates, February 1977*)

Cowper's departure marked a turning point, to which the regime responded by creating a new Ministry of Manpower, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, to be responsible for the implementation of the 1976 National Service Act and the initial military training of all eligible personnel. Responsibility for the call-up was in effect separated from the conduct of the war itself and grouped with that for commerce and industry. The Ministry of Manpower took various measures over the next few months to reorganize the call-up system, streamlining the whole process and closing such loopholes as it could discover.

For purposes of conscription into one of the six arms of the security forces (army, airforce, police, Guard Force, internal Affairs and prison service) the male non-African population is split up into four age-bands as follows:-

- **18-25 year olds:** required to complete 12 months full-time national service, followed by a number of years of "efficient part-time service" as territorials. (Full-time national service was reduced from 18 to 12 months by the regime in October 1978, at the same time as the announcement that certain groups of Africans were to be conscripted. These and other moves came in response to widespread complaints by whites that Africans, who were now able to share in the running of the country through the 'internal settlement', were not pulling their weight in the counter-insurgency war.) While the official age for commencing national service is 18, 17-year-olds may volunteer although they will not (in theory at least) be sent into the bush until they are 18. On completing their year's national service, personnel in this age group are liable to be called up by their various units for periods of several months at a time — and in practice, almost continuously. Most of the men concerned, particularly whites, are deployed in infantry units.
- **25-38 year olds:** Since January 1977, all men in this age group without an existing service commitment have been liable to up to six months' service each year, in the form of six week periods of service alternating with six weeks off. Those who have not previously done national service or had military experience usually receive twelve weeks basic training for the Territorial Army or eight weeks

for the Police Reserve or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In general, to cope with the war's growing demand for infantry power, increasingly large numbers of men in this age group are posted to army units rather than to the police or guard duties in protected villages as in the past.

- **38-50 year olds:** conscription for the over 38's was introduced at the end of February 1977, when a re-registration exercise for this age group got under way. They are liable for at least 10 weeks service a year in periods of two to four weeks at a time. At the time their conscription was announced, the regime indicated that they would not be deployed on active service but would be used for protective duties with the police, Guard Force or Internal Affairs. This undertaking has been abandoned, however, as the war has escalated. Over 38's in the top medical fitness category are now automatically posted to the army. The first batch of 38-50 years was called up in June 1977. 1,000 people in this age group were conscripted into the Police Reserve in the Salisbury area alone and it was expected that in all an extra 12,000 men would be made available for the war effort. Of the first 100 to be called up, five were later reported to have died of heart attacks during training. (*Guardian, 11.1.78*)

- **50-59 year olds:** conscription for this age group was announced in January 1979 as part of the regime's preparations for the April 1979 general elections. The first group due to be called up were men with military experience who had recently turned 50. An official statement explained that they would be used for "short duration static guard duties in urban areas", and would serve a maximum of six weeks per year, mainly part-time. (*Financial Times/Telegraph 13.1.79*) In March 1979 the regime's Ministry of Manpower issued a terse statement, warning all those eligible in this age group to register for national service by 28 March, or face prosecution. In practice many whites over the age of 50, some well into their 60's or 70's, have for a number of years served as part-time reserves in the police, force as home guards, on convoy duty and so on, on a voluntary basis.

It is extremely difficult for white men to avoid doing their stint in the security forces. Exemptions and deferments of service are only granted in the most exceptional circumstances and for a maximum of 90 days per man a year. Conscientious objectors who refuse to respond to their call-up papers are liable to prison terms of several months, followed by conscription on their release. Under the National Service Act of 1976, it is an offence to suggest to anyone that for religious reasons or otherwise they should not undertake national service. Certain categories of persons who in the past were exempt from military service, such as civil servants, MPs, judges, priests and nurses, have also become liable for registration under the terms of this Act, which came into force in September 1976. Under Emergency Regulations introduced in June 1977, it has been made for all practical purposes impossible to avoid military service by challenging a

call-up in a court of law. The authorities have perfected an extremely efficient system for filing information on the men affected from a variety of sources — school, place of work, the national registration scheme under which all residents are being issued with identity cards, and so on — in a central classification scheme. Virtually no loopholes are left. Speaking in August 1977 the regime's Minister of Combined Operations pointed out that "we have pretty well scraped the bottom of the barrel as regards European involvement in our security operations". (*The Herald*, 10.8.77)

Some of the further and increasingly desperate steps taken since that statement to catch the stragglers include:-

- **September 1977:** deferment of national service for university students was abolished. All non-African school leavers intending to enter university or college were required to first complete two years in uniform, with immediate effect. Students already at university were also made liable to call-up. One of the short term effects was to significantly increase the proportion of black students at the University of Rhodesia, a development which caused considerable alarm in white society.
- **September 1977:** all men who had previously been granted continuous exemption from call-up (top civil servants, judges and so on) were made liable to call-up on a part-time basis into the Police Reserve or the urban special constabulary at this time.
- **September 1977:** a bonus scheme was introduced to encourage conscripts deployed in an "operational combat role" and others who had been discharged but who wished to return full-time service to serve for longer than their statutory national service (18 months at this time).
- **November 1977:** the regime's Ministry of Education announced that pupils who had turned 18 by January 1978, who had not by that time acquired at least one "A" level pass, would not be allowed back to school, thereby making these boys liable to national service with immediate effect.
- **January 1978:** deferment of call-up for new immigrants to Rhodesia was reduced from two years, the previous requirement for resident status, to six months.

In April 1979, the regime implemented the biggest mobilization of military manpower in the country's history, with the aim of achieving as high a poll as possible in the general elections due to be held under the 'internal settlement' agreement. On 23 February, Combined Operations Headquarters announced that there would be a special call-up in all sectors of the security forces for the period 12 to 24 April inclusive; in other words, a general mobilization. Virtually all resident white, Asian and Coloured males aged between 18 and 60 and eligible for national service were issued with call-up papers. All leave, exemptions and deferments were cancelled. Visitors to the country reported that no white male was being allowed to leave Rhodesia during the run-up to the elections other than in the most exceptional circum-

stances. Normal day-to-day activities came to a halt. Schools and teachers' colleges were closed throughout the election period as staff and students were called up as part of the drive to mobilize all available manpower. It is estimated that 100,000 personnel were armed and put in the field to "protect" voters — excluding the auxiliary forces or private armies, whose members likewise played a key role in getting voters to the polls. At least two thirds of these 100,000 were whites, Asians and Coloureds. It is quite probable that even 16 and 17 year old whites were conscripted for the election period. According to one Rhodesian press report, even a group of school-children "volunteered and were accepted as Police Specials for the election period". (*Sunday Mail*, 18.4.79)

The gradual extension of conscription to more and more categories of people, and for longer and longer stretches of duty, has undoubtedly been the last straw for many whites. Families have chosen to emigrate rather than see their sons killed in the bush, or their husband's career ruined by constant interruptions and absences.

CONSCRIPTION—AFRICANS

During 1976 the regime began to give active consideration to the possibility of conscripting certain categories of Africans for military service, and provision for this was built into the National Service Act. The prospect of calling up men who might well have friends and relatives in the guerilla camps and be active sympathisers themselves with the armed liberation struggle forced the authorities to proceed with caution, and nothing concrete emerged for nearly a year. Under an amendment to the National Service Act gazetted in August 1977, however, African doctors were made liable for military service, and in October of that year, five doctors were served with notices of intention to call them up. Following this, in February 1978, the Ministry of Manpower announced that all African trade apprentices who had entered into contracts on or after 1 November 1977 would be required to register for national service. About 220 apprentices were affected by this move. (*The Herald*, 10.2.78)

Politically, the conscription of Africans is an explosive issue. The Smith regime has always used the existence of black regular troops in the Rhodesian army and the British South Africa Police (i.e. Africans who have "volunteered" for military service) as evidence that the liberation struggle does not command the support of the African majority. During the months preceding the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978 recruiting of African volunteers for the regular forces was considerably stepped up and reports appeared in Rhodesian, South African and British newspapers of "queues" of volunteers at military camps and of their keenness to fight the "terrorists".

A minority of press and media reports, however, hinted at the pressures involved. In a country where a high rate of African unemployment and under-employment has always been an endemic feature of

the white supremacist economy, the incentive of a relatively well-paid, relatively secure job has always been a powerful incentive to Africans to join the security forces. But apart from this, evidence towards the end of 1977 and beginning of 1978 indicated that local chiefs and headmen in the Tribal Trust Lands (all of whom are appointed and paid by the regime and have powers of arrest, trial and imprisonment), were increasingly involved in mobilising Africans for the security forces. A strong element of press-ganging was appearing. According to a report in December 1977 for example, "young African men with urban jobs need a detailed letter from their employer to avoid being coopted into the depleted labour forces of the District Commissioner (i.e. the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose African employees include armed guards at protected villages) while on leave in the rural areas. There are few African males of fighting age left in the reserves and those need to be able to show to either side, a very good reason for being there". (*Guardian*, 23.12.77)

A member of the Selous Scouts captured by the forces of ZANU (Patriotic Front) made the following statement to the liberation movement's publication *Zimbabwe News*. The Scout revealed that 40 grade seven pupils of Musamondo primary school in Gatooma were "visited" by representatives of the security forces as part of a publicity exercise. After several of the students voiced dissatisfaction, with some comments made by the security force members, they were all loaded into a truck at gunpoint and driven to barracks near Bulawayo. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 3.2.78)

Since the 3 March 1978 agreement, plans have been pushed ahead by the regime to conscript wider categories of Africans, culminating in the new National Service Act of April 1979. This has in effect made national service compulsory for members of all races who have at least three years schooling, or who have attained an apprenticeship contract at any time in their lives.

The reaction to these moves by Africans illustrates the depth of hostility and bitterness on the part of the black majority towards an army and a police force to which they owe no allegiance and which, more than any other institution, epitomises the white supremacist system. A careful examination of events which, over the past eighteen months to two years, have received little or no coverage in the British and overseas press, makes nonsense of the internal settlement leaders' propaganda claims.

In June 1978, for example, 70 African apprentices sent a letter to the Minister of Manpower, Rowan Cronje, explaining that they would rather face prison than do national service, under any circumstances. 33 African doctors at Mpilo and Harare hospitals affected by call-up moves, sent a letter to the Prime Minister's office, stating that they were refusing to be conscripted because they did not believe that the security forces were representative of the people of Zimbabwe. They threatened to resign their practices forthwith. (*Zimbabwe Times* 28.6.78) A few days later two African doctors at Mpilo Hospital who had refused to leave the Bulawayo area to carry out their national service obligations were sacked by the hospital.

Following these events, the issue flared. School children from many schools, aware that conscription for them was only a matter of time, began organising meetings, demonstrations and marches. Between 27 and 31 August 1978 alone, students from Goromonzi High School, St. Ignatius College (Chisa-washa Tribal Trust Land), Gokomare secondary school (Fort Victoria) and Bernard Mizeke College (Marandellas), marched on nearby towns, protesting against conscription for Africans. In all, about 500 students were involved.

Their fears were confirmed in September 1978, when the Executive Council announced its intention to conscript blacks for military service on the same basis as whites — a move which would affect about one million African. The then chairman of the Executive Council, Rev. Sithole, stated that "it was the unanimous feeling of the transitional government that blacks must accept a major role in defending the agreement which confers power on them". (*The Herald* 16.9.78) Later in October, it was revealed that initially only those African males between the ages of 18 and 25 who had completed at least three years secondary schooling, or who had entered into an apprenticeship contract on or before 1 April 78 would be subject to one year's national service as of 1 January 1979. (*The Herald* 21.10.78/28.10.78). About 25,000 young men were affected by this move.

Prompted by these announcements, country-wide demonstrations were held, involving thousands of students affected by the move. The University College of Rhodesia (UCR), commercial colleges and high schools rapidly mobilised to fight moves to conscript students. Almost every student at the UCR, including whites, signed a petition rejecting moves to call up Africans. Within hours of the call-up announcements 500 students demonstrated at the University. Esmael Chatikobo, leader of the students' union, declared that they would not be called-up, even "under force of death". (*Times* 28.10.78)

Massive demonstrations began to take place in early November 1978 in every major town in Rhodesia. In the main, these demonstrations were peaceful but in nearly every case arrests were made by police.

- On 1 November, it was reported that a total of 18 students had been found guilty of organising demonstrations involving some 500 people in the Gwelo area. 17 were sentenced to six cuts each by the police. (*The Herald* 1.11.78)
- In mid-November 265 students appeared in court on charges of organising illegal gatherings likely to cause a breach of the peace. (*The Herald* 16.11.78). On 7 December, 225 were found guilty and sentenced to cuts and fines. (*Rand Daily Mail* 8.12.78)
- In mid-November 93 student teachers from Morgenster Mission appeared in Fort Victoria magistrates court, and were found guilty of organising demonstrations. Each was fined Rh\$ 25.00. (*The Herald* 18.11.78)
- On 24 November a special court at Tomlinson depot sentenced 135 students to cuts and 41 to fines, for taking part in an illegal procession against call-ups. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 28.11.78)
- The Minister of Law and Order told the House of Assembly in November that to date 749 African

students had been prosecuted for demonstrating against proposed call-ups. (*Parliamentary Debates November 78*)

In addition, many young Africans who simply refused to fill out registration forms for conscription were harassed by employers and officials alike. For example, seventeen black employees of a Salisbury firm, World Radio Systems, were fired for refusing to fill out registration forms. (*The Herald 23.11.78*)

The depth of political consciousness and opposition to the regime among young Africans is well illustrated by an article which appeared in *The Times* in November 1978. It consisted of a series of interviews with students at St. Ignatius College, a Jesuit-run secondary school near Salisbury, which has "the reputation of being one of the best black schools in Rhodesia". Typical comments from the students were:

If the transitional government persists with its plan to call up Africans into the army it will be signing its own death warrant. We will use those arms against the government.

The interim government is a fiasco and now they want us to fight for a doomed regime. I will not fight or kill my own brothers. To do so would be treason against my people.

For us blacks call-up is the highest form of treachery. We want Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau to know we will never fight against the very people who have forced reforms on this country. Putting black faces into the government has not changed a thing. (*Times 21.11.78*)

When the first African call-up papers were actually sent out, the results spoke for themselves. Of the 1,544 Africans who had been called-up for "intake 163", on 10 January 1979, about 300 initially responded. (*Guardian 11.1.79*). In a television interview Lt. Gen. Hickman, the Army Commander, revealed that in fact only 250 had reported, of whom about 50 were not even scheduled for national service as they were either under age or were destined for the regular army. "We ended up with about 200", said Hickman. (*The Herald 16.1.79*)

Soon afterwards, the Rhodesian military command imposed a total news blackout on any article concerning intake 163. Journalists were ordered to stay away from barracks. (*Guardian 10.1.79*). The reason behind this attitude became quite clear when reports began filtering through that a number of the 200 had deserted within a few weeks, some taking weapons with them.

It is impossible to confirm how many of the initial 200 did in fact desert, as no reporters were allowed to see the recruits until some seven weeks into their training, when a few selected newsmen were invited to interview several of them. However, ZANU (Patriotic Front) has reported that 181 defectors from intake 163 arrived in Mozambique, mostly during March 1979. (*BBC Monitoring Service 23.5.79*)

Other reports reveal that several hundred of those called up into intake 163 had already fled to either Botswana or Mozambique by February 1979, to escape the brutal methods being used by security

personnel to get the African conscripts to barracks. Students who had fled spoke of house-to-house searches, to check if youth had their national service registration cards. If not they were beaten up. After the poor initial response to intake 163, hundreds of students were rounded-up from their homes and schools. Following a boycott of training by conscripts at Balla Balla barracks, near Bulawayo, 10 African students were reported to have been shot as "a practical warning to all those who might think of defying orders in the future". (*Zimbabwe People's Voice 3.2.79*)

One concrete result of the provisions to conscript African students has been a sharp decline in the number who are enrolling in colleges or taking up apprenticeship contracts. Reports confirm that a number of apprentices and doctors carried out their initial threat to resign contracts. The 1979 intake to the University College of Rhodesia of 521 students (mainly white) was the lowest since the University began in 1957, directly as a result of provisions introduced in December 1978 for compulsory military service to all intending university students. (*BBC Monitoring Service 9.6.79*) These made it practically impossible for Africans opposed to call-up to go to university.

There were subsequent national service intakes for Africans in March (intake 164), July (intake 165) and September 1979 (intake 166). In July 1979, Bishop Muzorewa announced that the responses to both intakes 163 and 164 had been extremely poor, and that accordingly the government had decided to conscript larger numbers of eligible Africans. He later announced in parliament that as from January 1980 phase one national service (i.e. 12 months) would apply to all young men leaving secondary school after three or more years of education. (*AFP 3.7.79; BBC Monitoring Service 30.7.79, reporting parliamentary proceedings on 27 July*).

On 10 August 1979 the regime announced new call-up regulations under which all eligible Africans between the ages of 16 and 60 must now register for national service — the previous age range was 18 to 25. Eligibility under this new ruling means those living permanently in the country or who have spent six continuous months in the country (thus including large numbers of migrant workers from Malawi and Mozambique), and who have completed at least three years secondary education or who have signed an apprenticeship contract. Although the registration age has been reduced to 16, a person will not (in theory) be called up until he has reached the age of 18 — i.e. as for whites, Asians and Coloureds. In announcing the regulations, the Minister of Manpower, Social Affairs, Youth and Rehabilitation in the government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Dr. Aaron Mutiti, said that they were in keeping with the regime's intention of removing racial discrimination at all levels. He pointed out that while "the manpower problem of this country is becoming ever more acute", the new regulations did not mean a mass call-up of Africans was imminent. "It would be impossible to train huge numbers quickly", he said, "because this would cause too big a drain of those

experienced men fighting having to serve as instructors. Secondly, the forces can obtain all the volunteers they want for the rank-and-file. What are desperately needed are leaders and specialists." (*BBC Monitoring Service 13.8.79*)

Dr. Mutiti also disclosed that exemptions and deferments from call-up were due to be further tightened up within the next few days. Greater use would be made of "civilian liaison officers", who would "be able to make more detailed examination of applications for deferment or exemption". (*BBC Monitoring Service 13.8.79*) The methods used by such "liaison officers" to intimidate parents into revealing the whereabouts of their sons and to force young men to the barracks, have been referred to earlier in this section.

At the end of August 1979, the regime announced that 320 Africans in the age range 22 to 24 would be called up on 29 September. They would be drawn from all government departments, commerce and industry for an initial 24 days training at four centres, after which they would be liable for 140 days service a year in the Police "B" Reserve. It was also revealed that 42 African teachers destined for the Police Reserve were already under training a few miles from Salisbury. A regime spokesman stated on 29 August that "for the foreseeable future we will be calling up men at a rate of approximately 320 a month, certainly into the new year. They will be paid the standard rate for a B reservist, Rh\$ 5.20 a day — whether you are black, white or coloured, it doesn't make any difference. . . We will probably work our way through this age group with the people that have been allotted to us and we will then be calling up people in other age groups. We will slowly move through the spectrum of people who are available to us for these types of duties". (*BBC Monitoring Service, 31.8.79, 1.9.79; see also section on the African Police Reserve in THE POLICE*)

In a statement issued on 24 September 1979, Dr. Aaron Mutiti said that more than 1,400 men had reported to Llewellyn Barracks in Bulawayo for intake 166. 1,041 had been accepted for national service, of whom 25 would receive officer training. (*BBC Monitoring Service 26.9.79*)

The regime's determination to push ahead with African conscription amounts to nothing less than press-ganging. The stark reality is that young African students and apprentices have refused en masse to give their services to an unrepresentative and oppressive army, but have rather fled to join the Patriotic Front. Recently announced plans to call up new categories of Africans can only mean more intimidation and harassment for them and their families. A statement by the then Co-Minister of Defence, Hilary Squires, soon after intake 163, sums up the implications. He warned that any African students called up who were found to have relatives involved in the liberation movement would be "made to settle accounts accordingly". Such a threat would affect practically every student in the country, and experience has shown that it is not an idle one.

From the point of view of the settler minority, African conscription is to a large extent a propaganda

move intended to placate whites who feel that they are being made to bear the brunt of fighting the war. The regime itself admits that conscripted Africans do not add to the fighting capacity of the security forces, at least in the short term, but rather detract from it, by causing instructors and supervisors to be withdrawn from the field. The administrative and other work involved in registering and calling up large numbers of Africans must meanwhile put considerable strain on an already overstretched economy.

THE ARMY

There are seven main infantry or fighting units within the Rhodesian army: the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) (all-white); the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) (African with white officers); the Grey's Scouts (mixed white and African); the Selous Scouts (mixed white and African — they are described in a special section below); the Rhodesia Regiment (white national servicemen and territorials, and African regulars); and the Independent Companies (white national servicemen and territorials, and African regulars). Other units have assumed an increasingly direct counter-insurgency role as the liberation war has escalated; they include the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, the Engineers Corps, the Military Police and the Rhodesian Artillery.

Asian and Coloured conscripts are mostly deployed in the Rhodesian Defence Regiment.

The main training centres for the army are the School of Infantry, at Gwelo; Llewellyn Barracks, Bulawayo (territorials); and Balla Balla Barracks, Bulawayo (African regular recruits). Virtually all commissioned officers receive their training at the School of Infantry, which is divided into three training units: tactical (conducts courses in tactics and operations for junior NCOs and others up to the ranks of captains and majors); cadet (trains both black and white candidates selected by an officers' training board); regimental (instructs NCOs in drill and weapons drill). The School of Infantry is staffed by 30 officers and 45 NCOs.

Following the dismissal of Lt-General John Hickman in March 1979 (see *SELOUS SCOUTS*), the Commander of the Army is Lt-General A.L.C. McLean.

Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI)

The RLI, nicknamed "The Incredibles", was formally established in February 1961 and first saw action as part of a Federal force on border control duty between what was then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and the Congo (now Zaire). In 1964–5 the RLI's role was switched from that of a conventional army, deploying troops en masse, to a commando unit, deployed "by the best means available to do a clandestine job". (*The Herald, special supplement: "Focus on the RLI" 24.7.75*). Companies became known as "commandos", privates as "troopers" or "troopies". National servicemen who are allocated to the RLI are known as "riflemen".

The RLI provide much of the manpower for the strategically placed Fire Force "fast reaction" units devised by the regime as the spearhead of its counter insurgency operations. RLI troops are trained for parachute and heliborne operations as a matter of routine, and as such could probably be more accurately described as a specialist airborne battalion, deployed strategically throughout the country. The Fire Force system of operations affords greater speed, mobility and effectiveness in combat situations, to relatively small numbers of troops (*See also section on THE AIRFORCE*)

Fire Force bases are under the administrative and organizational command of a camp commandant, who is almost always a Territorial Force member, specially chosen and trained for the job. He is in charge of setting up camp from scratch, in a matter of hours, and in its day-to-day running. Apart from airforce personnel and infantry, a Fire Force base typically includes numbers of technicians, a couple of armoured cars to guard the runway, a dozen national servicemen to act as sentries, medics and signals, and a fully equipped operations room from where raids are planned.

The RLI prides itself on being one of the most effective counter insurgency units, trained and adapted to bush warfare, in the world. The crucial role played by this small (representing less than 3% of armed personnel in the field), all-white unit in prosecuting the war is apparent from the regime's own statistics. Speaking in February 1979 at the unveiling of a statue of a white trooper dedicated to the RLI for example, the Commander of the Army Lt-Gen. Hickman stated that between 1 and 30 January 1979, the "national kill rate of CTs" ('communist terrorists') had been 189. "Of this figure, the RLI supported by airforce and other ground units have accounted for 105. Just over 50%."

The RLI comprises a single battalion of about 1,000 men, all of whom are white, divided into three commandos and a support group. The support group operates in many ways as a commando but concentrates more on mortars, reconnaissance and tracking. It is kept on immediate standby to back up other troops in a contact (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No 3, Salisbury 1976*). Normally, RLI recruits spend six weeks in the bush followed by 20 days of retraining, rest and recuperation.

The RLI contains substantial numbers of overseas mercenaries. In 1977, according to Private Lawrence Meyers, an American who deserted from the RLI, about 30% of the Rhodesian (white) regular army had been recruited overseas. It is believed that the proportion of US troops alone in the RLI may since have increased to around 30% of the regiment and that mercenaries of all nationalities account for over half the total. There are also significant contingents of British, South African, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian nationals.

Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR)

Africans were first recruited for regular army service during World War 1, when a Rhodesian Native Regiment was raised for the campaign in German East

Africa. This was subsequently disbanded but was revived in 1939 as the Rhodesian African Rifles.

The RAR, along with Rhodesia's regular police force, is the basis of the regime's long-standing claim that the war against the national liberation movement has nothing to do with racism but is a struggle by black and white together against 'communist insurgents'. The RAR is an all-African regiment staffed by predominantly white officers. Its exact strength is concealed by the regime but it is known to have expanded considerably in recent years as a result of concerted recruiting drives by the authorities. The overall strength of the regiment is probably upwards of 4,000 men. It now has four battalions, and it is believed that a fifth may be under formation in 1979. The second battalion, formed in 1975, was quartered in Fort Victoria for the first four years of its existence and in 1978 numbered around 1,200 men. In October 1979, when the second battalion transferred its quarters to Masvingo Barracks, about 6 km away, it was reported that 3,500 soldiers were based at Masvingo with their families. (*BBC Monitoring Service 8.10.79*) A new barracks to house recruits for both the first and second battalions was opened at Balla Balla, 50 miles south-east of Bulawayo, in July 1976. The African troops' training programme was cut from six to three months in 1977 in an effort to accommodate the new recruits.

A number of RAR troops are posted to Fire Force units, based throughout the country. Large numbers of RAR troops have undergone parachute training to enable them to take part in airborne operations.

At any one time hundreds of RAR troops are posted to other units to compensate for losses due to white emigration and to keep them up to strength. This is particularly common in the territorial forces (*see also below*).

Special Air Service (SAS)

The SAS is an elite, all-white parachute regiment, known as the "winged daggers", with close links with its British counter-part. The size of the unit is treated as classified information by the regime, but it is believed to number up to 750 men divided into four squadrons. A large number of foreign mercenaries, with the specialist skills required for service in the SAS, are understood to have been recruited by the regime since early 1978.

The first British Special Air Service was formed during World War II by Colonel David Stirling. The 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, established in 1952, gained extensive experience in counter-insurgency warfare during the British campaign in Malaya. One of the squadrons in the 22nd Regiment was composed of volunteers from Rhodesia, who thereby became the first Commonwealth troops to be trained in jungle dropping techniques and helicopter operations. Both Lt-Gen. Walls (Commander of Combined Operations) and Lt-Col. Reid Daly (Commander of the Selous Scouts up to August 1979) served under the British in Malaya. In 1961 it was decided to reform the Rhodesian Special Air Service Squadron (disbanded after the war) and basic parachute training commenced at the Parachute Training

School at New Sarum near Salisbury. In 1962 the Rhodesian SAS joined the 22nd British SAS Regiment for training in Aden. The unit was reorganised on a counter-insurgency basis in 1966. (*People's News Service* 2.10.79)

Selection courses for the SAS, held several times a year at Inyanga, are reputed to be extremely rigorous, with a pass rate of less than 30 out of every 100 candidates. As part of the selection programme, each recruit must complete six parachute jumps, after which he receives his "wings". Selection is followed by a total of three years training, between tours of operational duty, in free-fall parachuting; tracking and bushcraft; advanced signals; unarmed combat; map reading; sub-aqua diving including tactical diving; underwater demolitions and mine laying and clearing; climbing — "to carry out cliff assaults to attack an enemy from the least expected quarter"; demolitions — "designed to enable the SAS soldier to carry out tactical and strategical acts of sabotage in conventional war"; handling canoes and boats; physical fitness and first aid. Fluency in an indigenous language is a further important part of the qualifications. (*From an official Rhodesian History of the SAS*)

The Rhodesian SAS contains within its ranks many of the most diversely and highly trained professional soldiers with the security forces, including former officers of the British SAS, and other foreign nationals with training in specialist airborne forces abroad. It is believed that the Rhodesian SAS may still be formally affiliated to the British SAS. (*See also section on MERCENARIES and Appendix IV, article from The Leveller*)

Like the RLI, the SAS plays a crucial role in the regime's counter-insurgency operations, yet one that receives virtually no publicity. They have been responsible for many strategic and clandestine missions, including the attack on the Lusaka home of Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU (Patriotic Front), in April 1979.

Grey's Scouts

In July 1975 a new unit within the Rhodesian army, known initially as the Mounted Infantry, was given the official go-ahead. The Grey's Scouts, a mixed force of regulars, national servicemen and territorials, a third of whom are said to be black, are a revival of a cavalry unit last seen in action in Rhodesia in the 1890's when it helped to crush the resistance of the Shona and Ndebele people to white colonialism. The immediate predecessor of the Grey's Scouts was an "Animal Pack Transport Evaluation Team" in the Eastern Highlands of Rhodesia. Horses are used for speed and endurance in tracking down guerillas and are trained to ignore firing at close quarters. A number of suitable mounts have been donated to the Grey's Scouts by support groups in South Africa.

At the end of 1976 the unit was said to number about 250 men and to be expanding rapidly. The Grey's Scouts now probably number upwards of 400 men. They are divided into three combat and one support squadron, each squadron being comprised of three troops which in turn break down into four eight-man units. The support squadron includes a 60 mm

and 81 mm mortar section, a reconnaissance unit and a tracker dog troop which uses British foxhounds. Most of the troops allocated to the Greys are recruits who have undergone basic training in the RLI. The headquarters of the unit are at Inkomo Barracks outside Salisbury, along with the Selous Scouts.

The commanding officer up to February 1978 of No. 1 Squadron of the Grey's Scouts (the main squadron) was Mike Williams, a former US Army Officer with the 10th Special Forces, 77th Special Forces Group and 101st Airborne, who had fought with Mike Hoare's mercenaries in the Congo. He joined the Rhodesian security forces in 1975 and served for a time with the Rhodesia Defence Regiment as commanding officer for Coloured troops. He was promoted to major and as such became the highest-ranking US mercenary in the Rhodesian army. He was discharged from his command of the Grey's Scouts following a row with the Rhodesian military establishment over the damaging image of the security forces which his unit was presenting in the world press. He returned to the US to stand for the US Congress as a "Conservative Democrat" in northern Florida.

Rhodesia Regiment

The Rhodesia Regiment, officially described as a Territorial Force Regiment, is an integrated unit comprised of African regulars, white national servicemen and territorial forces. It is divided into 10 battalions, each with an establishment of about 1,000 men, and support units. Most white national servicemen who are posted to the Rhodesia Regiment undergo training with Depot Rhodesia Regiment at Llewellyn Barracks outside Bulawayo. African members receive their training at Shaw Barracks, Balla Balla, the RAR training depot, and are still members of the RAR, whilst given extended postings to the Rhodesia Regiment. Territorials, obviously, have already received training during their period of national service. The majority of Africans posted to Rhodesia Regiment are newly-trained recruits from Numbers 3 and 4 Battalions of the RAR — the newest battalions. The Rhodesia Regiment is structured so that white national servicemen and territorials provide the bulk of junior and senior officers, and fill all the specialist posts, whilst African regulars provide the bulk of low ranking troops. The Regiment's headquarters are at Llewellyn Barracks, near Bulawayo.

Independent Companies

Like the Rhodesia Regiment, Independent Companies are comprised of white national servicemen and territorials, and a number of African regulars. There are seven Independent Companies, each permanently based in a locality in operational areas near the border. Nos. 1 and 4 Independent Companies are based at Wankie; No. 2 at Kariba; No. 3 at Inyanga; and Nos. 5 and 6 at Umtali. Towards the end of 1977 the Independent Companies, formerly composed entirely of white national servicemen and territorials, were technically converted to RAR companies, by feeding into their ranks newly trained African soldiers

from the RAR training depot at Balla Balla. Each of the companies is a fully operational sub-unit commanded by a white regular army major, with white national servicemen and territorials and some white regulars filling the key command and administrative posts. As with the Territorial Battalions of Rhodesia Regiment, African troops are mostly young, newly trained recruits and make up the bulk of the low rank troops.

Before 1977, the Independent Companies made up a single battalion of the Rhodesia Regiment (formerly known as the Rhodesian Rifles). The Rhodesia Regiment at this time was designed to accommodate white national servicemen and territorials exclusively. The national servicemen were invariably posted to the Independent Companies. The incorporation of large numbers of African troops into the Rhodesia Regiment and Independent Companies signalled a major structural change within this section of the army, necessitated largely by the need to keep these units up to full combatant strength, whilst at the same time having to cope with the exodus of whites from Rhodesia, which was seriously depleting the all-white territorial forces.

In February 1978 a Bill was introduced in the Rhodesian House of Assembly under which the army is categorised into two sections (regulars and territorials) rather than three (regulars, territorials and reserves) as in the past. Reserves have been integrated into the territorial army. Whites in the over-38 age group are according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies still organized into two Reserve Holding Units of 3,000 men (*The Military Balance 1979-80*).

The remaining Territorial Forces (those not serving in Rhodesia Regiment or Independent Companies), serve their periods of call-up with regular units throughout the army, although a few are found in specialist units, such as SAS, RLI or Selous Scouts, where extensive training and re-training is required.

Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment

The regime is sometimes inaccurately portrayed as depending almost exclusively on foot soldiers and cavalry rather than tanks, tracked and heavy armoured vehicles. In fact, the Armoured Car Regiment is used extensively on reconnaissance and border patrol and has played a key role in the regime's attacks into Mozambique. In its present form it dates back to 1972, though its original predecessor, the Southern Rhodesia Reconnaissance Unit, was first established in 1939. Due to their superior speed (about 100 km an hour) armoured cars are, according to the regime, "capable of knocking out any known tank at anything up to 1300 metres". They have less firepower than a tank but require less maintenance and are much cheaper. "They guard vital installations and their firepower can be used to demolish enemy strong points. At the same time armoured cars can easily switch to a conventional war role - reconnaissance, destruction of enemy vehicles, deep penetration behind enemy lines, delaying actions to cover withdrawals, and the disruption of an enemy on the

run". (*Sunday Mail*, 13.11.77) Other counter-insurgency roles include curfew patrols, crowd dispersal, road blocks, cordons and escort duty on civilian and military convoys. Armoured cars are frequently sent into the Tribal Trust Lands to "show the flag", i.e. they have a comparable intimidatory function to low level fly-pasts of jet bombers. As well as armoured cars the regime is believed to possess a number of Centurion tanks and possibly some Scorpions. (See *Appendix 1*)

The Armoured Car Regiment is surrounded by tight security. One of the few publications in which photographs of the wide range of vehicles in use regularly appear is the US mercenary recruiting magazine *Soldier of Fortune*. Many of the vehicles have been developed by Rhodesian technicians using standard vehicle chassis as a base. The *Hippo*, a large troop carrier built high off the ground to withstand landmine explosions, is also used in South Africa. The *Bullet*, a landmine-proofed, infantry fighting vehicle, was due to become fully operational by the end of 1979. It carries a ten-man crew and is armed with a heavy machine gun or 20 mm cannon. The *Vapouriser* is a high speed, easy-to-manoeuvre vehicle devised for cross-country reconnaissance work. It is armed with a heavy machine gun. The *Rover*, a four-wheel drive vehicle, is armed with a heavy machine gun. Other models are the *Leopard*, *Rhino*, *Hyena*, and *Crocodile* (a 15-20 man troop carrier). British made *Ferret* Scout Cars are used as back up, and work is in progress to develop a new turret which can carry heavier armaments. Other heavier armoured vehicles are believed to exist but all information about them is strictly classified. They are reputed to be capable of knocking out T34 and T54 tanks. Many military, official and civilian vehicles are adapted to withstand landmine explosions and are fitted with armaments. (see *THE RHODESIAN ARMS INDUSTRY*)

The strength of the Armoured Car Regiment is between 300 and 500 men. It comprises four operational squadrons, three of which are commanded by regulars but composed largely of territorial force members. The fourth squadron, the largest and best equipped, is made up entirely of regulars. There is a further non-operational back-up squadron, based at the regimental headquarters. Regulars, territorials and national servicemen undergo a total of 49 weeks training. The Regiment is based at Blakiston-Houston barracks in Salisbury.

The commanding officer of the Armoured Car Regiment in 1977-78 was Major Bruce Rookens-Smith, a former officer of the British 17th/21st Lancers with experience on British Centurion tanks. His post has since been taken by Major Darrell Winkler, an American who previously served three periods in Vietnam and three in West Germany. He was commissioned into the Rhodesian army in August 1977 and is believed to have reorganised the Armoured Car Regiment since his appointment.

Engineers Corps

Members of the Engineers Corps, formed in 1944, are specialists in mine warfare and are detailed to drive landmine detector vehicles. They also have responsi-

bility for roads, bridges and other construction works in the operational areas. Besides maintaining the security force's own minefields (along the borders, surrounding airstrips and other strategic locations), the Engineers' task is to locate and destroy mines laid by the guerilla forces. In February 1978 the Commander of Combined Operations Lt-Gen. Walls revealed that 28 members of the Engineers Corps had lost one or two limbs. (*The Herald* 18.2.78) There are six squadrons in the Engineers Corps.

Military Police

Members of the Military Police, formed in 1941, have been deployed in front line combat role in recent years in addition to their normal functions of crime detection and vice control within the ranks.

Rhodesia Artillery

The Rhodesia Artillery was declared to be a corps in its own right in October 1976 and authorised to form a regular troop. In January 1977 the troop was reported to be up to half strength. (Up to that time, apart from a small training force of regular servicemen, it had relied solely on national servicemen and territorials). There are three territorial and one regular battalions. Officially the artillery use old World War II 25 pound (88 mm) field guns and these are still commonly in use. They have been reported to possess some 105 mm weapons and are known to have obtained at least ten 155 mm howitzer artillery pieces in a sanctions busting coup in 1979.

It is thought that a number of civilians have been killed by the security forces using artillery to shell suspected guerilla positions at night. Even the out-dated 25 pounder shell can be placed with great accuracy, and can devastate an area of 500 square yards. 105 mm and 155 mm artillery pieces are capable of much greater destruction and are believed to have been employed in cross-border shelling into Mozambique and Zambia.

Rhodesian Intelligence Corps

The Rhodesian Intelligence Corps (RIC) operates as a separate unit within the army. RIC officers take part in routine meetings of the Joint Operations Command structure (JOC). Conscripts may be posted to the RIC as to other units.

Special Intelligence Branch (SIB)

According to a report in the US mercenary recruiting magazine *Soldier of Fortune*, the Special Intelligence Branch was set up by the Rhodesian army in 1978 or 1979 as a special security unit to deal with dissenters in the ranks. The SIB was necessitated by mounting criticism of the regime's war policy, particularly its strategy of promoting private armies whereby it was seen by white troops to be collaborating with former guerilla fighters. According to *Soldier of Fortune* these "rumblings of discontent" extended "all the way up the ranks". The SIB is said to be answerable only to the Prime Minister and the top military commanders. (As this was reported before Bishop

Muzorewa became Prime Minister the situation may have changed). "The kind of comment that would have interested the SIB was heard several times around Johannesburg in December 1978 and was once voiced by a senior officer attached to one of the elite Territorial Units. He spoke to a colleague a few days before Christmas and said; "We've all but lost the war. The way things are going now the Terrs have beaten us at our own game and anyone who thinks otherwise is living in Mickey Mouse land". (*Soldier of Fortune*, June 1979; see also *DISAFFECTION AND DESERTION*)

Department of Psychological Warfare

"Psyc" was set up by the regime in early 1977 as a new undertaking separate from the rest of the security forces. Its first Director was Major General Andrew Rawlins, who as Commander of the Guard Force was previously in charge of the protected village programme. He resigned from Psyc at the end of 1978 and is believed to have emigrated to South Africa.

Psyc is a racially mixed unit which makes use of personnel from other units such as the RAR. As well as having responsibility for the regime's scare tactics and intimidation techniques in the operational areas (officially described as "winning hearts and minds"), Psyc is believed to be involved in undercover work abroad. A confidential Psyc memorandum obtained by the Patriotic Front identifies a wide range of "target groups" for the department's propaganda activities, including chiefs and headmen, African businessmen, domestic servants, African teachers, churches and the security forces themselves. (*Zimbabwe News, March-April 1978*). Methods used by Psyc include 'skyshouts' (messages boomed at villagers through megaphones from low-flying aircraft); leaflet and pamphlet drops (these have been undertaken in the front line states as well as inside Rhodesia; leaflets have been dropped in the centre of Lusaka); use of the state-controlled and heavily censored press and media; visits and lectures to schools; displays of the security forces' fire-power, both in the air and on the ground, to audiences of local villagers; and displays of the corpses of dead guerillas in public places, including schools.

Rhodesia Women's Service

Women were first recruited as volunteers into Rhodesia's regular army and airforce in July/August 1975. In theory the posts are open to women of all races, but of the first 2,000 applicants, only two came from Africans. Women regulars are trained to take over clerical and administrative jobs behind the lines to release more men for active service but they are all taught the techniques of counter-insurgency operations and given practical weapons-training. Women were accepted as full regulars on the same terms of rank, conditions and pensions (but not salaries) as men, with effect from 1 July 1977. By March 1977 there were about 280 members of the Rhodesia Women's Service. In 1978 six members of the RWS were Coloured, a number of whom were deployed at the Rhodesian Defence Regiment's head-

quarters (see below). The RWS includes around 35 commissioned officers. Two Coloured girls were included in a passing out parade of officer cadets in August 1979. (*BBC TV News 6.9.79*)

According to an official publication, "no matter how persistent the women may become, the Army dig their heels in at having women in the operational area." (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No. 5, 1978*) The Rhodesian Women's Service does however include a number of specialists such as riding instructors and remount riders who train horses acquired by the Grey's Scouts and other army units, medics, radio operators and dog handlers. In 1978 there was one Woman Mine Dog Handler who was probably the only member of the RWS to get anywhere near the front line.

Rhodesia Defence Regiment (RDR)

The RDR was formed on 1 January 1978 out of a combination of two existing units: the **Reinforcement Holding Units (RHUs)**, formed in 1973 to accommodate Asian and Coloured personnel who had completed their territorial service with the supply and transport platoons, plus a small number of whites in the 38 to 50 age group; and the **Protection Companies**, formed in 1974 to supplement the strength of the RHUs, and comprising almost exclusively Asian and Coloured national servicemen and territorials. Both units were led by white regular commissioned officers and their duties included guarding installations, escorts for army convoys, and transporting supplies to the operational areas. The Protection Companies were the more mobile. By 1978 the combined strength of the RHUs and the Protection Companies was approximately 6,000 men.

Technically, although Asians and Coloureds have always been conscripted on the same terms as whites, there is no provision for them to join the regular army. During national service they are not given infantry training and are not allowed to join infantry units. They only receive five weeks training for the RDR.

The Rhodesia Defence Regiment today is comprised of Asian and Coloured national servicemen, territorials in the 25 to 38 age group, whites in the 38 to 50 age group, and the so-called "continuously embodied volunteers" — Coloured and Asian personnel who have finished their national service commitments and who volunteer for further service. The last group are virtually regular members, but are not regarded as such in that they are obliged to renew their contracts every year and are paid substantially less than regulars in other units.

The RDR has two battalions: — Number 1 Mashonaland, based at Old Cranborne Barracks in Salisbury, and Number 2 Matabeleland based at Brady Barracks in Bulawayo. The training depot for RDR members is at Inkomo Barracks near Salisbury.

There are at least seven Protection Companies in the RDR, each numbering about 100 — 200 men and based in operational areas around the country, plus support and back-up troops.

The range of duties undertaken by the RDR is much more extensive than those given to the old

Protection Companies and RHUs. It includes guarding sensitive installations such as roads, railways, bridges and construction projects in the operational areas, plus convoy and protection duties. Service in the RDR is often extremely hazardous and has involved its members in many direct combat situations.

Other support and back-up services to the fighting units of the Rhodesian army are provided by the various divisions — catering, supplies, transport, signals, arms maintenance, medical, pay corps etc — of the **Rhodesian Army Services Corps**, formed in 1957. Most of the Africans conscripted since the extension of the call-up in 1978 have been deployed in units of this kind rather than in a combat role. Quite a number of Asians are deployed in the Signals Corps.

THE SELOUS SCOUTS

The Selous Scouts, an elite tracker unit now believed to comprise as many as 1,800 men, including 1,500 Africans, is by far the most notorious unit within Rhodesia's armed forces. They have been dubbed the 'SS' after their initials, a reference to the political police of the Nazis, and are widely believed to be responsible for a whole series of atrocities committed in the name of the guerilla fighters to discredit the national liberation movement. The Scouts have gained a reputation as the most ruthless and committed among a number of security force units specialising in intelligence gathering and clandestine para-military operations.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the Selous Scouts as fundamentally different from the rest of the Rhodesian security forces. The extensive publicity given to the Scouts over the last two or three years has served the purpose, from the Rhodesian army's point of view, of diverting attention from other security force units which in practice operate along similar lines — the SAS, Police Support Unit etc. Members of the Selous Scouts have frequently been recruited from the SAS and their tactics in the field are often inseparable.

The Selous Scouts were formed in February 1973 from an original Tracker Wing of the Rhodesian army based at Kariba and take their name from Courtney Selous, the chief tracker and guide for the white settlers who colonised Rhodesia in the late 19th century. Their commander up until the end of August 1979, Lt.-Col Ron Reid-Daly, served with the British Special Air Service in Malaya in the 1950's. He subsequently spent 13 years with the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Officially, the main function of the Selous Scouts is to seek out and assist the security forces to destroy guerilla units, a task at which they are claimed by the regime to have been extraordinarily successful. During the first four years of their existence the Scouts are alleged to have been responsible for 1,205 guerilla deaths, for the loss of only 10 of their own men.

The Selous Scouts operate as an independent unit and are not accountable to the Joint Operations Command (JOC) system controlling the rest of the security forces. Like Special Branch II of the

Rhodesian police (see below under *THE POLICE*) the Selous Scouts came under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office during Ian Smith's tenure of the premiership. Whether this arrangement persists under Bishop Muzorewa's nominal leadership is not entirely clear but it can safely be assumed that, like the rest of the security forces and the running of the war in general, effective command and control lie in the hands of (white) military personnel.

The Scouts operate in a highly secretive and clandestine manner and do not discuss their operations with other members of the security forces. In each JOC district certain areas are "frozen" for a period in which the Selous Scouts have complete control to operate as they wish, while other sections of the security forces stay out. This method of operating gives the Scouts ample scope to undertake independent initiatives of the most ruthless kind, with no effective disciplinary control. They liaise much more closely with the Special Branch and other intelligence units, than with the regular army. Selection standards for the Scouts are among the highest in the world: out of every 100 volunteers (many of them already serving in other regular units) who apply for each 35-day selection course, only about 15 make the grade. The unit is believed to include a number of former members of the DGS, a specialist force that operated in Mozambique under Portuguese colonialism and established a reputation for extreme brutality, together with American Green Beret veterans from the Vietnam War. The Scout's tough image and their stress on self-sufficiency and personal initiative have been a particular attraction to foreign mercenaries from the United States, Britain and elsewhere. In March 1978 a South African member of the Selous Scouts, Captain Christoph Schulenberg, was awarded the Grand Cross of Valour, the Smith regime's highest decorations. Captain Schulenberg was previously in the Rhodesian SAS. The Scouts' main training area is said to be at Wafa Wafa, a remote bush camp on the shores of Lake Kariba, where the men are rigorously drilled in bush survival, tracking, physical fitness, free-fall parachuting, skin-diving and martial arts, in addition to being skilled marksmen. The Scouts' headquarters at Inkomo Barracks outside Salisbury also has facilities for up to 100 men to be trained at any one time. Their quarters are totally sealed off from other units quartered at Inkomo, in keeping with their clandestine way of operating. A description of the Selous Scouts in operation is given in the *Guardian*, 17 April 1978. The full text of this article is reproduced in Appendix IV.

The Selous Scouts are a "dirty tricks" unit. As one example of their unconventional methods it has been reported that they use a pack of British foxhounds, trained to hunt only on the scent of human flesh. (*New Statesman* 28.9.79) It is now generally well-known, and indeed tacitly admitted by security force spokesmen, that members of the Selous Scouts regularly disguise themselves as freedom fighters for intelligence gathering purposes and to identify guerilla sympathisers among the local African population. Ample evidence on this aspect of their operations has been collected by a variety of observers, including the Patriotic Front themselves. In November 1976 for

example, Edward Kazembe, a Selous Scout who deserted to join the guerilla forces, was interviewed on the *Voice of Zimbabwe* radio station in Maputo. He explained that

one of the special tasks of the Selous Scouts was to go to the operational zone disguised as freedom fighters (and to) try to find out how the freedom fighters get their support from the masses. Then they go back and tell the security forces . . . Another task was to kill the local people in order to discredit the Zimbabwe People's Army. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 26.11.76)

Another former Selous Scout, Wonderful Mukoyi, aged 18, was a student of a primary school in Gatooma in November 1975 when his class was addressed by a member of the security forces. The students were ordered into a military truck and driven to Llewellyn Barracks, Bulawayo, where they were informed that they were to undergo military training as Selous Scouts. They were taught to use a variety of weapons including Chinese semi-automatic rifles and AK 47 Soviet Submachine guns. Mukoyi was later involved in a variety of atrocities against civilians as a member of a 10-man Selous Scout unit operating in the Chikore area. He was also a party to the massacre of 800 Zimbabwean refugees at Nyazonia camp in Mozambique in August 1976. 90 African troops including 40 Selous Scouts took part in this mission, according to Mukoyi, together with 50 whites and 10 Coloureds. They were instructed to kill everyone at the camp. (*Zimbabwe News*, July-December 1977).

In August 1978 another former Selous Scout who had previously served in the Rhodesian police, known as Flint, told a delegation from the International Association of Democratic Lawyers on a fact-finding mission to Mozambique that he had been involved in the murder of 13 British missionaries and children at the Elim Pentecostal Mission near Umtali in June 1978. While there are discrepancies between Flint's account and the circumstances of the massacre the evidence casts serious doubt on the regime's claim that guerillas of ZAU (Patriotic Front) were responsible. Flint also described his involvement in the Nyazonia massacre two years previously. (*FOCUS* 18, September 1978).

The Scouts are not the only unit to disguise themselves as guerillas. Members of the Rhodesian African Rifles are also believed to masquerade as freedom fighters on occasions while since 1978, the Scouts' role of sowing confusion and distrust among the civilian African population has been significantly bolstered by the activities of the private armies or security force auxiliaries. Members of the Selous Scouts are believed to be attached to units of the security force auxiliaries as instructors and to act as a liaison with the regular army.

It appears that the activities of the Selous Scouts have led to considerable confusion within the Rhodesian army itself. According to ZANU (Patriotic Front), the rate of clashes between the Scouts and regular troops has increased sharply in recent months. Selous Scouts units have been bombed in error by the Rhodesian Air Force on more than one occasion. At Dombashawa, 40 km from Salisbury, a considerable

number of Rhodesian troops were killed in a battle with Scouts whom they mistakenly assumed were guerillas. The dead were later claimed as "terrorist" casualties in official communiques. (*BBC Monitoring Service 28.5.79*).

The Scouts are also used for intelligence gathering missions into the front line states, to prepare the way for bombing raids and other forms of attack by the Rhodesian security forces. Members of the Selous Scouts infiltrate the countries concerned in small reconnaissance groups and may remain underground for long periods of time. The kind of attacks which have been mounted on Zambia and Mozambique since the 'internal settlement' agreement — such as the raid on Joshua Nkomo's house in Lusaka in April 1979 — imply that the Selous Scouts or other regime agents have established extensive networks of contacts, and hiding places or retreats in which to go to ground, inside the front line states.

Members not only of the Selous Scouts but of the PATU, Special Branch, SAS, RLI, RAR, Police Support Unit and other units are all trained on AK 47 assault rifles and machine guns characteristically used by the guerillas of the liberation movement, and many members opt to use them in preference to the heavier normal issue equipment of NATO origin. Yet the claim that white missionaries and others have been killed by bullets from guerilla weapons has been used on several occasions by the regime to "prove" that the liberation movement was responsible. In September 1976 it was reported that black members of the Selous Scouts had qualified as parachutists and would be deployed in the front line.

Apart from their headquarters at Inkomo Barracks, the Scouts are believed to have camps at Bindura and Mount Darwin in the north-east, where prisoners are tortured during interrogation. The Scouts are reputed never to bring back prisoners from raids into the front-line states — suspects and others captured for intelligence gathering purposes are interrogated and disposed of in the field.

It would appear that the secretive way in which the Selous Scouts operate and their lack of accountability to the regular security force command structure, have led to considerable tension between their leadership and that of the Rhodesian army. Differences of opinion among military commanders over the most effective way to fight the war are likely to be thrown up in any counter-insurgency situation and in this Rhodesia is no exception, particularly in the changing political and international environment of the 'internal settlement'. At the end of August 1979 the Selous Scout Commander Lt.-Col. Reid-Daly resigned following a lengthy controversy which, as reported in the press, centred around a personal row between him and the Commander of the Army Lt.-Gen. John Hickman. In January 1979 Hickman and Reid-Daly had reportedly had a slanging match at a formal mess dinner during which Hickman was accused of wiretapping his fellow officers and incompetence. According to one newspaper report, "the real friction arose from the state of near autonomy granted to the Selous Scouts by the military. The army commander resented it just as he disliked the power wielded by Colonel Reid-Daly in carrying out

sensitive and highly secret missions". (*Guardian, 29.5.79*)

In March, Lt.-Gen. Hickman was dismissed from his post, ostensibly, according to one report, because he had been involved in a drunken driving incident. (*Guardian, 29.5.79*). Three months later, Reid-Daly was brought before a secret court-martial on charges of insubordination and insulting behaviour towards a senior officer, and sentenced to a reprimand. (*Guardian 30.6.79*)

He later instituted legal action claiming damages totalling Rh.\$53,000 against Hickman and seven other members or former members of the army including the director of Military Intelligence, Colonel John Redfern, the director of Military Police, Major Robert Reith, and the director of Army Counter-intelligence, Major J. Des Fountain. The damages were for the alleged bugging of Reid-Daly's telephone at Inkomo Barracks, the theft and copying of military documents in his safe, and for keeping him under surveillance for a period of six months from August 1978 to January 1979. Bishop Muzorewa was also reported to be being sued in his capacity as Minister of Defence and Combined Operations. (*BBC Monitoring Service 22.8.79; Guardian 20.8.79*).

The fact that this row surfaced in the press despite the regime's attempts to hush it up is symptomatic of the disillusion and low morale which undoubtedly affect the Rhodesian security forces. According to the *Guardian* hostility was also generated between Hickman and Reid-Daly by the former's suspicions that the Selous Scouts were involved in fraudulent dealings in arms and ivory. According to "senior military sources" in Salisbury the Scouts were accused of selling captured AK 47 assault rifles to American arms dealers. (*Guardian 29.8.79*) Such behaviour if true, would not be at all surprising; there is considerable evidence that many white members of the security forces and not just the Selous Scouts (though by the nature of their operations the Scouts are particularly well-placed for this kind of activity) have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the disturbed conditions of the war to line their own pockets on the side. Game poaching, particularly of elephant tusks, has escalated in recent years, and in June 1979 an official of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife warned that a number of people in Rhodesia were acquiring ivory illegally as an investment and a source of foreign currency. (*BBC Monitoring Service 25.6.79*). ZAPU (Patriotic Front) have also warned that the country's natural resources of game and wildlife are being depleted by profiteers.

Reid-Daly's resignation at the end of August 1979 is likely to add to white resentment and disaffection within the security forces. A soldier was quoted as saying at the time of Reid-Daly's court martial that "Uncle Ron is the nearest thing to God we've got. If they harm him in any way there might be mutiny". (*Windhoek Advertiser 30.5.79*). A number of senior white Selous Scout officers were said to be preparing their own resignations "in view of what they term the betrayal of their unit by the political and military establishment in Salisbury". (*Guardian 29.8.79*). Reid-Daly is reported to have emigrated to South Africa to seek a comparable position with the South

African military. His place as commander of the Selous Scouts has been taken by Acting Lt.-Col. Patrick Anders Armstrong (31), previously the second-in-command of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. (*Rand Daily Mail* 2.10.79)

Since Reid-Daly's court martial, there has been considerable speculation that the Selous Scouts may be disbanded. It would not be particularly surprising if the regime, with its sights set on international recognition, decide to implement such a move in an attempt to clean up the public image of the security forces. As has been pointed out, the Selous Scouts by no means hold the monopoly of clandestine counter-insurgency operation and "dirty-tricks" and their disbanding would not affect the overall character and aggressive thrust of the regime's military apparatus. In all probability individual Scouts would simply join other units such as the SAS and carry on much as before.

THE POLICE FORCE

The British South Africa Police was the first uniformed force to be established under white colonialism in Rhodesia and remains today the illegal regime's largest single fighting force with a potential strength of around 43,000, including reservists. (*The Military Balance 1979-80*) The BSAP constitutes an integral part of the Rhodesian security forces. It is a heavily armed paramilitary body and plays a crucial role in counter-insurgency operations.

In 1889, 500 men were recruited by the British South Africa Company as a private police force to help consolidate its occupation of Mashonaland. In 1903 large numbers of Africans were recruited for the first time. Up to 1954 the BSAP were trained both as policemen and soldiers and doubled as an unarmed civil police force and a standing army. While these military functions were relinquished at the time of Federation, they have since been resumed as the armed struggle has escalated.

In August 1979 the regime's Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Francis Zindoga told black MPs who had asked that the colonial name "British South Africa Police" be dropped that he would not enforce any change without the consent of the police themselves. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 18.8.79; reporting parliamentary proceedings on 15 August).

About two-thirds of the regular BSAP, overall strength 8,000, are Africans. These have for years occupied the lowest ranks. Up until very recently Africans would enter the service as police constables, undergoing 18 weeks training on a starting salary of between Rh.\$768 and Rh.\$936 per annum, and might then through years of service be promoted through five ranks to become sub-inspectors. A young white straight from school, however, would automatically be attested as a patrol officer — one rank above sub-inspector. Attempts have been made by the regime to reduce this overt discrimination. In September 1976 the Minister of Law and Order informed the Rhodesian House of Assembly that African sub-inspectors were being invited to apply for the rank of patrol officers. African sergeant-majors (one rank below sub-inspec-

tor) would also be eligible to take the necessary tests. Twenty-three Africans were appointed as patrol officers in October 1976.

At the beginning of 1979, further changes were made under which members of all races are being officially accepted for training on an equal basis. Africans with appropriate educational qualifications (at least one 'O' level or its equivalent, and good spoken English) can now be attested as patrol officers. At the end of January 1979, journalists were invited to Morris Depot, the police headquarters in Salisbury, to report on the start of the first racially integrated training programme for police recruits. 47 African men had been accepted into the force for training as patrol officers, and one Coloured man — the first in the BSAP's history. Five African women, three of them former police constables, and two Coloured women, were also under training as patrol officers. In addition, 20 Africans who had worked their way through the ranks (i.e. not direct entry recruits) were being trained as section officers (above patrol officers); while 17 Africans, all again with long records of service, in some cases as many as 30 years, were being trained for unspecified "top ranks". (*National Observer* 1.2.79).

According to Mr. P.K. Allum, the Commissioner of Police, "the sky is the limit for African and Coloured recruits who are joining the BSA Police . . . Anyone found to be practising discrimination in this force on the basis of race will be dealt with accordingly." (*The Herald* 1.2.79)

In June 1979, nine squads of black and white, male and female patrol officers and members of the BSAP Support Unit who had just completed their training, passed out at Morris Depot. It was the first multiracial parade of police patrol officers in Rhodesia's history. In August 1979, the Minister of Law and Order told the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian parliament that there were now some 170 African police patrol officers, 21 African section officers and 10 African inspectors (at least two of whom are detective inspectors) in the BSAP. In other words, out of an estimated 5-6,000 regular black police only 201 have attained the rank of patrol officer or above. By contrast, 100% of white regular police fall into this category. Further, with the exception of a minority of Africans recruited into the BSAP in the last two years, those Africans who have achieved this rank have been in the force for at least 10 years, while for whites it is automatic on enlistment. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 4.6.79; see also the Section on RACISM IN THE SECURITY FORCES).

As with the army the regime has in recent years stepped up its efforts to recruit Africans into the BSAP. A special recruiting drive was launched in Bulawayo in October 1977 and from there to other parts of the country. In June 1979 the Minister of Law and Order said that recruiting for the police force was to be further increased and that more police stations were to be established in rural and tribal areas. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 23.6.79)

In September 1979 the national administrative director of the UANC Mr. Ayoub Kara announced the formation of a "youth police force" to help

farmers forced off their land by the war to return. Farmers would be provided with trained and armed personnel to guard their properties on a round-the-clock basis. Mr. Kara maintained that the country's military and political leaders had been consulted about this scheme and "all had agreed with enthusiasm". He added, rather grandiosely, that more than 250,000 unemployed youths could be immediately enrolled as members of this new police force. (*BBC Monitoring Service 25.9.79*)

Police Anti-Terrorist Units (PATU)

White members of the BSAP today are actively deployed in the front line under the aegis of the Police Anti-Terrorist Units (PATU). PATU was started as a reconnaissance unit in the early 60's by Superintendent Bill Bailey, a veteran of the British Army's long-range desert group which operated behind enemy lines during World War II. He was assisted by another British ex-soldier, Reg Seekins, who had also served in the Western Desert in the Special Air Service under Colonel David Stirling. Each PATU "stick" consists of four to five men and usually includes one African policeman. It operates as a highly mobile, independent and self-sufficient unit, staying out in the bush for several weeks at a time. Whereas PATU's original role was restricted to patrolling the borders and collecting intelligence from the local population, it has since developed along combat lines. A stick's mission is to "seek and destroy". Up until quite recently conscripts were allowed to complete their national service in the BSAP as an alternative to army training, or would simply be allocated to the BSAP so that each PATU stick was likely to contain a mixture of regulars, reservists and national servicemen. In 1978, however, the joint Minister of Manpower in the transitional government, Rowan Cronje, announced that from 1979 onwards, no more national servicemen would be allocated to the police. White national servicemen who are physically fit are now almost invariably allocated to army infantry units.

Members of PATU sticks are taught bushcraft, close-quarter combat, all aspects of small arms combat, map-reading, tracking and first aid. New sticks can be formed in a few weeks according to the regime.

The BSAP possesses a number of elite units for special and clandestine operations:-

Police Support Unit (PSU)

The Police Support Unit, known as the BSAP's "mailed fist" or the "Black Boots", is a highly-trained and relatively highly paid unit of the paramilitary forces, which operates deep in the war zones, in some cases along similar lines to that of the Selous Scouts. Most of the men and some of the junior drill instructors are black but the unit also includes white policemen and national servicemen. In 1974, the PSU was believed to comprise 30-40 whites, including a number of ex-Congo mercenaries, and around 300 Africans. It has since become increasingly involved in the guerilla war.

In early 1978, in an unprecedented move, the military command decided to move all white patrol officers under the age of 21 directly into the Support Unit. Most white patrol officers already had a commitment to tours of bush duty with PATU sticks. The move appears to have been part of the overall strategy of moving fit young men directly into full time combat duty, in this case to bolster up the Support Unit.

The PSU evolved from the Askari platoon, an all-African unit whose original function was to guard Government House and perform various ceremonial duties. During the unrest of the early 1960s, however, the Askari platoon supplied troops as armed back-up for the police and became known as the Support Unit.

Nowadays each PSU is highly mobile, going out into the bush for six-week stretches during which the men act on their own initiative and must be completely self-sufficient. They are armed with light machine guns and FN rifles and each troop - in which Africans outnumber white personnel by about eight to one - has its own transport. PSU instructors, many of whom are ex-British army regulars, are trained at the army's School of Infantry and units often team up with army or air force personnel in the field. The current overall strength of the PSU is concealed by the regime.

The PSU possesses an extensive range of vehicles, including Hyenas, Rhinos and Kudus, as used by the Rhodesia Armoured Car Regiment. The vehicles are used for transporting troops and supplies and mean that the PSU can function independently from other units and even the local JOC.

The PSU was due to move into a brand-new base in Salisbury in mid-1979. Previously the unit was housed at Tomlinson Depot. The new base, costing Rh.\$6 million, will include full accommodation for all members, plus a school, clinic, canteens, headquarters block, training centre and lecture rooms, swimming pool and sports facilities. A section of the Police Reserve is attached to the PSU to act as drivers and radio operators at base camps and headquarters.

Mounted Police

The BSAP Mounted Police unit, nicknamed "Equus", is the equivalent of the Grey's Scouts in the army. (The Ministry of Internal Affairs also has a mounted unit, based at Mount Darwin in the north-east). The Mounted Police were formed in 1977 and operate mainly in the west of the country along the Botswana border, from a base at Plumtree. Their commander in 1977 was Inspector Peter Combes. Officially the main role of the Mounted Police is to detect crime but they are trained in counter-insurgency and can be used in tracking and hunting down guerillas. They have also been heavily involved in operations against cattle-rustling, an offence closely associated with support for the guerilla forces, in the eyes of the regime.

Urban Emergency Units

The Urban Emergency Units are specially trained to combat guerillas operating in urban areas, as well as

criminals. They are modelled on the US SWAT units (Special Weapons and Tactics), and include at least one woman. The Urban Emergency Units seem to have had their precursor in the Special Unit, which was reported to have been established in the first half of 1975 to counter urban guerilla activity. In October 1976 the Special Unit was reported to comprise 30 men in the Salisbury area, two of whom were black. Members were regular policemen specially trained to tackle marksmen holed up in office blocks or other urban premises. The men were reported to use helicopters for roof-top landings and to be armed with pistols, submachine guns and automatic shotguns. Plans of all buildings in Salisbury were said to be available to the police on microfilm. (*Johannesburg Star* 16.10.76)

A new police station at Inez Terrace in Salisbury, scheduled for completion in February 1979, incorporates the city's first rooftop heliport. The station is intended to accommodate all the uniformed police responsible for patrolling central Salisbury. The CID and a number of other plainclothes sections remain in the old police station in Railway Avenue. The contractor at Inez Terrace is Richard Costain Africa. (*The Herald* 5.12.77).

Most of the founder members of the Urban Emergency Units have graduated from work in the Special Branch or the Crime Prevention Units (See below).

Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Special Branch (SB)

Both the CID and the SB are heavily involved in counter-insurgency work although their activities receive very little publicity. They are responsible, for example, for completing cases for prosecution under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act – i.e. interrogation of captured freedom fighters and others suspected of assisting the armed struggle. It is undoubtedly within the ranks of the CID and SB that some of the most sophisticated techniques of torture and intimidation are put to use. Both units have important intelligence functions and make use of an extensive network of African informers, said to include a number of young children who are "paid" for their services, and even prostitutes..

The **Special Branch**, which concentrates almost exclusively on political work, has been for many years in the forefront of the regime's attempts to suppress the liberation movement. The SB has its own interrogation centres and operates independently of the main police force. Its members are universally feared, hated and despised by the African majority for their brutal behaviour and terrifying torture techniques.

Members of the **Criminal Investigation Department**, which includes both whites and Africans, are drawn from the regular BSAP on the basis of at least 12 months' service. Once confirmed within the CID a member will remain in the Department for the rest of his service, which will include periodic duties with the Special Branch. Provincial CID officers commanding the provinces of Mashonaland/Salisbury, Midlands, Matabeleland, Manicaland and Victoria are directly

responsible for the Special Branch functions within their areas and double as Provincial Special Branch officers.

Officially, the regime acknowledges that the Rhodesian CID and Special Branch have working relations with other police forces around the world, for example in the exchange and reciprocal circulation of finger prints. Unofficially, cooperation at all levels, notably in intelligence collection and sharing, is believed to have continued at a high level throughout the period since UDI, in particular with the South African intelligence network BOSS (since renamed) and with British intelligence. Evidence has been published in Britain, for example, of links between the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, a "right-wing think-tank . . . believed to be closely connected to British intelligence", and Col. Claud Greathead of the Rhodesian Secret Service. According to the same source:

The South Africans have maintained close links with the Rhodesian intelligence service. They have met continually to discuss the defence and security of their respective countries and to "pool intelligence information". It is also very likely that information from Britain to South Africa has been passed on to Rhodesia. And this indirect link probably is not the only one. There are a number of sources which claim that direct contact exists between the Special Branch in Britain and Rhodesian intelligence . . . Subsequent to UDI it became vital for the Rhodesian government to be aware of Britain's intentions concerning sanctions and the activities of the liberation movements in exile. To this end the Rhodesian and South African intelligence community set up a spy network in Britain, and with its informers, kept the Rhodesian government abreast of the latest developments. (*People's News Service*, 2.10.79)

One of the heads of the Rhodesian security apparatus, Ken Flower, visited London during the Lancaster House talks. With his close counterpart Derek Robinson he is in fact no stranger to Britain.

Special Branch makes extensive use of a network of plainclothes black and white police throughout the country, known as **Ground Coverage**. Ground Coverage exists solely as an extension of Special Branch (SB), in effect to widen the area of SB operations in intelligence gathering and establishing networks of informers. Personnel posted to Ground Coverage work along similar lines to SB, but their role is simply to pass on all intelligence, not to act on it. In fact nearly all intelligence obtained by units such as the Crime Prevention Unit, Urban Emergency Unit, by military intelligence, or in the normal course of police and military operations, is also eventually channeled through to Special Branch for centralised processing and analysis.

Members of the police may be seconded to **Special Branch II** for special security duties. Special Branch II, a highly-paid and extremely secretive organisation, also falls outside the ambit of the regular police force and is believed during Ian Smith's reign as premier to have come under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. (See also **MILITARY SPEND**-

(ING) It possesses a substantial number of civilian-registered vehicles and operates in a clandestine way along the lines of the Selous Scouts. Special Branch II is generally believed, for example, to have been responsible for the kidnapping of Dr. Edson Sithole, at that time Publicity Secretary of the ANC, in October 1975. Nothing further has even been learnt with certainty of Dr. Sithole's fate and he is by now almost certainly dead. SB II has bases all over the country and its headquarters was reported in 1976 to be inside the Signals Headquarters at Bindura. (*Africa, February 1976*).

Crime Prevention Units (CPUs).

These are loosely organised, plainclothes units of both blacks and whites, operating in urban areas and particularly the African townships. In 1977 CPUs recruited from among the local unemployed black population were reported to be terrorizing a number of townships and appeared to be operating as unsupervised gangs of thugs. Members of the CPUs devote much time to drug detection and, like the CID and the Special Branch, to building up their own networks of informers. While being concerned with crime detection and prevention the CPUs have become heavily involved in counter-insurgency operations, in close liaison with Special Branch and Ground Coverage.

Women in the BSAP

Women have come to play an increasingly important role in the police as more of their male counterparts have been deployed in active service in the front-line. They are now deployed in almost every branch of the BSAP, including drugs, fraud, road blocks, the Special Branch, Crime Prevention Units and Urban Emergency Units. They operate radio links, administer first aid, search female suspects etc. However, they only receive 80% of male police salaries. (*The Herald 3.7.78*)

In February 1979 the Joint Minister of Law and Order in the transitional government told the Rhodesian parliament that 180 white and 118 black policewomen were currently employed in the BSAP. The regular women's police section is matched by a Women's Field Reserve. The most senior post occupied by a policewoman is that of Inspector. (*Debates 21.2.79; The Herald 3.7.78; see above*).

The Police Reserve

It has been convention for many years for adult white men who have completed their national service, or Territorial Force commitments, to become Police Reservists and Police Special Reservists. The size of each division within the Police Reserve is classified information, but the total potential strength is around 35,000. The vast majority of reservists are in the Field Reserve, where they function, in theory, as an emergency force.

Reservists are divided into three age ranges: there are very few men in the under-38 age group in the Police Reserve, most having been posted to Territorial Force for combat duties. This group does however include a number of farmers who live in very sensitive

areas, who were made exempt from Territorial Force commitments because of security problems on their farms. Most farmers in operational areas now have an additional commitment to locally organised paramilitary organisations, organised along the lines of a 'home guard'. Under-38s in the Police Reserve have a liability, in theory, of 190 days per year.

38-50s serve for 70 days per year. This group provides the bulk of Police Reservists in operation. Men over 50 have a compulsory commitment of 42 days per year. Most of them, particularly those classified as medically unfit for full-time active service, undertake this in the Police Special Reserve or 'D' Reserve, a kind of home guard of probably over 10,000 men operating chiefly in urban centres. The Special Reserve also includes volunteers, some of them over 70 years old. The unit was revived in 1974, after lying dormant through the 60s to cope with undermanning in urban areas caused by the deployment of regular and field reserve police in the war zones. Its personnel are equipped with lighter weapons than other police units and undertake guard, curfew, patrol and road block duties.

The Police Special Reserve also includes a unit called the "Key Point Specials", whose function is to guard key points of national importance such as power stations, water works, pumping stations etc. The Key Point Specials are drawn from employees at each point, who, should an attack occur, immediately assume full police powers including legal powers of arrest.

The Police Specials are charged with maintaining law and order in urban residential areas — in practice, this means that they patrol exclusively in white, Asian and Coloured residential areas.

In September 1979 the Minister of Law and Order Francis Zindoga said that the Special Reserve was to be asked to increase the number of its patrols because of "banditry perpetrated by misguided people". He said that the ultimate aim of his Ministry was nevertheless to ease the call-up of Specials and substitute regular force men and young blacks who would be trained. (*BBC Monitoring Service 10.9.79*)

The Women's Field Reserve was started in 1960 and supplies volunteers to take over Police station administration while male police are on active duty. Women Police Reservists are given weapons drill up to FN level. About six per cent of the total reserve force, both men and women, serve on a more regular basis in the 'A' Reserve, where their duties are to all intents and purposes identical to those of full-time policemen, and the rank structure mirrors that of the regular force.

African Police Reserve

The great majority of police reservists are white, but there is also an African Police Reserve, formed in 1958 from a handful of African BSAP regulars. It now numbers about 3,000 men, and is based at Yotamu, a Salisbury township. African reservists were reported in 1977 to undergo 10-day instruction courses and to be earning Rh.\$1.30 a day when on duty, plus rations, increasing to Rh.\$1.80 a day when on active front-line service with the Police Anti-

Terrorist Unit (PATU). (*Sunday Mail* 13.11.77). When not deployed with PATU, African police reservists are used for static guard duty, in administration, as radio and telephone operators, in catering and transport.

The Officer Commanding the African Police Reserve in 1977 was Inspector Badenhorst, and the unit's training team included one Section Officer Tommy Heslip, a former officer in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and veteran of the war in Northern Ireland. (*The Herald* 25.4.77).

Following the extension of conscription to Africans a number of Africans in the 21 to 30 age group are now being called up for service in the Police 'B' Reserve, where they are liable for up to 140 days service a year on the same basis as whites. A total of 446 Africans including 126 teachers were due to have been attested into the 'B' Reserve by the end of October 1979. They will receive the standard rate of Rh.\$5.20 a day, "providing they meet the normal salary requirements" and will be used for 'brightlighting', convoy duties, cordon and search, road blocks, curfew and key point guard duty. (*The Herald* 30.8.79)

Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW)

The Police Reserve also includes an Air Wing of light aircraft. PRAW members are all volunteers, usually businessmen or farmers who are police reservists, own their own aircraft, have a minimum of 200 hours flying time and are night rated. Each undergoes a stringent flying test each year. The PRAW, formed in 1957, was modelled on the Kenya Police Reserve Air Wing, used in operations against the Mau Mau. Its Headquarters is at police headquarters in Salisbury, but a "flexible and decentralised chain of command" links area flight commanders located throughout the country.

The size of the Air Wing is said by the regime to have increased "dramatically" since the present phase of the guerilla war commenced at the end of 1972. It is responsible for reconnaissance and target spotting, directing ground forces, supply drops, transporting tracker dogs or specialist teams to follow-up areas, casualty evacuation ("casevac") and courier work in collaboration with other security force units. The first woman member joined the Air Wing in 1978. PRAW works closely with the Police Reserve Marine Division, which is responsible for patrolling on Lake Kariba and the Zambezi. (*FOCUS on Rhodesia Vol 3 No. 5 1978*)

In February 1979, the Rhodesian House of Assembly was told by Rhodesian Front backbenchers that a number of people were making large amounts of money by renting private aircraft and boats to the BSAP at unreasonably high prices — even to the extent of purchasing aircraft specifically for this purpose. The Joint Minister of Law and Order Chris Anderson said in reply that it was unreasonable to expect the BSAP to purchase the aircraft and boats it needed because this would place a strain on Rhodesia's foreign currency reserves. He rejected a suggestion that the Police Reserve Air Wing should be placed under the control of the Rhodesian Air Force.

The aircraft operated by the PRAW should nevertheless be added to the Rhodesian Air Force inventory of armaments included in Appendix II, as they are an important element in the regime's control of the air.

The BSAP's heavy commitment to the war has produced a situation in which its "normal" functions of maintaining law and order are entirely subordinated to the overall war effort. This is recognised in official publications from the regime. A five year *Programme of Development in the Public Sector* published by the Ministry of Finance in January 1979, for example, states that:

Additional men will be required to provide the number needed to carry out normal police duties in the conventional sense . . . whilst a settlement will give rise to amnesties and a consequential immediate reduction in the prison population, the resumption of normal activity by the Police will lead to an increase in convictions.

Many of the regulations now governing martial law areas were designed to cut down on the time-consuming investigative and preventative work usually undertaken by the police, by granting sweeping powers of arrest and detention to the army, the security force auxiliaries (private armies) and other security force personnel. The regime has also responded to the deteriorating security situation and the growing burden of front line combat duty incumbent on the police by setting up loosely organised and quasi-official units to operate as plainclothes "police" in the townships. The "Ziso re Vanhu" established in 1979 under the auspices of the UANC as an informer network, for example, (*see section on SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES*), appear to be a further development of the plainclothes Crime Prevention Units, and one which is even less subject to disciplinary controls.

Like the army and airforce, the Rhodesian police has attracted its share of mercenaries. According to an official regime publication,

The BSA Police has traditionally been a force where young men from abroad joined up for a few years and then found themselves staying on. The Women's Section of the Police is no different, although many more Rhodesian girls than foreigners apply. (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No. 5, 1978*)

THE GUARD FORCE

In December 1975 the regime announced that overall responsibility for the euphemistically named 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages — the fenced concentration camps set up in the war zones — was to be transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Defence. A new unit, the Guard Force, was established as an autonomous section of the armed forces shortly afterwards and from July 1976, took over the control and administration of protected villages. It grew very rapidly and by the end of 1976, 2,500 African recruits had completed four weeks military training in anti-ambush drill, mine detection and weapons use, and provision had been made for a further 500 Africans to be trained each month.

The Guard Force is a racially mixed (predominantly African) unit, and receives allocations of white national servicemen and Territorial Force members, particularly those from the older age groups and less physically fit. The whites are normally trained as 'keep commanders'. Each protected village is guarded by a force of about 20 African troops led by one or two white keep commanders, making up a Guard Unit. Members of the Guard Force are also used to guard white farms, in troops of about six men to a farm. By the end of 1978 more than 500 farms throughout the country were under Guard Force protection. (*The Herald* 28.12.78)

As an alternative to the Guard Force a protected village may be controlled by a contingent of African District Security Assistants from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under the command of a white national serviceman. In either case, the African inmates of the fenced camps are supervised day and night by armed troops who far from 'protecting' the residents, are known to frequently abuse their position. Numerous instances of rape and assault against African villagers have been reported in the Rhodesian press, together with cases of insubordination and indiscipline. In June 1979, for example, an African member of the Guard Force was found guilty in the Salisbury High Court of murdering his white keep commander. He was deemed to be suffering from a mental disorder. (*The Herald* 8.6.79) In August 1978, a Regional Magistrate said in sentencing an African Guard Force member to 7½ years imprisonment for rape that the Guard Force command should check the credentials of its recruits more carefully. (*The Herald* 31.8.78)

A posting to a protected village is regarded as one of the least prestigious forms of military service by white troops, and efforts have been made by the regime in recent months to upgrade and glamourize the Guard Force. At the same time, as the war has escalated — and particularly as an increasing number of protected villages, or rather the troops guarding them, have come under attack by guerilla fighters — the Guard Force has assumed a direct counter-insurgency role. In January 1979, for example, the white Joint Minister of Defence in the transitional government, Hilary Squires, reassured white conscripts allocated to the Guard Force that it was "one of the most crucial arms of the defence force". Squires said he had heard that "the parents of some of the national servicemen, and some of them personally, were dismayed and sadly disappointed at being allocated to the Guard Force — that they had wanted to join the SAS, the RLI or another elite unit and do some real fighting". However it was essential to keep areas clear of guerillas and this was the Guard Force's function: "you are likely to be in the front-line contacts just as much as anyone else". (*The Herald* 19.1.79)

White national servicemen allocated to the Guard Force undergo 10 weeks of training at the regimental headquarters at Chikurubi, near Salisbury. By early 1979 this was reported to concentrate almost entirely on counter-insurgency warfare, under instructors who include former SAS and RLI veterans. The conscripts

learn bayonet fighting, mine detection, weapons handling, radio voice procedure, fieldcraft and map reading. The Officer Commanding the Guard Force Regimental Depot is Senior Commandant Robin Tarr, a retired regimental sergeant major and captain with the RLI. (*The Herald* 7.3.79)

Black recruits to the Guard Force are also reported to be being trained "to cope more effectively with infantry situations". In May 1979 the first two black cadets were commissioned as officers in the Guard Force. As trainee Junior Commandants, they had been "extensively trained in counter-insurgency procedures" and were due to be posted to the forward areas in an infantry-type role. (*The Herald* 19.5.79)

Relations between white keep commanders and their African troops in the 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages are apparently extremely tense and in some cases are believed to have reached breaking point. Unconfirmed reports indicate that in certain keeps, particularly those heavily infiltrated by Patriotic Front guerillas, African Guard Force members have all but thrown in their lot with the guerillas and are assisting them with supplies and weapons. Keep commanders are said to be extremely nervous to go out of their fortified dug-outs after dark and are believed to be simply ignoring many day time duties assigned to them, delegating these to their African troops instead.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, now renamed 'Home Affairs' in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government, is responsible for African administration in the Tribal Trust Lands. District Commissioners, and other staff from Internal Affairs, have for many years been one of the most immediate manifestations of white authority for thousands of rural Africans, and have been responsible for enforcing a wide range of unpopular policies in collaboration with regime-appointed African councils and chiefs.

With the increasing penetration of the rural areas by guerillas of the liberation movement, Internal Affairs personnel have become involved in implementing security precautions, so much so that their usual administrative role has become almost entirely subordinated to the war effort. Above all, Internal Affairs is responsible for setting up and administering the hated protected village programme. Even despite the formation of the Guard Force (*see previous section*), Internal Affairs were still responsible for guarding 50% of protected villages at the beginning of 1978 (*Sunday Mail* 26.2.78). Within the keeps, District Assistants and other Internal Affairs personnel are distinguished from other members of the security forces by their distinctive red-trimmed hats (causing them to be known as "cherry-tops" by other troops), and no-camouflage uniforms.

In 1976 a new grade of African 'District Security Assistant' was introduced in Internal Affairs ('Intaf'). These receive four weeks training, predominantly in counter-insurgency techniques. Only 10% of the

course is concerned with administration. (*Sunday Mail* 26.2.78)

In June 1977, the first of eight specially trained 'flying squads' or 'Administrative Reinforcement Units' went into action in the Mount Darwin area. These comprise around 30 District Assistants whose function is to go to any part of the country at short notice to restore order after guerilla attacks on African councils or chiefs. They are fully trained in counter-insurgency techniques. Intaf has a mounted unit, also based at Mount Darwin.

Around this time it was further decided to establish a National Service Unit as an overtly paramilitary wing of Intaf. A quota of national servicemen and territorials are allocated to Intaf and undergo paramilitary training at the depot headquarters at Chikurubi (shared with the Guard Force). About 60% of the training is devoted to weapons drill, anti-ambush procedure and other counter-insurgency techniques. Many of the national servicemen go on to become regular members of Intaf, in which case they are required to learn at least one African language fluently. Once they have completed their initial training they are known as 'Vedettes'. The National Service Unit is divided into 'Echelons' and the administration of call-ups, pre-deployment training and retraining etc is handled by Territorial Force members. The Unit includes an engineering section. Vedettes are thereafter posted to protected villages where they will be in charge of contingents of African Assistants and District Security Assistants.

The establishment of the National Service Units caused Intaf's personnel to increase by "several thousand" as recruits were drafted in. (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia*, No. 5, 1978). While the regime continues to maintain that Intaf's role is primarily an administrative one it has in fact been fully integrated into the combined operations structure and plays a significant counter-insurgency role as 'mediator' between local people and the security forces, to use the regime's own terminology. As such Intaf personnel are involved in keeping in touch with government informers and sympathisers and are well placed to undertake intelligence gathering of an extensive kind and to further the regime's psychological warfare programmes.

THE AIR FORCE

Possession of an air force has enabled the illegal regime to mount devastating bombing raids on targets both inside Zimbabwe and against the front line states. Air superiority is crucial to the regime's survival. Planes of British origin dating back to pre-UDI days have been specially adapted for bush warfare by Rhodesian technicians — for example by mounting air to ground rockets beneath the fuselage. Over the last four years, furthermore, the Rhodesian Air Force has expanded its fleet out of all proportion as a result of a series of spectacular sanctions-busting transactions, and has acquired some of the most lethal counter-insurgency aircraft available on the international arms market. An official publication from the regime describes the tactics employed by

'Fire Force' units:

As a result of the close liaison between the Rhodesian Army, the British South Africa Police and the Rhodesia Air Force, countless terrorist encampments have been destroyed during the past 12 years. The system in general works this way, ground or air forces locate the intruders, and when necessary, call for air support. Within a very short time the aircraft are there swooping in with cannon and rocket fire, and bombs if these are required. (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia*, No. 3, 1976)

According to the Rhodesian business weekly, *Financial Gazette*, the role of the Rhodesian Air Force is as follows:-

The Rhodesian Air Force today fills four major roles. In order of importance they are: air defence; maintenance of a deterrent; tactical support; and a "humanitarian role".

The deterrent role is crucial as has been shown by successful attacks on terrorist bases in Zambia. Concurrently with the escalation of the bush war, the question of air defence has inevitably assumed greater importance. The threat of air attack however remote has to be encountered.

The Air Force tactical support role has emerged as a vital aspect of anti-terrorist operations, with the success of Fire Force concept in which troops and aircraft mount combined flexible operations against reported terrorist presence throughout the country. In addition, an efficient air-ground strike capability is available for use if necessary.

The fourth role — the "humanitarian" work of the airforce — includes casevac (casualty evacuation), search and rescue operations, and a number of other activities such as aerial survey, reconnaissance and supply work. (*Financial Gazette* 17.11.78)

This report more or less sums up the view put across by official military sources.

Fire Force units are now spread throughout the entire country and have become an integral part of the regime's counter-insurgency operations. Fire Force groups rely on the combined use of helicopters, troop-carrying Douglas Dakotas and reconnaissance aircraft such as the Lynx, together with ground, heli-borne and paratroops. A full scale airstrike by Hawker Hunter fighters and Canberra bombers can be called in as necessary in addition. Fire Force functions as a 'quick reaction' force to reports of guerilla presence and as such affords troops maximum mobility. Most troops attached to infantry units such as the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Rhodesian African Rifles are now trained for parachute jumps with Fire Force, as a matter of routine.

According to one of the regime's official military publications, a Fire Force group is made up of a number of Airforce aircraft (helicopter and fixed wing) and personnel who co-operate with a number of army personnel (troops and paratroops). They form a quick reaction team, completely mobile and self-contained, who are able to provide firepower or assistance immediately on request. The advantage of Fire Force is that the

entire operation can be packed up and moved to a new base within twenty-four hours. (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No. 5, 1978*)

The importance of the air force to the regime's war effort must not be underestimated. It is unlikely that the security forces could mount a military operation of any size without air force support in reconnaissance, air-strike, casevac, trooping, re-supply and other roles. The regime itself readily admits that this is the reality of the situation. A confidential report prepared in February 1979 for the United Nations Security Council on illegal aircraft transfers to the regime suggested that "in the short term, acquisition of the aircraft in question may have been decisive militarily, perhaps enabling Smith to avoid collapse". The report cited airforce spending by the regime multiplying six fold in a five year period, from 9.7 million South African rand in 1972-3 to about 60 million rand in 1977-8. (*Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 4.3.79*)

It is equally important to point out, however, that the airforce is not exclusively, or even primarily, used for operations against guerilla units, but also as a crucial element in the regime's terror tactics of blanket bombing African villages, refugee camps and other civilian and economic targets in neighbouring African countries. In July 1976, for example, the regime's Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs P.K. van de Byl, warned that

if villages harbour terrorists and terrorists are found running about in villages, naturally they will be bombed and destroyed in any manner which the commander on the spot considers to be desirable in the suitable prosecution of a successful campaign... Where the civilian population involves itself with terrorism then somebody is bound to get hurt and one can have little sympathy for those who are mixed up with terrorists when finally they receive the wrath of the security forces. (*Parliamentary Debates 2.7.76*)

There is no doubt that bombing and rocket attacks against the civilian population have become more and more frequent and indiscriminate since that statement was made. It is not the intention of this publication to detail the kind of air attacks perpetrated by the regime both inside Zimbabwe and externally (see e.g. *Muzorewa-Smith regime incursions into the front line states, March 1978 to September 1979, paper prepared for Anti-Apartheid Movement Teach-in on Zimbabwe, 15 September 1979*), but a recent statement by Josiah Tongogara, Chief of Defence of ZANU (Patriotic Front), is one indication of the devastation that is being wrought. The enemy, he said,

comes with Mirage supersonic jets, bombers, spotter planes and helicopters. Using these aircraft supplied from France, Italy, America and Israel through South Africa he drops bombs and rockets. The aircraft bomb everywhere without any bother to pinpoint targets. One wonders how big their arsenal of bombs is because the fear-ridden pilots use them aimlessly and recklessly. It is just a way to frighten people... The carpet-bombing is worrying us for two main reasons. We are worried

about our landscape - the flora and fauna. Whole tracts of land are being ravaged, causing massive destruction to green life and animal life. An ecological disaster is in the making in our beautiful country. International war conventions are against this type of warfare. (*Zimbabwe News Vol. 11 No. 1, Jan-June 1979*)

A type of napalm, sprayed from the air, has been used in attacks both inside Zimbabwe and against the front line state since at least 1976. Called 'Frantam', it is manufactured inside the country. (See also the section of *CHEMICAL WARFARE*)

The Rhodesian Air Force today has a greater percentage pro rata of manpower and equipment in the operational area than any other branch of the security forces. Its overall strength according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies is 1,500 personnel. Estimates of the exact numbers of different types of aircraft which the regime is using differ considerably. Precise statistics are virtually impossible to maintain because the regime obviously makes every effort to conceal losses due to guerilla action and new additions to the air force obtained via South Africa and Western suppliers.

The Rhodesian Air Force is believed to be heavily dependent on mercenary pilots, noticeably South Africans and Israelis. With around 300 aircraft and helicopters (see *Appendix II*), yet officially only around 100 Rhodesian pilots to fly them, the discrepancies in the statistics themselves point to such a conclusion.

The air force is organised along conventional squadron lines although aircraft may be dispersed throughout the country, or attached to joint units such as Fire Force units. Pilots spend up to eight months a year on operational duty, and on average fly troops into two contacts per day. Helicopter technicians, who are trained to use the machine guns which are fitted to each helicopter, accompany helicopter pilots and act as gunners.

No. 1 Squadron

This is a fighter combat squadron, based at Thornhill airbase near Gwelo. It is composed of 9 Hawker Hunter FGA.9 fighters, left out of 12 obtained by the regime in 1962. The aircraft have been specially adapted for ground attack using rockets, bombs and cannons. Maximum speed 730 mph. Ferry range: 1 800 miles.

No. 2 Squadron

Also based at Thornhill, No. 2 Squadron is both an operational and training squadron, using De Havilland Vampires of both FB.9 and T.55 type. There are reportedly 18 of these aircraft still in use, some of them dating back to 1956. They are used largely for converting pilots to jet fighters, although occasionally the FB.9s are used for combat duties. Armament potential: rockets, bombs and cannons. Max. range 1 200 miles. Maximum speed: 520 mph.

No. 3 Squadron

This is a transport squadron. The aircraft are based at airfields throughout the country, some as part of the Fire Force units, for transporting paratroopers. The Squadron is closely involved with the SAS and provides transport for all SAS paratroop operations. It is also used by Psyac, for example for leaflet drops and 'skyshouts'. The following aircraft comprise No. 3 Squadron:-

- Douglas Dakota C-47s – there are estimated to be 13 of these aircraft still in use. They are used for transport and supply purposes, particularly for paratroopers.
- Britten Norman Islanders – the BN-2 Islanders are originally light transport and patrol aircraft, with short take-off and landing characteristics. They can carry up to 10 persons, plus the pilot. They have a maximum speed of 170 mph. and range of 1,380 miles. They are reported to be used for transporting paratroopers. It is believed that two BN-2As arrived in 1975 and a further 12 in 1977. The Stockholm International Institute for Peace Research reported the delivery of 14 in 1977. (See *Appendix 1 items 15 and 20*)

It is not known exactly how the regime was able to obtain these aircraft. However, an interesting sequel to the delivery of the Islanders to Rhodesia is that one Mr. John Fairey, son of Sir Richard Fairey, the founder of Fairey Aviation, was reported to have gone to Rhodesia in 1978, to fight as a pilot in the Rhodesian Air Force. The Islanders are in fact made by Britten-Norman (Bembridge) Ltd., a member of the same Fairey group of companies. Mr. Fairey was said to "feel very strongly about Rhodesia". (*Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 22.10.78; see also Appendix 1, items 15 and 20*)

The Islander can be easily converted into a combat aircraft, in which role it is called the 'Defender'. It has an armament potential of up to 2,300 pounds of bombs, or two pairs of 7.62 mm machine guns or 68 mm SNEB rockets. In either role the Islander has been described as an ideal counter-insurgency aircraft.

- Beech Baron – a single Beech Baron 55 is in use in No. 3 Squadron for transporting VIPs.

No. 4 Squadron

This squadron is both a reconnaissance and combat squadron, based at different airfields throughout the country, often as part of Fire Force units. The following aircraft are operational in No. 4 Squadron:-

- Aermacchi AL-60FS Trojans – 7 of an original 12 delivered in 1967 in a sanctions busting coup, are widely reported to be in use for offensive troop support, casevac, transport work and reconnaissance. A further consignment of 7 is believed to have been delivered in 1971. Armament potential: rockets, machine guns, teargas, parachute flares. Maximum speed: 125 mph. Maximum range 600 miles. (See *Appendix 1 items 3/7*)
- Cessna/Reims FTB 337 – now believed to number 13 or 14, an estimated 20 or more of these aircraft were obtained in 1976, in another sanctions busting coup. In the Rhodesian Air Force they are

known as the 'Lynx', presumably to disguise their original identity. According to military sources they are used for reconnaissance and light transport work. However they can be used for light strike missions, and can be armed with 68 mm SNEB rockets or 7.62 mm machine guns. They are ideal aircraft for a variety of counter-insurgency duties, due to their unusual lift and speed, and adaptability for small airstrips. The Cessna/Reims 337s are made jointly in the United States and France by the company Reims Aviation. Maximum speed: 199 mph. Maximum range 1120 miles. (See *Appendix 1, item 18*)

- Rockwell OV10 Bronco – the regime acquired four of these aircraft early in 1977. Produced by the United States Company, Rockwell International, they have been described as "one of the deadliest and most versatile light strike and counter-insurgency aircraft in the world". (*"Arsenal of Democracy", T. Gervasi; New York; Grove Press 1978; see Appendix 1 item 19*). Furthermore, the version of OV-10 now in Rhodesia is believed to be equipped with sophisticated laser range finders and night sighting equipment, plus a night observation gunship system, enabling it to perform target destination missions and strikes at night. If used for bombing missions, the OV-10 can carry up to 3,600 pounds of bombs or 1,200 pounds of bombs and four pods of 68 mm SNEB rockets. Maximum speed: 281 mph. Maximum range (with full weapon load): 228 miles.
- Siai-Marchetti SF 260W Warriors – the aviation weekly *Flight International* has indicated that the regime may well be using the SF 260Ws in No. 4 Squadron. They were acquired in 1978 via a bogus order from the Comoros islands, and exported by a Belgian distributor. (*Flight International 4.8.79*). Other sources believe they may be in No. 6 (Training) Squadron. Estimates of the numbers in use vary from 17 to 22. The SF 260W is an aerial reconnaissance and light strike aircraft. (See also *Appendix 1 item 26*)

No. 5 Squadron

This is a bomber squadron, based at the Old Sarum airbase near Salisbury and composed of an estimated eight (possibly only seven) English Electric Canberrasix B2s and two T4s, part of a consignment of 18, delivered in 1959. Armament potential: 8 – 10,000 pounds of bombs. Maximum speed: 420 mph. Maximum range: 2,500 nautical miles.

No. 6 Squadron

This squadron is the training ground for air force pilots, who complete 115 hours of basic flying before moving on to jets and in some cases helicopters. There are 13 Provost T.52s, acquired in 1955, in the squadron. In practice most of the 'training' aircraft used by the regime are easily adaptable to combat roles.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (*Military Balance 1979/80*), the

regime also has 31 Aermacchi 'Genets' which are used for training and reconnaissance purposes. Having finished training on the Provosts, pupils go to South Africa for conversion on to the Atlas-built MB 326 Impala. These Impalas are believed to be owned by Rhodesia but have not been flown outside South Africa and are operated under the auspices of the South African Air Force. (*Flight International* 4.8.79; see *Appendix I item 27*)

No. 7 Squadron

A helicopter squadron. As such it plays a key role in bush warfare especially through its ability to transport troops over short distances at speed and land them in tactical formation ready for immediate action. Helicopters are deployed throughout the country, and play a crucial part in the mounting of Fire Force operations and in casualty evacuation. There are several helicopters attached to every Fire Force unit. The two best-known helicopters in use are:-

- Alouette Mark IIIs – French-built Alouettes have for some years been the key to the fast movement of heli-borne troops, and the general mobility of troops in operational areas. According to one of the regime's official military publications, *Contact*: "Helicopters have become almost indispensable . . . It is almost impossible to list all the tasks in which the choppers are involved in the present counter-insurgency operations". As such the helicopters undoubtedly have the heaviest loss rate in the Air Force. Officially, there are said to be 34 left. A number of Alouettes were left behind by the South African Government when several thousand paramilitary forces were officially withdrawn from Rhodesia in 1975. It is almost certain that South Africa has supplied the regime with numbers of Alouettes since then. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (*Military Balance 1979/80*) the regime has 43. Other sources put the figure at 66. It may well be much higher. The Alouettes are mounted with 20 mm heavy machine guns and are capable of devastating air attacks. Alouettes are also used to direct ground troops during operations.
- Agusta Bell 205s ('Huey's) – 11 (possibly 12) of these helicopters were obtained by the regime in 1978 in a major sanctions-busting coup, delivered via South Africa. The Agusta Bell 205 is an Italian version of the UH-1 Iroquois military helicopter used by the United States Forces in Vietnam. It was described as the 'workhorse' of many US operations in Vietnam. The regime has at most 10 of these helicopters left in operation. The Bell 205 can carry a substantial load of armaments, including 40 mm grenade launchers with a one mile range and pods for aerial rockets with a range of more than 2 miles, plus 20 mm heavy machine guns. Alternatively, as a transport chopper it can carry up to 15 troops or six casualty litters. It has a speed of 127 mph and maximum range of 318 miles.
The regime is also believed to possess at least 27

SA-330L Puma helicopters delivered by South Africa in 1973 and 1978. (*See Appendix I items 12 and 33*)

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the regime's helicopters are divided between two squadrons. (*Military Balance 1979/80*)

(Much of the information on the composition of squadrons has been drawn from *Flight International* 4.8.1979).

It has from time to time been reported that the regime has been able to obtain Mirage fighter jets. In April 1977, for example, the *Guardian* reported that the Smith regime had received 12 Mirage fighters from South Africa, together with a number of brand new Alouettes and jeep-mounted recoilless rifles. (*Guardian* 28.4.77) It is thought that the Rhodesian Air Force now possesses or has use of more than 20 Mirages. Mirages have been used in bombing attacks into Mozambique, possibly starting from bases in South Africa. A number of Rhodesian pilots are believed to have received training in South Africa on Mirage fighters, under the auspices of the South African Air Force. (*See Appendix I item 22*)

South Africa has consistently played a key role in maintaining the regime's airborne superiority. As a somewhat different example of this, the propaganda victory scored by the regime in convincing British and other observers that the April 1979 Rhodesian elections were 'free and fair', was in no small measure due to assistance from South Africa. Support came not only in the form of extra troops and personnel, but also through the loan of South African Air Force Dakotas and Puma helicopters, which were used to transport journalists and observers during the election period.

There is no doubt that the Rhodesian regime, with the help of a series of deliveries of sanctions-busting aircraft, has been able to keep well abreast of the latest and most sophisticated techniques of counter-insurgency warfare. As far as its pre-UDI aircraft are concerned – the Canberras, Hawker Hunters and Vampires which are so often cited as evidence that the Rhodesian Air Force is 'old-fashioned' – there can be little doubt that they have been kept in the air only through a constant and assured flow of spare parts from the British suppliers.

There is evidence that British military collaboration with the Rhodesian air force may even extend to assistance with training programmes. According to an article in the British magazine *New African*, for example, a group of Rhodesian pilots secretly visited Oman, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, in 1978, on a clandestine training course. The pilots spent all their time in Oman with British soldiers on secondment to the Sultan of Oman's army and on mercenary contact. "The British taught the pilots everything they had learnt in 14 years of warfare using helicopter gunships against guerillas." It appears that this knowledge may have been put to use by the Rhodesian Air Force in testing out sanctions-busting Huey helicopters which arrived in Rhodesia towards the end of 1978. (*New African* October 1979 – the full text of this article is reproduced in *Appendix IV*. An article from the US newspaper *Newsday*, describing the uses to which the sanctions-busting *Bronco* and *Lynx* are put, also appears in *Appendix IV*.)

AIRSTRIPS AND AIRFIELDS

Since 1976, reports have appeared that the regime has been constructing new military airfields at strategic locations around Rhodesia of sufficient size and equipped to take the heaviest bombers and transports.

A film shown on Danish television in October 1976, for example, showed an airstrip about 2,000 metres long with areas cleared for parking planes and vehicles. It was said to be in Rhodesia's geographical centre. Two more such landing strips were said to be under construction. (*Financial Times 17.10.76*) The regime's Ministry of Defence themselves announced at this time that additional facilities in the form of a runway and dispersal area were being provided for the Rhodesian Air Force at a new site at Hartley near New Sarum airport some distance from Salisbury. It was expected that this would be developed into Rhodesia's main Air Force base. (*BBC Monitoring Service 18.10.76*)

Reports later that year indicated that the regime was in fact constructing three if not four fully equipped military air fields as well as expanding the runways of others, with the help of US technicians. The airfield at Hartley was being provided with underground workshops and a runway capable of taking the heaviest transports. Two civilian airstrips at Wankie (north west) and Buffalo Range (south east) were being reconstructed as military air bases. The existing main Air Force base at Thornhill near Gwelo was being enlarged and plans for another airfield in the north-east were thought to be in an advanced state. (*Rand Daily Mail 25.11.76*; *BBC Monitoring Service 29.11.76*)

A year later, a report on Maputo radio alleged that French and Israeli technicians were also assisting the construction of the Hartley, Wankie and Buffalo Range air bases. The bases could accommodate at least 50 Mirage jets. (*BBC Monitoring Service 9.12.77*) The airfields at both Hartley and Wankie are believed by the Patriotic Front to include underground storage facilities.

The period since March 1978 has seen further significant expansion of Rhodesia's airfields. Many of these projects are of an exclusively military character and for this reason kept strictly under the wraps, but those that have surfaced in the press or the Rhodesian parliament include:-

- A new Category 1 airfield at Umtali was opened to traffic in September 1978, replacing the gravel runway which had served the city for the past 25 years. The new 950 m long surfaced runway is suitable for commercial operations by aircraft not based in Rhodesia and for flying instruction. It is apparently intended for sanctions-busting operations in the first instance. (*Zimbabwe Times 3.7.78*; *The Herald 30.10.78*)
- In July 1978, work started on a massive new hangar for Air Rhodesia at Salisbury airport, capable of taking widebodied airliners such as the Boeing 747 Jumbo jet. The project was due to be completed in August 1979. A spokesman for Air

Rhodesia said that the airline could only house one of its three Boeing 720 jets at a time in the existing hangar. According to Air Rhodesia's deputy general manager Mervyn Eyett; "The (*new*) hangar is also big enough to take a DC-10. It is being built with an eye to the future and getting back into international air routes as and when we can. Everything we do is in terms of not only what we need today but what we need tomorrow. It is our firm intention to get back into international operations and fly between here and the UK and Europe and, if we are going to do this, there is going to come a time when we need 'wide-bodied' aeroplanes". (*The Herald 28.8.78, 2.11.78*; see also Appendix 1 item 10)

- In December 1978, a row surfaced in the Rhodesian House of Assembly concerning the use that had been made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of funds ostensibly set aside for the development of the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). The chairman of the Select Committee on Public Accounts, Dennis Divaris, in introducing a report on the use of African Development Funds, censured the Ministry for, among other things, building unauthorised airfields at Bveke and Pachanza; using Rh.\$80,000 allocated for the building of a security fence to buy chemicals to create a 'safe' (presumably defoliated) corridor along the Mozambique border; and financing the purchase and maintenance of a fleet of 14 aircraft with money raised from levies on African produce and officially destined for rural development projects. The aircraft had been "almost entirely used for security purposes". In the course of making his criticisms, Divaris revealed that an 'Air Fields Committee' had been in existence for the past three years to co-ordinate the construction of air strips. (*Parliamentary Debates 5.12.78*; *BBC Monitoring Service 7.12.78*)
- In February 1979 the regime revealed that since June 1973, when the Ministry of Roads and Road Traffic had first become involved in security work, it had constructed nearly 3,500 km of roads, 55 bridges and more than 30 airfields. (*BBC Monitoring Service 28.2.79*)

(Airfields and airports have in the course of events become key targets of guerrilla strategy and are protected by intensive security, little of which ever surfaces in the press. In February 1979, however, Rev. Sithole, at that time a member of the transitional government's Executive Council, made the news when he narrowly avoided stepping on a minefield at Chipinga airfield in the south east of Rhodesia. The security forces had laid mines in the area around the airstrip, and "Mr. Sithole and one of his officials were locked in conversation when security officers warned them just in time that they were about to step into a minefield".) (*BBC Monitoring Service 22.2.79*)

Facilities such as new airfields and wide-bodied jets could play a key role in any plan to evacuate white Rhodesians from the country en masse. The regime has clearly done some forward thinking along these lines and made contingency plans. At the end of November 1978, for example, Rhodesian Air Force

headquarters announced that a routine helicopter night flying training exercise would be carried out in the vicinity of the Harare and Andrew Fleming hospitals in Salisbury. A spokesman said that the purpose of the exercise was to familiarise pilots with landing and take-off procedure on helicopter pads at the two hospitals. (*BBC Monitoring Service 30.11.78*) According to ZAPU (Patriotic Front), a number of medical personnel were also likely to be involved in these exercises and the public was warned not to interfere and not to panic. ZAPU continued:

Reliable and confirmed reports from inside Rhodesia have indicated that the regime in its preparations for a major war has evolved an evacuation plan which embraces all hospitals and medical stations inside the country. This plan includes the training of all medical staff on the elementary tactical exercises and skills needed by evacuation teams. Salisbury major hospitals have been chosen because they offer optimum conditions as pioneers in this field in regard to their facilities and quantity of personnel. The risks in these exercises mean that it needs to be done in a place where help can be rendered to the injured. The regime in conjunction with major NATO countries is also making preparations for the fortification of major cities in Rhodesia in preparation for an airlift of whites in case of a military collapse. Salisbury is seen as of paramount importance in this regard and hence first preparations for the scheme are being made there. All hospitals in the country have airstrips which are reported to be under extension by the regime for bigger aircraft beside helicopters, for which the airstrips were originally designed. Repairs have been completed at Harare and Andrew Fleming hospitals. In the intended Harare/Fleming night exercises it is reported that a sizeable number of military personnel is known to be involved. A number of high risk and rescue teams are included. These preparations are linked to the regime's exercises in a number of places in the country for the purpose of mounting night raids on ZAPU forces and for aggression into neighbouring countries. The expected casualties in these night operations would then be airlifted to the hospitals. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice 9.12.78*)

In 1978 the regime revealed that the Rhodesian Air Force possessed fully computerised lists of every airstrip and every fuel dump in the country. "At the press of a button all airfields and fuel supplies close to a given trouble spot can be listed and their positions radioed immediately." (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No. 5, 1978*)

MERCENARIES

As the liberation war has expanded, the Rhodesian security forces have become increasingly dependent on foreign mercenaries to maintain their military superiority. In fact, it is not inaccurate to state that the most important characteristic of the Rhodesian army today is that it is a mercenary army — and much the same goes for the airforce. The international recruiting networks through which the

mercenaries reach Rhodesia have been in existence for many years, and function with great efficiency, only rarely provoking comment, still less censure, from the press and the establishment in Britain and the West.

It is wrong, in other words, to think of foreign mercenaries as a new phenomenon in the Rhodesian context. The regime has been expending effort and resources on enticing them into its armed forces for at least two decades. Before UDI, of course, this was perfectly 'legal'. In 1960, for example, Major John Shaw (later Army Chief of Staff) was sent to London from Salisbury to recruit 150 officers and NCO's, and 100 private soldiers, for the newly formed Rhodesian Light Infantry. Operating from Rhodesia House in the Strand, he set about placing advertisements in the *Times*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Mirror* and *News of the World*. The British recruits were later flown out to Rhodesia in Rhodesian Air Force planes. (*The Incredibles — The Story of the 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Geoffrey Bond, Salisbury 1977*)

Many of the regime's leading military commanders today, not to mention members of the ranks, have backgrounds of service with the British army and experience of British counter-insurgency tactics in arenas such as Malaya. The Rhodesian Special Air Service is still regarded as the 'C' Squadron of the British Special Air Service, and as such maintains close links with its parent squadron. Distinguished members of the British SAS, and other airborne regiments in the British army, are known to have made their way to Rhodesia, where they have provided a core of experienced officers in the Rhodesian security forces. According to a British press report:

A wooden plaque bearing the Osprey insignia of Rhodesia's crack counter-insurgency unit, the Selous Scouts, hangs on the wall of the Palud-R-Inn Club at the Special Air Service barracks in Hereford (*Britain*). It was sent over recently by Ron Reid-Daly, the Scouts' former commanding officer, as a mark of appreciation for SAS help with recruiting . . . Sources within both the British and the Rhodesian armed forces suggest that there are up to 50 former British SAS men in the Rhodesian SAS and a slightly smaller number in the Selous Scouts. Other former SAS men have important jobs in Rhodesian military intelligence. Most of them have British passports; many receive army pensions and are on the British Army's Reserve List. (*The Leveller, October 1979 — the full text of this article is reproduced in Appendix IV.*)

An article in the Rhodesian *Financial Gazette* in 1977, for example, commented that:

Rhodesia's fighting forces stand to gain from the dissatisfaction with life in the British army which is running rife amongst the eighteen thousand plus men stationed in and around Belfast. With the stringent cutbacks in military appropriations under Britain's Labour Government, more and more men are finding that an exciting global career in Her Majesty's Armed Forces is now no more than a mirage, and, at best, a squalid beat-bashing job in

the back streets of Northern Ireland. For officers and men of action, the tedium of this unwanted job and public disdain for their efforts, are forcing more and more regular troops to look abroad for a natural continuation of their military careers . . . Other members of the British Armed Forces are finding that at the end of their nine-year contract term, they either face redundancy or a further signing-up period of up to 21 years in an Army that has largely become meaningless. For many, the only alternative is to seek fame and fortune overseas. A staff sergeant in the para-engineers who was faced with this prospect recently decided that enough was enough. A few weeks ago, when his contract with the British army ended, he caught the first plane to Salisbury in order to join up with the Rhodesian army. Even though this meant a drop in rank to sergeant, he was happy for he was able to feel that he was fighting for a worthwhile cause and had an opportunity to use his military expertise to best advantage. When spoken to in Salisbury this week, he confirmed that there were large numbers of men in Northern Ireland in the same position as himself who were coming to the end of their contracts in the British Army, and saw no future ahead of them. Nearly all of them were looking to Rhodesia as an opportunity to persevere in the career they had set their hearts on many years before Britain lost its will to maintain a proper standing army. (*Financial Gazette*, 29.7.77)

The regime denies that foreign nationals in its security forces are mercenaries, on the grounds that they receive the same pay and serve under the same conditions as Rhodesian troops. However, they arrive in Zimbabwe through well-established mercenary recruiting networks and for the same motives as mercenaries anywhere else in the world. Those who have been in Zimbabwe for some years may well have taken out Rhodesian citizenship.

In 1977/78, Western intelligence sources estimated that there were upwards of 1,500 foreign mercenaries serving in Rhodesia. The figure may in reality have been much higher than this at that time. In February 1978, for example, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, joint President of the Patriotic Front, accused the Smith regime of having recruited some 11,200 foreign mercenaries, including 4,500 South Africans, 2,000 British, 2,300 Americans, 1,000 French, 600 Israeli commandos and an unspecified number of Portuguese and West Germans. (*Guardian* 7.2.78)

Mercenary recruitment has undoubtedly continued since the signing of the 'internal settlement' agreement in March 1978. Indeed, the Patriotic Front has recently warned that recruitment has been stepped up and that agents of the regime's security forces are once again busy tapping their well-established channels in the international mercenary market. Major Nick Lamprecht, the officer in charge of recruiting for the Rhodesian army, is said to keep close personal contact with a wide range of mercenary recruiters who in turn provide a steady stream of applications for the security forces.

In May 1979, ZAPU (Patriotic Front) pointed out that its members were

aware of the great activity taking place in the mercenary capitals of the world. In Bonn, Washington, Paris, London and other satellite capitals preparations are under way to save the tottering settler bandit regime in Rhodesia. Hundreds of them (*mercenaries*) are undergoing familiarization courses in Rhodesia before being deployed in the field. Many of Rhodesia's military commanders are experts from NATO. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 19.5.79)

A recent report in the French Magazine *Jeune Afrique* has tended to confirm the Patriotic Front's fears. By August 1979, according to this source, there were some 15,000 mercenaries in the Rhodesian security forces - 50% more than in 1978 in *Jeune Afrique's* estimation. This number included 1,600 South Africans, 2,300 from the United States, 1,800 from France, 1,050 West Germans, 800 Israelis and 2,800 from Portugal. The balance would presumably be made up largely from Britain, always the main mercenary supplier to the regime. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 17.8.79)

One well-known British mercenary who recently surfaced in the press while on a visit home from Rhodesia for "rest and recuperation" is Peter McAleese. McAleese, a former member of the British SAS, served with the notorious Colonel Callan in Angola in early 1976. (*Guardian* 3.8.79 - the full text of this article is reproduced in Appendix IV.)

In September 1979, Joshua Nkoma, joint President of the Patriotic Front, noted at the opening session of the Lancaster House talks that 60% of the regime's present white army were mercenaries. (*Patriotic Front statement* 11.9.79)

The regime is obviously on the look out for mercenaries with skills, training and experience. Members of the British SAS, the US Green Berets (well-known from the Vietnam war), and other specialist units of the major Western powers, are at a premium. Regime spokesmen themselves admit that recent moves to conscript and train large number of Africans for military service have stretched their resources of skilled and experienced manpower to the limit. (see section of *CONSCRIPTION - AFRICANS* above)

In May 1979, ZAPU (Patriotic Front) reported that "dozens of mercenaries" were now working for the regime's intelligence service. In one particular case a 30-year-old Austrian mercenary, Gerrit Pointner, had been hired by the Rhodesian secret service for \$700 a month. He was employed to gather information on the whereabouts of refugee camps and the movements of Patriotic Front forces in Zambia, and especially anything on Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU's President. Pointner also worked closely with the regime's army corps, a military intelligence body. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 19.5.79)

Besides the Rhodesian SAS, the Selous Scouts are also known to be a popular choice for mercenaries. Despite the premium on the security forces' need for skills and experience, there is no doubt that the Rhodesian war has attracted criminal elements, failures and drop-outs from many countries. The regime, in its desperate search for white manpower, is not in a position to be too particular.

Some sources indicate for example, that United

States nationals have a poor record of service to the regime, and that the desertion rate among Americans can be as high as 80%. This indicates that the turnover of mercenaries is high, and therefore that the recruiters must be active. A key role in this respect is played by the US monthly magazine, *Soldier of Fortune*, which carries regular articles extolling the pleasures of service with the Rhodesian security forces, with practical information about how to get there, who to contact, rates of pay and so forth. The editor of the magazine, Lt. Col. Robert K. Brown, is an officer of the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne), US Army Reserve. Five other members of his editorial staff have been identified as members of the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) or the US Special Forces Reserve Units. (*Guns for Hire - How the CIA and US Army recruit mercenaries for white Rhodesia, South African Anti-Mercenary Coalition, San Francisco, 1978.*) *Soldier of Fortune* is openly on sale in military bookshops in Britain.

Other US nationals, particularly from various airborne and specialist units, are known to have given valuable service to the regime and in some cases are said to have become outstanding field commanders.

A contingent of French mercenaries, fighting in Rhodesia in 1979, is said to have been decimated in its first contact with Patriotic Front guerrillas.

In addition the Rhodesian Light Infantry boasts a so-called ANZAC contingent. There are thought to be at least 20 Australians and New Zealanders in the RLI alone.

It is not the purpose of this publication to delve into the depths of British collaboration with the illegal regime over the years but there can be little doubt that senior members of the British Foreign Office and the military establishment are aware of the extent of mercenary recruitment, and that the British government has failed to take effective action to stop it.

The regime's security forces are known to favour men without financial, family or other commitments. If a mercenary with no known relatives, bad debts or business connections dies or is injured while on active service, it is much easier to hush the matter up or even to deny that he was ever there.

Foreign mercenaries have acquired a reputation for callousness exceeding even that of white Rhodesian troops. A report in the London *Times* of 23 April 1977 claimed that foreign mercenaries "have been guilty of crimes which decent white Rhodesians would never commit. Some of them are criminals capable of mindless violence. A favourite sport is reported to be kaffir hunting, the indiscriminate shooting of blacks." The behaviour of mercenaries has been particularly notorious in units such as the Selous Scouts and Grey's Scouts, where lack of supervision and disciplinary control gives ample scope for individual 'initiative' and indiscriminate brutality.

Despite this, foreign mercenaries, together with other members of the security forces and those considered by the regime to be 'assisting' them, have been granted powers to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely without charge, sentence people to death

for political offences who are brought before special courts martial, and destroy homes, property and livestock on a mass scale in the interests of maintaining 'law and order'. These powers are contained in the martial law regulations promulgated by the regime in September 1978 and now in force over virtually the entire country. It is worth noting that over the last year or so an increasing number of foreign mercenaries have taken jobs with multinational companies operating in Rhodesia, or wealthy white farms, as security guards and vigilantes. The pay is generally better and the discipline less strict. (*See above under MANPOWER FOR THE SECURITY FORCES*) They too appear to be included in the regime's definition of 'security forces' for purposes of applying the martial law regulations. Even before the introduction of martial law, of course, the security forces were largely immune from any legal consequences arising out of atrocities committed in the field, under the terms of the regime's Indemnity and Compensation Act 1975, and other legislation.

Many mercenaries were, at least potentially, enfranchised by the regime for the purposes of voting in the April 1979 Rhodesian elections, under a specially introduced provision that those who had qualified for citizenship but had not formally applied for it, could nevertheless vote. Anyone who had been permanently resident in the country for two years or more was enfranchised.

There is little doubt that the massive influx of "foreign nationals" into the regime's security forces over the years has had a significant effect on the character of those forces and the attitudes prevalent within them. It is hardly surprising, for example, that Rhodesian "troopies" have adopted the jargon used in Vietnam from US nationals now serving alongside them. "Terrorists" have become "gooks", and so on.

Mercenary "figureheads", organizations and journals throughout the Western world have adopted Rhodesia as a focal point of their activities and right-wing sympathies. The Rhodesian security forces provide a home for those who hold violently racist and right wing views, plus a whole range of disenfranchised stragglers from past and present counter-insurgency wars. Persons of this type clearly have little or nothing in common with the kind of multi-racial society envisaged by the Patriotic Front and could cause enormous damage to the construction of democratic institutions, both nationally and at the level of the local community.

SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES

Security force auxiliaries (SFAs) is the term that the regime has adopted to describe the gangster-like private armies which have operated in the name of the black parties to the "internal settlement" since early in 1978. While attempting to distance itself from the more blatant and horrific crimes committed by the private armies, the regime has acknowledged that its own security force establishment has been responsible for setting them up, providing rudimentary training and logistical support, and supervising and directing

them in action. In an interview in November 1978, for example, the Commander of Combined Operations Lt. Gen. Peter Walls confirmed that "we have Special Branch and army officers working with (the SFAs). Their entire logistics are under our control. They are merely an extension of the security forces." (*Daily Telegraph* 6.11.78)

The private armies, in short, are a particularly striking manifestation of the lawless and criminal character of the regime itself, and a direct result of the policies that it has pursued since the "internal settlement". The origins and development of the private armies up to February 1979 have been described in some detail by the International Defence and Aid Fund in a Fact Paper entitled: "*Private Armies in Zimbabwe*". (IDAF, February 1979; see also "*Private Armies - A Tragedy for Zimbabwe*", pamphlet published by ZAPU (Patriotic Front), August 1979). One of the most important *raison d'être* for their formation was to bring out the African vote in the April 1979 elections. The methods of intimidation and harassment which the SFA's employed both during polling and in general have been fairly well documented by humanitarian organizations such as IDAF and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and in the Western press.

Their value to the regime either as a counter-insurgency force, or as part of a public relations drive to persuade the world that the frequently repeated and bogus "amnesty" offer to the Patriotic Front is working, is highly questionable, however. By issuing uniforms and titles, negotiating salaries and so forth, the regime has tried to lend an air of credibility to the SFAs. It has tried to draw a distinction between "auxiliaries" - supposedly well-disciplined - and "criminal elements", from which it dissociates itself. It has tried to claim that the SFAs have a popular base of support and that they are a "military presence" which represents and defends, in each locality, the people of that locality. In the final analysis, however, the regime is fully prepared to liquidate its own creation in the most brutal fashion, once it has outlived its usefulness - as the massacre of over 500 SFAs, supporters of Rev. Sithole, by Rhodesian Light Infantry "fire force" troops in July 1979 demonstrated. (It was also reported in July that some 600 SFAs loyal to James Chikerema had recently been dismantled, leaving the UANC private army virtually alone in the field. *Rand Daily Mail* 18.7.79)

In October 1979, "Commander Max", an SFA leader who has received considerable press publicity, was reported to have arrived in London together with Lt. Gen. Walls and P.K. Allum, the Police Commissioner, to advise the regime's delegation to the Lancaster House talks on the "practical difficulties of holding the general election demanded by the British". "Commander Max" is a supporter of Bishop Muzorewa who began to work closely with the Rhodesian Special Branch at the beginning of 1978. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 17.10.79; *The Herald* 24.11.78)

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, there were some 6,000 SFAs by

July 1979 (*The Military Balance 1979-80*). The security forces have always been reluctant to divulge the exact number of SFAs undergoing training or deployed in the field at any time, and the total may well be considerably higher than this - possibly more than 20,000 men. Already by January 1979, according to a Rhodesian military spokesman, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Sithole had about 6,000 men deployed in more than 20 districts or "free zones", and the number is known to have continued to rise since that time. Another source reported in July that the total number of SFAs might have reached 15,000 (*Africa Confidential* 18.7.79)

Considerable evidence now exists that the SFAs have been recruited almost totally from the unemployed, criminal groups of youths inhabiting urban townships, or by resort to blackmail, bribery and trickery, and that they include members of regular security force units, particularly from the Selous Scouts and Special Branch. Others are captured guerillas who have been given the choice between torture, trial and a lengthy prison term, if not execution, and joining the SFAs. One form of "recruitment" used by the UANC, for example, has been to despatch buses inscribed with the WENELA symbol (used to recruit contract labour for the South African mines) in to the townships and industrial centres. The would-be employees, however, found themselves taken to an SFA training centre at Sunmeat Farm near Que Que in the Rhodesian midlands (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 20.1.79). Other "recruits" are given the choice of joining the SFAs to escape the consequences of minor crimes such as tax evasion. Many of the auxiliaries are extremely young - some only 12 years old.

The regime has made some ludicrous allegations about the number of former Patriotic Front guerillas who have heeded the "amnesty" call and changed sides to join the SFAs. In November 1978, for example, General Walls said in an interview that some 2,000 former Patriotic Front guerillas were now working as SFAs. (*Daily Telegraph* 6.11.78) In January 1979, Bishop Muzorewa announced that in the previous 12 days alone 2,000 Patriotic Front guerillas had joined SFAs and in May it was claimed that the number of Patriotic Front guerillas joining SFAs was up by some 40%. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 8.1.79, 22.5.79)

In fact, the regime has not been able at any stage to produce concrete evidence to back up these claims. A few individual "guerillas" now working with the auxiliaries have been given massive publicity. In March 1979, for example, the regime renewed its bogus amnesty offer to the Patriotic Front and predicted that large numbers would respond. Extensive coverage was subsequently given by the Rhodesian press to two "guerillas" who turned themselves in to "cast their vote", (*The Herald* 15.4.79) Other alleged former guerillas appear on examination to be decidedly disreputable characters. "Comrade Mick Jagger", for example, otherwise known as John Ndhlovu, was gaoled for two years in June 1979 on various counts of intimidation. (*The Herald* 2.6.79)

A few days before the opening of the Lancaster

House talks in September 1979, the regime admitted that the "amnesty" campaign had in fact failed. According to Lt.-Gen. Walls, the number of guerrillas returning was no more than a "trickle". "I could not tell you how many have come over, but it's a trickle compared to what we hope will happen when amnesty catches on". (*The Herald* 5.9.79) Subsequent reports, moreover, indicate that the regime is now abandoning the whole exercise. The Deputy Minister of Manpower stated in an interview in October that it was "now unreasonable for the government to continue calling on these people to return in peace. . . terrorists had been given enough time to make up their minds." The regime, he said, should reconsider its amnesty offer after six weeks. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 19.10.79)

Inside Rhodesia, training and barracking of SFAs have been carried out largely on farms owned by Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and James Chikerema. A variety of tracts of empty land, commercial warehouses and private houses have also been used throughout the country, usually with the co-operation of the local security force authorities. Bases have been established in clinics, schools, missions and other centres appropriated for the purpose. Regular security force barracks have also been used, in particular at Jambezi, west of Fort Victoria, near Karoi, and a few miles north of Bindura. It is very likely that the SFAs now have their own permanent barracks under the auspices of the security forces.

The "hardcore" founder members of the SFAs received their training outside Rhodesia during 1977 and the early part of 1978, in a number of countries including Malawi, Uganda (before the fall of Amin), and Iran (where the SFAs are believed to have been trained by members of the SAVAK secret police before the fall of the Shah).

New recruits, aged between 12 and 30, receive a short haphazard training, extremely limited in scope, which lasts for some 3 to 6 weeks. According to security force spokesmen training is said to include: re-orientation into the military "way of life", weapons drill and field craft, lessons in camouflage and concealment, communication and anti-ambush drills. (*The Herald* 24.3.79) For the most part, training is now given by regular security force instructors, who are mainly white. Recruits are paid an allowance of Rh\$ 20 per week, plus board and lodging. In practice, SFAs supplement their allowance, once deployed in a Tribal Trust Land, by stealing and plundering from stores and villagers alike.

Throughout 1978 and well into 1979, SFAs carried an enormous variety of weapons; the most common of which included captured AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, plus items such as knob-kerries, clubs and pangas. Since the re-organisation and renaming of SFAs to "Pfumo reVanhu" ("Spear of the People") in March 1979, much of the equipment has been standardised. "Pfumo reVanhu" now have their own uniform of brown denim and green berets, plus their own distinctive flags and banners. Weapons now issued are largely of NATO origin, such as the West German-made G3 and Belgian FN, although AK 47 rifles are still in use.

In August 1978, the regime began to give concrete indications of how it was planning to deploy the auxiliaries in the bush. A military spokesman said that the SFAs were "permitted to operate in specific and clearly defined areas under the command and control of the security forces". (*The Herald* 15.4.78). Those TTLs and other areas where SFAs were active were deemed "frozen zones" and the conventional security forces were restricted from entering or operating in them. In January 1979 some 22 "frozen zones" together covering about 15% of the country and divided between Bishop Muzorewa's and Rev. Sithole's SFAs, were identified by missionary and other sources. The SFAs however, have never "controlled" such areas; they do not possess either the military superiority or the technical and administrative competence to do so. Significantly, security force spokesmen have been reluctant to divulge a "kill-rate" for SFA military operations against Patriotic Front guerrillas. This is given enormous publicity in other branches of the security force, and therefore indicates that SFA operations in this respect have not even been noteworthy.

In the normal course of events there is little direct contact between the SFAs and the main body of the security forces. Control is exercised through specially-appointed liaison officers or members of the Special Branch and intelligence services. It is likely that the Selous Scouts are also supervising the SFAs in the "frozen zones". In February 1979, for example, it was reported that Selous Scouts and auxiliaries had undertaken a joint operation in the Nembudziya district which had resulted in three kraals being burnt down and 21 civilians burnt to death in a hut. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 10.3.79)

In June 1979 it was announced that the SFAs were being integrated into the combined operations structure of the security forces, together with the army, police, Guard Force and Internal Affairs. "Retraining and reorganization" operations were initiated, resistance to which was the ostensible reason given by the regime for the virtual elimination of Rev. Sithole's private army, referred to above.

A disturbing feature of SFA deployment is their increasing presence in urban areas. Since about June 1979 gangs of youngsters, often no more than 13 years old, have been established in the Salisbury townships as an intelligence gathering network for the regime. Known as "Ziso reVanhu", Shona for "Eye of the People", they are intended to complement the activities of Pfumo reVanhu in the rural areas. Their role is to report anyone whose political sympathies do not lie with Bishop Muzorewa, to the police.

There is increasing evidence that large numbers of SFAs have deserted as soon as they have the opportunity. In May 1978, for example, 45 young men who had fled to Mozambique, told a press conference in Maputo that they belonged to a group of 66 men recruited from Salisbury and Hartley under the guise of being sent to Mozambique to join the Patriotic Front forces. They were held for some weeks at a "fort" near Salisbury and escaped after learning that they were to be trained and incorporated into Muzorewa's private army. (*BBC Monitoring*

Service 11.5.78) (See also section on **DISAFFECTION AND DESERTION**)

ZAPU (Patriotic Front) has pointed out that the regime's first objective in creating the security force auxiliaries was "to Africanise the war by setting Africans against Africans... firstly, to spare the lives of the whites and secondly to prove to the world that civil war in Zimbabwe was inevitable — that is, if left alone the Africans would kill each other". (*Private Armies: A Tragedy for Zimbabwe, op. cit.*) Apart from these twin roles as cannon fodder and public relations showpieces, the SFAs are used by the regime to terrorise the African population and to exacerbate the chaos already caused by the army's activities in the rural areas. They are not trained or equipped to a level where they could fulfil a significant role in a direct combat situation.

SOUTH AFRICAN COLLABORATION

The illegal Rhodesian regime could never have survived the 14 years since UDI without the constant support and assistance of South Africa. The facts on this matter are incontrovertible and will not be reproduced here. Since March 1978, representatives of the "internal settlement" leadership have worked consistently to deepen Rhodesia's military, economic, political and diplomatic alliance with South Africa and made it clear through numerous statements that they are committed to a role as a client state of the apartheid regime. This of course includes deployment of South African troops on Rhodesian soil.

Since 1975, when a number of paramilitary South African police units were withdrawn from Rhodesia with considerable publicity, it has been extremely difficult to obtain details of South Africa's continuing military collaboration with the Smith regime. The first report of South African ground forces being redeployed in Rhodesia surfaced in the British press a few weeks after the signing of the "internal settlement" agreement. Quoting "reliable sources" in Salisbury, the London *Guardian* reported that South African combat police, indistinguishable from regular soldiers, were operating in the southern part of Rhodesia. These police units had been sent out from military bases in the northern Transvaal to work with the Rhodesian police and army and were said to have brought with them a detachment of South African military liaison officers, now based at regional army headquarters in Fort Victoria. South African forces were also reported to be working closely with Rhodesian Air Force and patrol boat units on Lake Kariba. (*Guardian 19.4.78*; see also *Smith's Settlement, IDAF Fact Paper No. 6*).

The "internal settlement" has created the political and diplomatic conditions for South African forces to intervene in Rhodesia in a much more overt and aggressive way — apparent during the Lancaster House talks in British press reports of belligerent threats by unidentified South African military spokesmen of open war against the Patriotic Front and the Zimbabwe people. (*Sunday Express 23.9.79*; *Daily Mail 22.9.79*)

As far as air attacks are concerned, there seems no doubt that many if not all major Rhodesian attacks into the front line states have been jointly planned and coordinated with South African military intelligence, and that South African planes and pilots have been involved. In December 1977, for example, the Mozambican authorities reported that South African Mirage fighter jets, flying from bases inside South Africa, had taken part in Rhodesian bombing raids on refugee camps and other targets inside Mozambique, culminating in an attack on Chimoi at the end of November in which 200 people were killed. (*Guardian 19.4.78*) There have been several reports of a similar nature since that time. In February 1979, nearly 200 people were killed in what was described by the Rhodesian regime as a Rhodesian Air Force raid on Luena area of Angola, using Canberra bombers. Information available to the Patriotic Front and the Angolan government, however, suggested that South African Mirage jets and pilots had flown from a base in the Transvaal, via Wankie in north-western Rhodesia and had returned via the Caprivi Strip in Namibia. (*BBC Monitoring Service 28.2.79, 1.3.79*; see also the section on **THE AIRFORCE**)

During the April 1979 Rhodesian elections the South African government provided open "logistic" support to the regime. South African Air Force Puma helicopters, Dakota aircraft and pilots, C130 transport aircraft, trucks, troop carriers and personnel were made available — officially to help transport foreign observers, newsmen and election officials around the country. There is no doubt that the help provided was much more substantial than officially made known, and that much of it — with the probable exception of conspicuous items such as the Dakotas — was left behind for the regime's use. A letter written from inside Zimbabwe towards the end of May noted:

The amount of mobilization was extraordinary.

The numbers of South Africans involved and their new army vehicles placed in the TTLs so that no outsider could notice was also interesting. The Rhodesian army had to work close to the polling stations. (*FOCUS No. 23, July—August 1979*)

South African assistance continues to be given to Bishop Muzorewa's government. The President of ZANU (Patriotic Front), Robert Mugabe, stated in Maputo on 14 June 1979 that about 5,000 South African troops, hundreds of military trucks and substantial quantities of South African arms and other equipment were now deployed inside Rhodesia. (*BBC Monitoring Service 18.6.79*)

According to ZAPU (Patriotic Front), the numbers may be even higher than this. ZAPU's newspaper reported in May 1979 that over 7,500 South African soldiers were now permanently based inside Rhodesia and actively involved in counter-insurgency operations. Many South African experts were believed to play a crucial role in the regime's war planning and strategy units. Other South African forces were deployed in Rhodesia on a short term basis, meaning that at any one time more than 10,000 troops were inside the country. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice 12.5.79*)

Many South Africans in Rhodesia are officers and

in command of units. In general, the South Africans are integrated into the various divisions of the Rhodesian army and airforce, so that they are less conspicuous, and it is believed that various administrative arrangements have been worked out to allow South African regulars to complete part of their training in Rhodesia or to spend periods on secondment there. Other South Africans go to Rhodesia as civilian "volunteers", or in other words, mercenaries.

THE RHODESIAN ARMS INDUSTRY

Rhodesia's white population is the most heavily armed in Africa and possibly even in the world. Since 1976 the regime, through the medium of private enterprise, has been developing a sophisticated arms and munitions industry in response to the white public's demand for guns and ammunition of all descriptions. Concerted efforts have been made to develop locally-made substitutes for expensive and scarce imported weapons. During 1977 and 1978 a rash of home-produced weapons, mostly 9mm semi-automatic carbines but including some shotguns, appeared on the market. These guns are designed for persons unused to weapons and according to early market research reports have proved particularly popular with white women and middle-aged people living in "sensitive" areas.

The first guns to be announced, at the end of 1976, were the *Rhuzi*, or LDP machine pistol, and the *Rhogun*. The *Rhuzi* is based on the Israeli Uzi commando assault weapon and in its present improved and modified version is manufactured in Salisbury by the Arms Manufacturing Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. The *Rhogun*, a Bulawayo-produced version of the *Rhuzi*, subsequently faded out.

The *Rhogun* and the *Rhuzi* were closely followed by the *R-76* 9mm semi-automatic machine pistol. It is manufactured by a Salisbury firm, Northwood Developments (Pvt) Ltd. Both the *Rhuzi* and the *R-76* were reported in 1978 to be undergoing rust-proofing with ferrochrome using a US technique "not previously used in any other country". The arrangement has been established between Northwood Developments and Quality Plates, and involves Union Carbide, the US company believed to handle most of Rhodesia's chrome. (*Africa Confidential* 3.11.78; *Financial Gazette* 27.10.78)

Fort Victoria's contribution to Rhodesia's domestic arms race, the *Barad*, a two-version shotgun and handgun designed by an Israeli immigrant to Rhodesia, Yoram Sharar, shared the same fate as the *Rhogun* and disappeared. Other more or less successful prototypes include the *Jumbo*, a seven-shot automatic shotgun, the *Mamba*, an automatic pistol, and the *Cobra*, a 9mm semi-automatic carbine.

Other firms involved in manufacturing weapons include Bulawayo Armoury (Pvt) Ltd. and Stellyte Arms Co. (Pvt) Ltd., also of Bulawayo. According to ZAPU (Patriotic Front), "these companies are closely linked with the South African arms production industry to facilitate distribution. But much of the capital is openly and secretly contributed by transnational

corporations from Britain, France, Israel, the USA and West Germany." (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 23.9.78)

There is no doubt that the Rhodesian and South African authorities cooperate closely on matters relating to the arms industry, as in all areas of defence and security. In the military sphere there has for example been apparent collaboration in the design, manufacture and supply of the Hippo armoured vehicle — a heavy troop carrier designed, like the Hyena, the Rhino, the Leopard, the Crocodile and other distinctively-named oddities, to withstand landmine blasts in the Rhodesian context, but also used by the South African riot police.

In July 1978 a Rhodesian newspaper commented that "the next most logical step from the public's point of view is the production of ammunition, but weapons manufacturers say sophisticated equipment is necessary — and the cost of importing it would be prohibitive", (*The Herald* 6.7.78) Ammunition for small arms continues to be imported.

Besides meeting its own security needs, Rhodesia is becoming an exporter of arms, primarily to South Africa but also to Western European and American countries via agents in South Africa. In 1977, for instance, it was reported that the LDP machine-pistol was being distributed in South Africa and from there exported to Western European and other countries by Dirk Stoffberg, an arms dealer in Johannesburg. Stoffberg, who previously worked for the Iranian government, was reported to have offices in Britain, Australia, Germany, Brazil and Saudi Arabia. (*Sunday Times, Johannesburg* 29.5.77)

After the *Cobra* semi-automatic pistol had made its debut at the Rhodesia Trade Fair in April 1977, representatives of international arms manufacturers in North and South America and Europe were reported to have expressed interest in manufacturing the weapon under licence. The *Cobra* seems to have been one of the more successful designs. (*The Herald* 12.4.77; *BBC Monitoring Service* 10.5.77; *Rhodesia Financial Gazette* 23.9.77)

Rhodesian arms manufacturers tend to pride themselves on the claim that their products match up to the highest international standards. All weapons have to be proofed by the Standards Association of Central Africa before being sold. (*The Herald* 6.7.78) However the fact that several designs have become obsolete and been phased out at an early stage points to the likelihood that they were found to be inefficient, if not actually dangerous. In this connection, it is relevant that ownership, control and development of the Rhodesian arms industry has been entirely in the hands of white private enterprise until comparatively recently, operating in a war situation with all the opportunities that implies for unscrupulous profiteering. It was only in 1978 that a national armaments corporation, Armscor, was established by the regime on the lines of the South African body of the same name. Armscor itself is intended to manufacture weapons of a general nature. (*The Herald* 6.7.78)

It is also worth remembering that however well-designed and efficient the weapon, it is still freely

available to white members of the public, who may or may not be expert in its use. Such restrictions as do exist on the sale and possession of weapons have been relaxed as the war has intensified. In November 1976, for example, a spokesman for the Firearms Registry said that while the Firearms Act normally prohibited the sale of fully automatic weapons to members of the public, "for people living on farms, the position might be different. It might be possible to get permission for possession of a fully automatic weapon through the Prime Minister's Office". (*The Herald* 1.12.76) In September 1978, an advertisement in the Rhodesian press for the Kommando 9 mm semi-automatic pistol informed readers that if they were city and town dwellers, they were now able to buy this and other semi-automatic weapons under the terms of a new directive issued by the transitional government. (*Sunday Mail* 24.9.78)

Some of the weapons and other counter-insurgency devices developed in Rhodesia over the past 18 months and placed on the market for sale to the general (white) public are of a horrific character. Their effects on their victims — guerillas or civilians — can scarcely be imagined. They must surely contravene the letter and the spirit of international conventions on the rules of war. What is perhaps most shocking is the casual way in which these developments, and what they illustrate of the nature of contemporary white Rhodesian society, have been greeted — if not ignored altogether — by the overseas press and media and other ostensibly concerned bodies.

In August 1978 for example, the Rhodesian newspaper *The Herald*, under a headline "Terrorists terrorised", carried a report of a demonstration of "a bizarre range" of anti-ambush and home protection "devices" to local and foreign journalists and representatives of the security forces, the government and the private sector. The display took place at the home of Andre Holland, a Rhodesian Front MP, outside Salisbury, and those present included the Commander and Deputy Commander of Combined Operations, the Army Chief of Staff and the white co-Minister of Justice, Law and Order in the transitional government. Holland himself was on hand to show off his own particular invention, the Cougar, described as "the world's biggest shotgun". The Cougar comprised an armoured mine and bullet-proofed vehicle equipped with 36 cannons arranged in four banks of nine so that they give all-round fire power. If the vehicle is ambushed the cannons are detonated electrically at the push of a button, and blast 9,000 pieces of jagged metal out in a 300 metre circle. Holland, who also calls his invention "HH" (Holland's Hail), told onlookers that "nothing can survive in the circle". The Cougar costs about £7,000 — not much more than an average family car in Britain.

A local company demonstrated a device which, when fitted to the roof of a car, would provide all-round fire from four sets of five-barrel weapons using standard 12-gauge shotgun ammunition. The barrels point skyward until released during an ambush by the driver or passenger of the vehicle. On release, the

"banana bunches" drop to a horizontal position, simultaneously firing from all 20 barrels. The full set, designed to fit on to farm vehicles, retails to members of the public for about £200.

Another device, either for vehicles or installation in the home, features six shotgun barrels falling in sequence when released from a single switch, each firing as it falls horizontal. For farm homesteads, what *The Herald* described as the "ultimate defence weapon" comprised a series of outsize, 2 kg fragmentation grenades, detonated by the homestead occupant by pulling a cord attached to an electronic switch. This particular device was demonstrated to journalists and others by an army expert to illustrate its "psychological and lethal potential". A "deafening explosion" was followed by a blast which curled around the corner of Mr. Holland's barn and set fire to the grass. The expert said the lethal range was a radius of 200 metres, but a 300 metre model was in course of being manufactured.

Also on show was "razor rip" wire, featuring small blades and similar to a product used by the Rhodesian army. (*The Herald* 4.8.78; *Rand Daily Mail* 4.8.78; *Daily Telegraph* 4.8.78)

An article in the Rhodesian *Sunday Mail* some three months after this spectacle revealed that a "low-profile" group called the Lethal Devices Advisory Committee had been in existence in Rhodesia since February 1974, under the auspices of the Ministry of Combined Operations. This "loosely-knit group of government and civilian experts in fields ranging from explosives to electrical power" was described as "Rhodesia's equivalent to the British Second World War Dirty Tricks' branch". Its function is to develop, test and approve weaponry for "civilian protection". According to the head of the Committee, Colonel "Mac" Willar: "People were devising the most terrible weapons; some were so unsafe they were more in danger of blowing themselves up than the terrorists. It was obvious there was urgent need for control". Colonel Willar was a British artillery officer before joining the Rhodesian army. (*Sunday Mail* 26.11.78)

Mr. Holland is not the only member of the Rhodesian parliament to have become involved in the arms trade. In October 1978, nine Rhodesian Front MPs were revealed as shareholders of the Salisbury-based Arms Manufacturing Corporation (Pvt) Ltd., the makers of the Rhuzi, the Kommando and other weapons (see above). Six of them were company directors, including John Landau (managing director) and Dennis Divaris (chairman of the company and also the Rhodesian Front caucus spokesman), Albert Mells, Jan Buitendag, Richard Cartwright and Henry Elsworth. P.K. van der Byl, at that time co-Minister of Foreign Affairs and in June 1979 appointed Minister of Transport and Power, and of Posts, in Bishop Muzorewa's government, was also reported to have shown an interest in the Arms Manufacturing Corporation. Half of the company's business was aimed at the export market at this time. (*Sunday Mail* 20.10.78)

John Landau (also the Rhodesian Front's chief Whip), Dennis Divaris, Richard Cartwright and Henry Elsworth all continue to serve as MPs in the parliament of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

There is now an increasing body of evidence that not only napalm but other methods of chemical warfare are regularly used by the Rhodesian regime as an established part of its counter-insurgency tactics. In using such weapons against civilians in the rural areas, the army appears to have abandoned any pretence of "winning the hearts and minds" of the African population.

In November 1978, a review of the evidence available at that time was published by the International Defence and Aid Fund in its news magazine *FOCUS*. This report, the bulk of which is reproduced here, pointed out that:

Published references indicate that the Rhodesian military apparatus has been fully cognizant with the use of napalm for at least a decade. Rolf Steiner, a former member of the French Foreign Legion who fought on the Biafran side during the Nigerian civil war, refers in his autobiography to a Salisbury armourer who had deserted the Rhodesian security forces and joined Colonel Ojukwa's secessionists as a mercenary: "One of his specialities was napalm, which he cooked up to his own recipe. The method was simple: into an old oil drum he put ordinary household soap and heated it gently until it was liquid, when the soap was melted he topped the drum with petrol and added gunpowder, in proportions he obviously knew by heart." (*R. Steiner: The Last Adventurer - from Biafra to Sudan, 1978*)

Tom McCarthy, a British mercenary who joined the Rhodesian army with the assistance of the South African Embassy in London, told the British Anti-Apartheid Movement in March 1976 that a version of napalm — which he compared to airfix glue — was regularly used by the Rhodesian air force to flush guerrillas from cover. (*Interview in London 11.3.76*)

Accusations by the Mozambique government that napalm bombs had been used by the Smith regime in attacks against Zimbabwean refugee camps were frequently made from the end of that year. Rhodesian napalm, trade name "Frantam" is manufactured inside Zimbabwe, using local materials. The effects have been described by Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, Minister of Health for ZANU (Patriotic Front) while on a tour to the USA in May 1978. He showed pictures of the havoc wrought by "napalm porridge": "Imagine somebody dipping his arm in a jar of sulphuric acid — the pain, the agony, the disintegration of tissue, the death. If that porridge lands on you and you try to wipe it away you're in trouble — your hands fall off, gets eaten away." (*Africa News (U.S.) 26.6.78*)

Dr. Ushewokunze also revealed that he and his colleagues were regularly faced with cases of poisoning and germ warfare. Wells and other water supplies inside Zimbabwe were polluted with cholera and typhoid germs by the regime, he said, while crops grown by Zimbabwean refugees in an effort to be self-sufficient while in Mozambique

had been poisoned by Rhodesian troops during cross-border raids. (*ibid.; Southern Africa June-July 1978*)

The use of poison by the Smith regime — either as a deliberate tactic or as a consequence of the defoliation of strategic areas, particularly along the borders — appears to go back at least to 1974, when a number of residents of Mukumbura protected village in the Zambezi valley died from an unknown shaking sickness apparently caused by defoliants washed into the soil and absorbed by plants. (*FOCUS 12 p. 5*) In April 1976, Zambian newspapers reported that the security forces had begun to poison water sources in the south-east of Zimbabwe as a weapon against guerrillas. (*BBC Monitoring Service 28/29.4.78; The Herald 28.4.76*)

A total of 115 Africans were reported to have died in November 1977 after drinking poisoned water in the south east and to have been buried in a mass grave. (*BBC Monitoring Service 5.5.78, reporting Maputo in English for Rhodesia*)

In December 1977, 11 out of 17 African farm workers on a Shamva farm died after eating poisoned corn beef from a number of cans which they had found lying in the bush. The manufacturer, Liebig's Rhodesia Ltd., subsequently carried out tests on the meat and published warnings to the public in the Rhodesian press. The cans, the company stated, had been "lying in the Rhodesian bush for an unknown period of time exposed to the elements and the sun." According to ZANU (Patriotic Front), however, the poisoned meat had been "deliberately piled 10 miles out of Shamva by Rhodesian troops" and was aimed at "ZIPA freedom fighters operating in the area." The liberation movement claimed that 73 African civilians and school pupils had died in the preceding three months after eating this and other deliberately poisoned foodstuffs. (*The Herald 2/5/8. 12.77; BBC Monitoring Service 30.12.77*)

South Africa has been implicated in the Smith regime's use of chemical weapons. In September 1978 sources in ZAPU (Patriotic Front) reported that South Africa had donated oxygen masks to the Rhodesian army through Battle Ensign of the Transvaal, a company specialising in making chemicals. The masks, the liberation movement concluded, indicated "feverish" plans for chemical warfare. A chemical weapon plant was also to be nearing completion in the Orange Free State, finance by West German sources. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice 30.9.78*)

It seems likely that chemical methods may increasingly be used inside South Africa itself. On 1 August this year, for example, contingents of the SADF were reported to have sprayed the Rustenberg area with chemicals, napalm, defoliants and teargas from canisters in an attempt to flush out a detachment of Umkhonto We Sizwe guerrillas. (*Statement issued by National Executive, ANC (SA) 11.8.78*)

(*FOCUS on Political Repression in Southern Africa No. 19 November 1978*)

Both ZAPU and ZANU (Patriotic Front) have repeatedly warned of the threat of chemical warfare. In October 1978 ZAPU stated that the Smith regime had "not refrained from using napalm in large areas of Zimbabwe and in the neighbouring countries. He has not hesitated to use defoliants on large tracts of land, he has not hesitated to poison rivers, swamps and wells. In many areas innocent people have been given poison to give to the freedom fighters; shopkeepers have been given poisoned clothes and food-stuffs to sell to the freedom fighters." (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 7.10.78)

Besides napalm, the Rhodesian security forces regularly use phosphorus grenades.

In February 1979, evidence was submitted by ZANU (Patriotic Front) on the regime's use of poisons to the first session of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes in Southern Africa, held in Brussels, Belgium. The methods included infiltrating agents into Mozambique to poison food supplies in the refugee camps, distributing poisoned aspirins to African villagers and poisoning wild fruits in the bush.

Other recent incidents reported by the Patriotic Front include:-

- On 27 January, in the Midlands, poisoned clear beer was mixed with home-brewed beer on the orders of the security forces. 30 people died and many others were taken to hospital (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 3.2.79)
- On 28 March the Rhodesian Air Force sprayed chemicals on a group of villagers who were harvesting their crop in the Salisbury region. Most of the crop was destroyed (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 7.4.79)
- On 31 March more than 40 people in the Fort Victoria area were forced to drink water which had acid sprayed into it. Most of them died and the rest were reported to be in a serious condition. (*Zimbabwe People's Voice* 7.4.79)

Relatively little is known of the source of poisons, defoliants and other chemicals used by the Rhodesian security forces. There are a large number of firms inside Rhodesia, some of them the subsidiaries of multinational corporations, engaged in manufacturing herbicides, pesticides, industrial chemicals etc. One such company is AE & CI, a subsidiary of ICI. In

February 1979, the Rhodesian police reported that four guerillas had entered the AE & CI complex in the Salisbury suburb of Donnington through a hole cut in the security fence, and set an explosive charge in the cyanide storage depot. An African employee was seriously injured in the blast, which according to the police caused some external damage to the building. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 12.2.79). A factory to manufacture explosives being built by AE & CI near Que Que was due for completion in February 1980. (*Rand Daily Mail* 28.8.79) Other overseas firms with interests in Rhodesia's chemical industry include Pfizer Inc., Reckitt & Colman, Fisons and Unilever.

One source has reported that the Rhodesian security forces use chemical defoliants from the Geigy Corporation in Switzerland. (*Guns for*

Hire - How the CIA and US Army recruit mercenaries for White Rhodesia, Southern African Anti-Mercenary Coalition, San Francisco, November 1978)

In June 1979, the London *Financial Times* quoted a Zambian publication as alleging that the West is "secretly testing new weapons in Rhodesia, including chemical warfare agents." (*Financial Times* 27.6.79)

RACISM IN THE SECURITY FORCES

The Smith regime has always used the presence of African regular troops in the Rhodesian army and British South Africa Police as "proof" that the liberation struggle does not command the support of the majority of the black population. The frequently repeated claim that "80% of the regular security forces are black" - Lt-General Walls announced in June 1979 that he was expecting the security forces to be 95% African by the end of 1979 - has continued to be one of the most powerful propaganda weapons in the hands of the "internal settlement" leadership. Any evidence to suggest that Africans are well represented in the security forces and have confidence in what they are doing is clearly going to be of great importance to the regime in any debate on the future structure of the police, army and airforce and the role that they should play in the transition to independence.

In reality, the situation is very different. Whereas Rhodesia's white population is stretched to the limit by military conscription and the demands of territorial service, only a tiny fraction of the black majority has shown itself willing to fight voluntarily on the side of the regime. Effective command and control of the various units within the security forces remain firmly in white hands while African, Asian and Coloured troops are heavily concentrated in the non-combatant, administrative and service roles, and in the lower ranks. At the top end of the scale, the Commanders of the various divisions and the officers around them are without exception white, while at the lower end, for example at Shaw Barracks, Balla Balla, the principle training depot for RAR recruits, the security forces "employ" several hundred African boys under the age of 17. They are issued with basic army kit and are formed into companies and drilled. They reportedly work mainly as domestics for a basic wage. Most are using school facilities at the barracks. These youngsters, attracted by the prospect of having a comparatively good wage plus access to schooling, provide a steady stream of willing recruits for the RAR as they reach the age of 18.

It is difficult to reach a precise figure for the number of Africans currently serving in the security forces (largely because the statistics are disguised by the regime for its own purpose) but it is probably in the region of 15-20,000 men available for front line service in the regular army and police, and in the Police Reserve; with 20,000 in the security force auxiliaries and others in non-combatant roles. (*See the second table in MANPOWER FOR THE SECURITY FORCES*) This represents a very small proportion out of a total African population of (estimated)

seven million people. The whites, however, amounting to only 3% of Rhodesia's total population, contribute disproportionately to the regime's war effort and probably provided some 60% of the manpower used to police the April 1979 general elections.

The view that the regime consistently puts across in its propaganda material is that Africans join the security forces out of a sense of patriotism and a desire to fight the "communist terrorists" — perhaps to gain retribution against guerillas who have killed members of their family or friends. There is no doubt that some individuals do volunteer for the regular forces for reasons of this kind. These arguments, however, conceal a number of much more important practical incentives.

Firstly, recruiting has always been most successful among African families with one or more members already serving in the police or army. Most African regulars live with their families in quarters provided by the authorities at or near their barracks, so that their children and other relatives are constantly exposed to army and police life.

Secondly, a disproportionate number of African volunteers have always tended to be drawn from certain parts of the country with a tradition of army and police service — notably from among members of the Karanga tribal group, located mainly in the Fort Victoria, Gutu and Chibi districts and numbering about 500,000 people. Individual families in this region often have a tradition of military service stretching back for several generations. In 1977 the Rhodesian press reported that about 60% of African policemen came from this part of the country. (*The Herald* 7.6.77)

Thirdly, while black regular troops are paid lower wages than their white counterparts (*see below*), army and police service is still one of the most financially rewarding and, as far as the terms of service are concerned, secure forms of employment for Rhodesian Africans, particularly those with no educational qualifications. An African private in the RAR will receive a salary of over Rh\$ 1,000 a year, plus free medical facilities for himself and his family, free accommodation, a guaranteed pension, free schooling for his children plus many other fringe benefits. The average annual income in 1978 for African males employed in urban areas was Rh\$ 630, and for agricultural and forestry workers, Rh\$ 360, according to official statistics. Other sources indicate much lower wages than this in many areas.

The escalation in African unemployment in recent years, a reflection not only of the war but of inherent characteristics of the colonial economy, is a fourth major incentive to Africans to volunteer for the security forces. The security force auxiliaries or private armies, in particular, have been substantially recruited from among the unemployed and for other reasons which have been dealt with in detail above. (*See section SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES*).

Fifthly, there is substantial evidence that a variety of press-ganging and blackmailing methods are employed by the regime's recruiters, and that these have increased considerably in importance with the growth of private armies and the extension

of conscription to Africans. (*See Section on CONSCRIPTION — AFRICANS*)

In August 1979, during an interview on the Jimmy Young radio show from Salisbury, the Commander of Combined Operation Lt-General Walls stated that

We don't have colour in the forces at all — black and white doesn't come into it. They sleep together, fight together, dig trenches together, die together if necessary — we just have no colour bar in the forces (*BBC Radio Two, 10.8.79*)

Lt. General Walls has proved a plausible spokesman for the regime in its efforts to project a multiracial image for the security forces, and he has won the confidence and respect of many Western journalists and observers. An official publication from the regime, however, gives another view of the racist assumptions which are still prevalent in the white military establishment. It also illustrates the appeals which have always been made to narrow tribal sentiment in recruiting Africans for the RAR and other police and army units:-

A hundred years ago the Matabele warrior enjoyed a reputation as a fighting man that was second only to that of the dreaded Zulus of Natal, which was not to be wondered at since most of the blood in his veins was of Zulu origin. In those days his weapon was the stabbing assegai and his uniform a skin kilt and a plume of ostrich feathers.

Today that man's descendants, in the camouflage uniform of the modern soldier and armed with an automatic rifle, is maintaining tribal tradition by playing a valuable and effective role in the battle against his country's enemies, the terrorists. . . The white soldier is perhaps more sophisticated and better at physical training, but the African, thanks to his traditional way of life, is more at home in the bush and can walk long distances without tiring. They are thus ideally suited to counter-insurgency work.

They have a real loathing for the terrorists. . .

There can only be one fate for such vermin — elimination. Rhodesia's black soldiers are busy doing just that. (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No 3, Salisbury 1976*)

Statements of this kind are extremely common in official military publications, which consistently put forward the idea that Africans and whites possess certain innate, and different, qualities which fit them as trackers, riflemen and other lower-ranking, albeit combat posts, and for key organizational, command and administrative posts, respectively.

The regime has been taking steps since 1977 to integrate certain aspects of security force structure. Officer ranks previously reserved for whites have been opened up to Africans with the necessary qualifications, in both the police and the army. There have been a number of racially mixed training schemes: a passing — out parade of troops of the Rhodesia Regiment (mainly White national servicemen and territorials) held in Bulawayo in November 1977, for example, included black fellow trainees drawn from the RAR. A police passing-out parade in Salisbury on the same day included both black and white recruits for the first time (*BBC Monitoring*

Service 1/3.12.77). There have been others since, a development which has accelerated with the extension of conscription to Africans. African and white troops have been required to share billets and messes, and so on.

In general, however, the Rhodesian security forces continue to be organised along racial lines, with inferior pay and conditions for black personnel. Some units — such as the elite RLI and SAS — are all-white, others (Greys Scouts, Selous Scouts, regular BSAP) are racially mixed while others (RAR, security force auxiliaries) are all-African. The relatively small numbers of Asians and Coloureds in the security forces, virtually all of whom are conscripts, tend to be in different units again, notably the Rhodesian Defence Regiment. A little-publicised aspect of the security forces is that within each unit, almost every regular white soldier or policeman from the lowest ranks up to officers, and including national servicemen straight from school, has an African "batman" or personal servant to cater for his domestic and other needs. This would be unheard of for African constables and troops in the police and army.

African regulars throughout the security forces receive salaries of between Rh\$ 60 and Rh\$ 100 per month with accommodation for their families provided on site. By comparison, white regulars in the army receive a minimum of Rh\$400 a month, with various bonus incentives in addition. A "troopie" in the Rhodesian Light Infantry will in practice earn around Rh\$600 a month. Even a white national serviceman, straight out of school, receives a basic wage of Rh\$201 a month, with an extra Rh\$100 a month if he stays in the army after completing his one year of national service (*Rand Daily Mail 20.1.78*). In September 1979 the Rhodesian parliament were informed that pay for the security force auxiliaries was to be raised to Rh\$ 74 per month and that there had been "some kind of increase" for other African regulars in the course of the year. (*Parliamentary Debates 4.9.79*)

Asian and Coloured members of the security forces, although liable for conscription on the same terms as whites, are also treated less favourably. They have been reports of attempted strike action by Asian and Coloured troops and undoubtedly there is considerable dissatisfaction and alienation from the regime. A Rhodesian Front MP reported to the House of Assembly in October 1977, for example, that Coloured troops had expressed a number of grievances. They were denied opportunities to join the regular forces and were given only five weeks' training. The highest rank a Coloured man could achieve was that of Warrant Officer. (*The Herald, 6.10.77*) A few weeks after these remarks a petition signed by about 500 Coloured national servicemen was presented to Lord Carver on his arrival in Salisbury, protesting against conscription of the Coloured community. (*Rand Daily Mail, 21.11.77*)

Previous sections have described some of the steps being taken by the regime to promote Africans, and a few cases, Asians and Coloureds, to ranks previously occupied exclusively by Whites. Up to 1979, Africans in the regular army were not permitted to rise above

the rank of NCO or Warrant Officer, regardless of the length of service. In March 1976 it was announced that commissioned ranks would in future opened to Africans and in June 1977, 13 African soldiers, all of them with at least 10 years' service, were commissioned as lieutenants. The numbers entering officer ranks have remained small, the *New York Times*, for example, reported on 3 June 1979 that there were now 30 black officers in the Rhodesian army, while the *Daily Telegraph* of 4 September 1978 gave the figure as 38. According to the regime, "despite the publicity given to the commissioning of black officers, the number of applications received from young, qualified African men is still small, both from the military and civilian sectors. At the start of 1978 applications were invited from young men throughout the country, and yet the course this year has only one black cadet and two coloured cadets amongst those in training." (*Fighting Forces of Rhodesia, No. 5, 1978*).

Six blacks from intake 163 passed their officer selection course and began training at the Gwelo School of Infantry in January 1979. The total number of black commissioned officers in the army is certainly less than 50. There are no known reports of Asians and Coloureds being commissioned as army officers, with the exception of one Indian in the Army Corps of Chaplains in 1979, and another in the Medical Corps.

No figures are available for the number of Africans in the Rhodesian Air Force. There are no reports of any blacks among the estimated 100 + pilots in the Air Force (although one or two Africans have qualified or are in training as civilian pilots). Africans generally occupy the lowest rank of "aircraftsmen" and are employed as drivers, watchguards and clerks. There are only two African commissioned officers in the Air Force, with a handful of African technicians. In short, Africans, whom the regime constantly claim provide 80% of the regular security forces, provide at most 7% of the estimated 700-plus commissioned officers in The Rhodesian army and airforce, (*For details of opportunities for Africans in the Police Force, see section on THE POLICE*).

DISAFFECTION AND DESERTION

In March 1978, the regime made it an offence for a member of the security forces to fail to report any colleague whom he or she believes may be intending to go absent without leave. The new regulation was contained in a provision of the Defence Amendment Bill, which passed its third reading in the Rhodesian House of Assembly on 1 March 1978. (*BBC Monitoring Service 3/4.3.78*) It was clearly one among a number of pointers to the regime's concern at the growing rate of both black and white desertion from the security forces. Later that same month, the Deputy Secretary for Information and Publicity of ZANU (Patriotic Front) told a conference in London that many secret trials of African members of the security forces had been held by the regime, on charges of insubordination and refusing to fight.

Other deserters had managed to flee the country.

The loyalty and discipline of African regular troops are without question major sources of anxiety for the Rhodesian military establishment. It is impossible to say how many members of the RAR and other African or mixed units have deserted; a significant number certainly have, either to join the forces of the liberation movement or turn to crime, banditry or other 'freelance' operations of one kind or another.

In 1977, for example, an African deserter from the British South Africa Police told a Mozambican magazine that "I joined the police because at that time there were no other jobs in Rhodesia. There a person of my age could only arrange food in the army or in the police. There is no work." He deserted because "I was in the police in a post near my own village. One day I learned that the police went to my mother's house because of guerillas... When I arrived there they had killed her." (*African News, US, 28.2.77*)

The extension of conscription first to selected categories of Africans, and eventually to the African population as a whole, has prompted large numbers of desertions. (These are referred to in the section on CONSCRIPTION - AFRICANS, above.) Asian and Coloured members of the security forces have also deserted in significant numbers. Among white troops, political developments over the last three years, culminating in the 'internal settlement' agreement and the installation of Bishop Muzorewa's government, have severely strained the confidence placed for so many years in Smith and the Rhodesian Front. This has manifested itself in disciplinary problems and declining morale. In March 1977, for example, Flight Lieutenant D.M. Bester, judge advocate presiding over a two-week series of courts martial at Brady Barracks, Bulawayo, warned that excessive drinking had led to "an obvious slackness and indiscipline in the armed forces". Evidence was heard by the court martial of "the lack of interest and utter disregard for responsibility" shown by senior members of an army camp in the operational area. (*The Herald 16.3.77*) Drug-taking has now reached a very high level among members of the RLI - supposedly the regime's elite counter-insurgency force - and indeed among other units of the security forces. The rising incidence of armed robbery, fraud, smuggling and other crimes committed by both whites and blacks, who in many cases are deserters or part-time members of the security force, is another indication of these trends.

A growing number of young whites, Asians and Coloureds have succeeded in evading their national service obligations by going overseas or to South Africa before the date set for them to report for initial training. Legislation has been enacted, particularly since January 1977, designed specifically to catch such malcontents before they have a chance to dodge their conscription obligations. The regime has been particularly keen to prevent university applicants leaving the country to study before completing their national service commitments. Even while the loopholes have been closed, however, draft-dodgers have found new ways of escaping the call-up net.

Figures released in January 1979 show that of the 1,500 whites, Asians and Coloureds who were issued with call-up papers for intake 163, only 1,075 reported to Llewellyn Barracks for training. Undoubtedly, the majority of those who chose to ignore their call-up papers would have already left the country. Failing to report to barracks on the designated day carries a maximum penalty of two years in prison.

Those who have managed to escape the call-up net include a number who simply have no wish to get caught up in a war in which they have lost class-mates and relatives, and which the white minority has lost the confidence and will to fight. However, there is evidence that a growing number of young whites, Asians and Coloureds are deserting the regime's security forces for new and more positive reasons - viz, their political opposition to the illegal regime and the maintenance of white supremacy through the 'internal settlement'.

Opposition to conscription from the Asian and Coloured communities has been voiced consistently by their respective leaderships and at times has become bitter and intense. A petition signed by 500 Coloured national servicemen and presented to Lord Carver, the British Resident Commissioner-designate, in November 1977 (*see above under RACISM IN THE SECURITY FORCES*) stated:

That whereas it is the legal and moral duty of all citizens to participate in the defence of their country against foreign aggression, we believe that the racial war now raging in our country is a direct result of an unjust and racist political order which we are victims of as much as the African people are... We have no objections to conscription in the armed forces of a free and independent Zimbabwe. (*Paragraph 2*)

Paragraph 3 of the petition read:

We object most strongly to the racially selective compulsory conscription by which we are forced to fight in order to preserve an unjust government against our conscience and therefore petition that the induction of the so-called 'Coloured' people of Rhodesia be on a voluntary basis. (*Sunday Mail 5.11.77*)

The organisers of the petition said that they could have obtained 1,500 signatures if they had had more time to collect them before Lord Carver left Salisbury.

In August 1978, six men - three members of the Coloured community and three Asians - appeared in court charged with contravening the National Service Act by failing to report for training after receiving call-up papers. The case developed into the most important legal challenge to date to the regime's conscription system. Three of the accused were members of ZAPU (Patriotic Front).

The accused made it clear that they objected to fighting for a system which discriminated against them. One of the six, Mr. Kurupal Shingadia, a qualified diesel mechanic, stated:

I applied for a job in the airforce because I wanted to do my national training there. My application was turned down on the grounds that the advertisement was meant for Europeans only. I was then sent to Llewellyn Barracks, Bulawayo, together with other Asians and Coloureds. When

we got there we found that the facilities used by us were very inferior to those used by the Europeans. (*Zimbabwe Times* 8.8.78)

He said he would not in future attend national service because of the racial discrimination practised in the army. All six were found guilty and sentenced to terms of between four and six months imprisonment with labour, suspended for five years on condition that no similar offences be committed in that time.

In April 1979, the first reports surfaced in the British press of an organization called the Zimbabwe Democrats, which had been working clandestinely for over 18 months within the security forces and among teenagers who were about to be conscripted. According to one of its members:

Democrats started up as a deserters' self-help group among conscripts called up into the security forces.

We passed information and advice simply by word of mouth to start with, on how to desert and escape from the country — because once you desert, that's the only course open.

Gradually, we became more politically conscious and realised the war could not be won by Smith. We countered the constant lies and misinformation by circulating newsheets and letters. (*Morning Star* 10.4.79)

The number of deserters and draft dodgers from the Rhodesian security forces appears to have increased quite dramatically over the period referred to. A representative explained that the Democrats had decided to come out into the open and publicise their work because the Rhodesian Special Branch had stumbled onto their activities and were carrying out extensive investigations.

Several members of the Zimbabwe Democrat organization interviewed by the *Morning Star* revealed details of many aspects of life in the army, including the treatment of conscripts who appeared reluctant to fight, and of atrocities committed against African civilians. They said that because of tactics used by the regime in security force operations, morale was crumbling not only among black conscripts, but also among white conscripts and territorials. In the words of one 28 year old Coloured deserter, "there is terror going on in the bush. It is the terror of being killed when you don't believe what you're fighting for." (*Morning Star* 14.4.79; the full texts of interviews in the *Morning Star* with members of Zimbabwe Democrats are reproduced in two articles in Appendix IV.)

Defectors, mainly conscripts from intake 163 (the first African intake), who reached Mozambique, confirmed the existence of a clandestine group called Zimbabwe Democrats. They described it as consisting essentially of whites within the security forces who were organising the flight of draft dodgers and deserters. (*Sunday Post, Johannesburg*, 27.5.79)

It is clear that the regime's escalation of the war, and the brutal methods used by the security forces in conducting counter-insurgency operations, underlie

the growing disaffection in many ranks of the security forces. Indiscipline and falling morale are symptomatic of the growing desperation with which the regime conducts its operations. There is considerable evidence that morale is particularly low in those units which receive the least training, among them employees of Internal Affairs, Guard Force members and the security force auxiliaries (SFAs).

Josiah Tongogara, the Chief of Defence for ZANU (Patriotic Front) has revealed that ZANLA (ZANU's military wing) is retraining thousands of security force auxiliaries who have defected from the Rhodesian security forces. In an interview with *Zimbabwe News*, the official organ of ZANU, he stated that:

The ZANU Commissariat Department is busy turning them into people's soldiers. The pleasing thing about them is the open and frank way they talk about their bitter and unfortunate experiences in the racist army. A typical explanation they give is: "I was forced against my will to join their army. I did not volunteer. Smith forces went around the villages forcing us to go for war". They ran away and came to the ranks of the people because they could not fight against their brothers. A new personality dedicated to serve the cause of the people is being fashioned out of these helpless victims of Smith's criminal war designs. We have got thousands of them undergoing this process today. (*Zimbabwe News, January-June 1979*)

The Patriotic Front has consistently made it clear that deserters and defectors from the regime's security forces, whether they are black or white, are welcome on the side of the liberation movement. Repeated appeals have been made by the Patriotic Front to the regime's soldiers to the effect that they are fighting an unjust racist war, whereas the Patriotic Front is not fighting against whites as such in Zimbabwe, but against an unjust system. On 19 December 1978 for example, Joshua Nkoma, president of ZAPU (Patriotic Front) issued a statement addressed specifically to soldiers serving in the regime's security forces:

Consider individually and collectively the energies you are expending on a lost cause; consider that the cause is not only lost but also that it is unjust; consider that the struggle for human dignity has always triumphed and will surely triumph in Zimbabwe; consider that you are being forced to take innocent lives against whom you have nothing personally; consider how much good you could contribute individually and collectively to the building of a just, humane, non-oppressive society. You must make individual decisions now. The future is not on the side for which you are fighting. The gathering storm should not engulf you for lack of advice. The decision is yours. You either cling to the self-destructive Smith colonial regime or you leave and support the forces that are fighting for everybody's future and progress.

There is no doubt that an increasing number of Rhodesian soldiers, policemen and others, of all races, are responding to such sentiments by quitting the country.

CONCLUSION

Rhodesia occupies a unique position in the history of British colonialism. When, in 1923, it was made a self-governing colony, it had its own standing army controlled by the white settler minority. This army, and the other units within the Rhodesian security forces that have been described above, have been used throughout Rhodesia's history to maintain and enforce white minority rule. With the growth of African nationalist demands for a universal franchise in the 1950's and early 1960's, the regime made a conscious decision to contain the threat to the privileged position of the settler minority through increasing militarisation rather than through compromise and negotiation. In this it was aided and abetted by the British government at the break-up of the Central African Federation. It has maintained this position ever since, as witnessed by the growing portion of its budget devoted to defence and security, and the remorseless extension of the call-up to mobilise more and more categories of personnel for the war effort.

This position has not essentially changed since the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978. In fact the Smith regime's decision to flout the Anglo-American settlement initiative (set out in the British government's White Paper of September 1977), and to press ahead with its own 'internal' solution was prompted not only by the knowledge that the British and US governments would make no effective protest, but also by a belief that its own military strength was sufficient to continue to contain the threat from the liberation forces. Over the period of the 'internal settlement', the militarisation of Rhodesian society has become even more pronounced through the introduction of martial law and its extension to virtually the entire country. Despite Bishop Muzorewa's protestations that a democratically elected, majority rule government is now in power in Rhodesia, it is the elite white military commanders who effectively run the country.

The Salisbury regime would never have survived until 1979 without the guarantee of continuing sanctions-busting supplies of arms, ammunition, military hardware, spare parts, fuel and so forth, from South Africa and the West. Speaking in February 1977, for example, the regime's Minister of Defence pointed out that "we are able to get what we need in the way of arms and munitions. We have access to overseas markets for these commodities. Frankly, we frequently receive offers for provision of materials which we are unable to take up simply because they exceed our basic requirements, so I can assure you that under present circumstances with the channels that do exist, Rhodesia could continue ad infinitum." (*The Herald* 15.2.77) As has been shown (Appendix I and II in particular), this trade in weaponry, particularly in aircraft, has escalated in recent years. It has given the Rhodesian military establishment the grisly confidence of knowing that with South Africa's support they can mount devastating attacks not only on targets inside Rhodesia, but on refugee camps, economic installations and other settlements virtually anywhere in the front line states.

The regime's capacity to violate the peace of the region has increased considerably as a result of the 'internal settlement' agreement. The presence of black faces in the governmental machinery has not only created the conditions for much more overt South African military involvement, but for hawkish statements from Western sources along the lines of "give the Rhodesian army the tools and let them finish the job".

Is it realistic for the backers of the Rhodesian regime to calculate on a military victory over the forces of the Patriotic Front? To date, despite the sophisticated military apparatus that has been described in this book, despite blatant breaches in United Nations sanctions and despite South Africa's increasingly overt military involvement in Rhodesia, the illegal regime's security forces have been quite unable to crush the will of the Zimbabwean people to fight for their freedom. On the contrary, the armed struggle continues to advance and the presence of the Patriotic Front is felt throughout the country.

In this climate of country-wide liberation war, the regime and its allies are now searching more and more desperately for ways to defuse the armed struggle and to shift the balance of forces decisively back in favour of white supremacy. The lifting of economic sanctions, and the international recognition — whether *de jure* or *de facto* — which this implies, are crucial to this strategy for the regime's survival. There is no doubt that the immediate consequence of lifting economic sanctions against Rhodesia would be a massive flow of sophisticated armaments and military equipment to the illegal regime's security forces. Lifting sanctions, in other words, far from enabling the Muzorewa-Smith regime to raise the standard of living of the African majority, is a recipe for sharply increasing the regime's capacity for military aggression, with disastrous consequences for the Africa people throughout the region.

A decision by the West to recognise the 'internal settlement' regime by lifting economic sanctions would at the same time further legitimise South African military intervention in Rhodesia. Lifting sanctions would open up new channels for supplying arms and military hardware to the apartheid regime in South Africa itself. It would in effect amount to a wholesale flouting of the United Nations mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, thereby dramatically enlarging the threat which apartheid poses to the peace of the entire African continent.

In Britain's case in particular, any decision to lift sanctions against the 'internal settlement' regime, or indeed to recognise any 'agreement' which is not based on a genuine transfer of power to the Zimbabwean people, will inevitably commit the British government, as the administering power, to providing various forms of material assistance to that regime. In the conditions of war which now prevail in South Africa — and which will continue until genuine liberation is won — such a commitment must sooner or later draw the British into overt military involvement in the region. Lifting sanctions, in other words, is the first step towards declaring war on the rest of independent Africa and would indeed have repercussions far beyond the continent.

APPENDIX I: ARMS SUPPLIES TO RHODESIA

The following includes a list of reported deliveries of major items of military hardware, vehicles and aircraft to Rhodesia in the period since UDI. It has been compiled from a variety of published sources, which are listed under each item and at the end and which have been cross-checked as far as possible. Given the nature of the war in Rhodesia some weapons are strategically more important than others and it is towards these that the list that follows has been weighted.

Following the break-up of the Central African Federation, the military hardware at that time in the hands of the Federal forces was divided up among the member countries. It is noteworthy that Zambia acquired non-combat or less strategic equipment while most of the more formidable weaponry remained in Southern Rhodesia. (See *INTRODUCTION*)

At the time of UDI the Rhodesian Air Force had in active service 9 *Vampire BF9* fighter bombers plus a further 15 of the trainer version out of a total of 32 aircraft delivered by the UK between 1953 and 1955; 10 *Canberra* bombers, of which 3 were of trainer specification, from the original consignment of 30 delivered in 1959 and of which 12 were returned to the UK; 12 *Hunter FBA9* ground attack fighters, two of which were equipped as trainers, delivered in 1962/3; 8 *Alouette III* helicopters also delivered in 1962 and 1963; 4 *C 47* transport aircraft dating from 1956; and 12, out of an original 13, *Provost* trainers. (Praag 1976)

Many white Rhodesians had served as pilots in World War II and had thus undergone the same process of transition from Spitfire/Hurricane through Meteor/Vampire to Hunter/Canberra. This stood them in good stead to make the later jump to Mirages.

On the ground the Rhodesian security forces had 30 *Ferret* scout cars dating from around 1960 and about 12-13 thousand men on active service. (Praag 1976; Gervasi 1979)

It is generally accepted that after 1965, South Africa took upon itself the burden of supplying Rhodesia's military needs. Pretoria doubtless saw links between its own fight against liberation movements and possible developments in Rhodesia. Its ability to assist was greatly enhanced by two relevant developments in South Africa itself. In 1965 the *Atlas Aircraft Corporation* was established with advisory aid from the French company *Sud Aviation*, and in 1969 *Armcor* (the South African Arms Corporation) was incorporated in law, having been formed in 1964.

The list of supplies is in date order and features the country or origin followed by countries assisting or through which the arms passed, in parenthesis, the weapon in question supplied, a short description and notes relating to relevant facts concerning design, supply, manufacture etc.

Country of origin	Item
1967	
1) Italy	6 or 7 Piaggio P166 light spotter and surveillance aircraft
These do not appear in the current inventories (see Appendix II) so one must assume that the Rhodesian Air Force no longer has them. However, between 1968 and 1974 South Africa acquired 18 such aircraft, nominally from Italy. It is possible that they may have been exchanged with South Africa for equipment that was more appropriate to the Rhodesian situation (helicopters, for example - see below). The Italian company Piaggio is controlled by Fiat and the P166 is powered by engines made under licence from Rolls Royce. South Africa had 9 P166's in service in 1974, shown as delivered in 1969; a further 11 were delivered in 1975. They are used in South Africa for maritime patrol. (SIPRI Arms Trade Registers 1975)	
2) South Africa	4 Sud-Alouette III helicopters.
These are made by Atlas under licence from Sud Aviation. The licensing arrangements assumed a period of direct im-	

Country of origin Item
ports to South Africa followed by assembly of French-made parts, and then domestic manufacture and production with local modifications. The licence contains provision for development improvements to be exchanged between Atlas and Sud-Aviation. (SIPRI Arms Trade Registers 1975, Lock/Wulf 1977)

3) Italy (South Africa, USA) 12 Aermacchi - Lockheed Trojan - AL60-C4 light military aircraft

This is a Lockheed design built under licence in Italy and further licenced to Atlas where it goes under the name 'Kudu' (AM3C). 20 were imported into South Africa in 1967 from whence all but eight were re-exported to Rhodesia at this time (see below). The deal was set up by Aeritalia, owned by Fiat, and despite being widely documented and reported was denied by the Italian Government. A further South African modification of the Kudu, manufactured by Atlas, is called the 'Bosbok'.

The AL60 is powered by Lycoming engines manufactured by the Avco Corporation of the USA. (Praag 1976; SIPRI Year Book 1978; SIPRI Arms Trade Registers 1975)

4) (Source unknown) 2 Viscounts
These were transferred from Middle Eastern Airlines to Air Rhodesia, for whom they serve a double role as passenger aircraft and troop transport. (Johannesburg Star 21.4.73)

5) UK Aircraft maintenance services

Maintenance facilities provided by Airwork Services Ltd. a company which had operated under contract for this purpose prior to UDI. Airwork is a subsidiary of British and Commonwealth Shipping (UK), a group of companies which imposes no restriction on its personnel working in Rhodesia. Airwork's aircraft maintenance operations in Rhodesia, through plants in Salisbury and Bulawayo, are believed to have continued at least until 1977. (Flight International, July 1977)

1970
6) US Facilities for military supplies

In February 1970 the US administration granted the first of 10 licences for the export of Lockheed C130 cargo planes to SAFAIR, a charter company which under South African government contract flew military supplies to South African forces deployed in Rhodesia and Namibia. (Praag 1976)

1971
7) Italy (South Africa) 7 Aermacchi-Lockheed AL60 - C4 Trojan/AM3C Kudu light military transport planes

(See item 3). The current inventory (see Appendix II) shows at most 16 of these, whereas by 1971 the total would have been 19, all of which could have come from the original 1967 deal with Aeritalia. This may indicate some losses in action. At this time (1971) the US-designed engines were still coming from the Italian licencees. (SIPRI Arms Trade Registers 1975)

1972
8) South Africa (France) 30 AML-60/90 armoured cars

These are versions of the Eland armoured car made under a licence from Panhard (France) granted in 1965 to Armcor (South Africa). Armcor went into production of the AML-60 in 1967 and 100 per year were produced. The second generation of the model, the AML-90, was also developed in South Africa from the original French design. (SIPRI Arms Trade Registers 1975) The AML-60 carries a mounted machine gun and 60mm mortar; the AML-90 carries a mounted machine gun and a 90mm cannon. They are recently built by Sandock Austral, a company in Boksburg.

1973
9) South Africa (France) 20 AML-60 armoured cars
A further consignment of the version of the Eland armoured car built under licence in South Africa. Some 800 4.8 tonne AML 60s and 5.5 tonne AML 90s were available in South Africa between 1961 and 1972. (Lock/Wulf 1977)

Country of origin	Item
10) Switzerland (USA, West Germany, Portugal)	3 Boeing 720 long range cargo aircraft

This is a variant of the Boeing 707. The aircraft, which were eleven years old at the time of the sale, originally entered service with the US *Eastern Airlines* in 1961. They were subsequently sold to a Frankfurt charter company *Calair*, which went bankrupt in February 1972 and the planes were transferred to *Jet Aviation* of Basle, Switzerland. This company has apparently been involved in several deals for Rhodesia and South Africa.

The planes were next 'sold' to a Liechtenstein company, *IAC* (International Air Cargo) who then re-sold them. *Jet Aviation* both prepared them for their journey to Rhodesia, via Portugal, and maintained them for the year until Rhodesia pilots took them to Salisbury. They were subsequently made available to *Overseas Holidays and Aircraft Hire* in an arrangement involving both West German and Portuguese charter groups. *Overseas Holidays and Aircraft Hire* is a Johannesburg registered company, the managing director of which, Mervyn Eyett, handled the deal. Eyett is also the deputy managing director of Air Rhodesia. The US government withdrew export licences to Eyett's company in August 1975, two years later. Each plane cost the Rhodesians approximately \$400,000 plus a further \$200,000 for maintenance. (*Times* 8.5.76; *Johannesburg Star* 10.8.75; *Sunday Times, Johannesburg* 22.4.73; *Rand Daily Mail* 18.3.73; *The Herald* 18.4.73)

11) South Africa	armoured cars, planes and helicopters
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At this time there were an estimated 2,500 South African paramilitary forces and 1,000 South African regular troops serving in Rhodesia. They were supplied directly from South Africa with Saracen armoured cars (UK), four Alouette helicopters and two spotter planes. (*Praeger* 1976)

12) South Africa	2 Aerospatiale SA330 Puma helicopters
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Made in South Africa by Atlas under licence using designs transferred from the French company *Sud-Aviation*. In 1970/71, 20 had been delivered to South Africa by France/UK. (*SIPRI Arms Trade Registers* 1975)

13) South Africa	1 Viscount
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This was supplied by South African Airways to Air Rhodesia. (*Johannesburg Star* 21.4.73)

1974

14) UK Jordan	Hawker-Hunter jet fighters; Tiger-cat missile system; 41 Centurion tanks; 120 Aden cannons; 3000 SAM missiles; 400,000 rounds of 30 mm ammunition
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This consignment was sold to Jordan by the UK government in July 1974 and immediately bought for \$16 million by a private South African company registered in Liechtenstein. The items were resold to the South African government who then supplied a major part of the content to Rhodesia. It is believed that half of the tanks and possibly some of the jet fighters remained in South Africa. The contract also provided for a spares supply for 5 years. The missile system comprised 555 combat and 162 practice SAMs, jeeps (Leyland), launchers, target room simulators, radar, film analysis and maintenance equipment. (*Praeger* 1976)

1975

15) UK	2 Britten-Norman Islander/ Defender STOL transport and patrol planes
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(see item 20) (*Gervasi* 1979; *Sunday Times, Johannesburg* 4.3.79)

16) US Luxembourg	2 DC-8 55 F jet traders (one acquired in 1972), 1 CL 44 cargo plane
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These three planes were supplied to *Affretair*, a sanctions-busting airline set up by the Smith regime in 1969 and based in Gabon. In 1978 *Affretair* was renamed *Air Gabon Cargo*. It is a subsidiary of *Air Trans Africa*, a company based in Salisbury whose operations are believed to be funded by loans from the regime. The managing director of Air Trans

Country of origin	Item
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Africa, Captain Jack Malloch (he is also the general manager of Air Gabon Cargo), was awarded a commemorative decoration by the regime in November 1978, for "courageous loyalty to Rhodesia".

One DC-8 aircraft was acquired by *Affretair* in 1975 from US sources possibly through a Belgian link. The aircraft was originally owned by *Capital International Airways*, Tennessee, and may have been sold to Captain Malloch by *National Aircraft Leasing*, Chicago. The other DC-8 was acquired by *Affretair* in 1972, also possibly from *National Aircraft Leasing* (since renamed *Tiger Air Inc.* a subsidiary of *Tiger International*, Los Angeles). It was originally operated by *Seaboard World Airlines*, New York.

The CL 44 was reportedly acquired by *Affretair* in 1975 from *Cargolux Airlines International*, Luxembourg. It is a very adaptable plane whose tail can be opened to take cargo as large as Alouette III helicopters.

Air Gabon Cargo's (*Affretair*'s) planes are believed to fly regularly to Amsterdam, Brussels, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Gabon, Ivory Coast and other destinations in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, carrying cargoes of Rhodesian beef and other produce. An operations officer at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport was quoted as saying: "There are rumours that they carry weapons, of course, but it is impossible to control." (*Wall Street Journal* 13.12.78; *Africa Confidential* 31.1.79; *Johannesburg Star* 10.8.75)

1976

17) UK	20 Ferret scout cars
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These are made by Daimler, part of British Leyland, and some 60 were delivered to South Africa in the period preceding UDI. 50 were in service in South Africa in 1974. An examination of the current inventory (*Appendix II*) suggests that the 30 Rhodesia had at UDI had either been lost in action or had been retired. British Leyland South Africa has the capacity for domestic manufacture of Ferrets using components exported from the parent company in the UK. (*Africa Confidential, February* 1976)

18) US France	20 (or more) Cessna-Reims 'Milirole' FTB 337 light reconnaissance planes
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This is a highly versatile aircraft which, as the '0-2', was used extensively in Vietnam. It is powered by *Rolls Royce* engines made under licence from the *Teledyne Corporation* and it is known as the 'Lynx' in Rhodesia. The design, which is American, is easily adaptable for a combat role and this version, the 'Milirole', similar to the '0-2', is made by Reims Aviation a French company 49% owned by Cessna. The primary structures are shipped from the USA to Reims. This particular consignment arrived in Rhodesia in two batches. They were all bought by Dimeca, a "Spanish fishing company" registered in the Canary Islands. The Canary Islands were mentioned in an indictment against the Olin Corporation for supplying arms to South Africa via the Winchester group. It would appear that Dimeca arranges for the issuing of new documents for cargoes that are being "diverted".

While most of the 'Milirole' were delivered directly to Salisbury, at least four went via Panama. Pierre Klostermann, the president of the French affiliate, has indicated that he would have delivered them legally to Rhodesia if he could, though Cessna US denied all knowledge of any deal. One of the planes was reported shot down in Mozambique and only 18 were listed in 1977, 14 in 1979. In 1978, 6 other Cessna light aircraft were approved by the US State Department for delivery to South African private distributors, for "border protection". One of the inventories for Rhodesia shows 6 Cessna that are otherwise unaccounted for. (*Praeger* 1976; *Gervasi* 1979; *ACAS* 1978; *Daily Telegraph* 4.12.77; *Sunday Times*, 11.12.77; *American Friends Service Committee, press release* 16.12.77; *Baltimore Sun* 22.11.77; *New African Development* March 1978; *Rand Daily Mail* 16.12.77)

(In May 1976, it was reported that 14 (or 20) training aircraft built by *Aerospace Industries* of Hamilton, New Zealand, were to be sold to a Basle-based company in a deal worth £800,000. After it became common knowledge that the planes were destined to end up in Rhodesia, and after pressure from the US administration, the New Zealand

Country of origin	Item	Country of origin	Item
	government banned the deal until the company could assure them that they were not going to Rhodesia. It is still possible that training aircraft from New Zealand may have reached Rhodesia. (<i>Times</i> 8.5.76; <i>Financial Times</i> 25.5.76) There were also reports in 1975 indicating that Vampire jets and spares from the New Zealand Air Force may have reached Rhodesia despite denials from the New Zealand government. (<i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 14.6.76) The war was being stepped up in 1976 following the breakdown of talks between the regime and the ANC (Zimbabwe), the political organization of ZAPU inside Zimbabwe. It would appear, for example, that South African supplies of 7.62 FN rifles, made under licence from the Belgian originating company, were increasing to the regime (<i>Lock/Wulf</i> 1977.)	24) US	2 Ford Fargo trucks; field cannon; 900 tons of small arms and mortars
1977			This was a consignment which according to ZAPU (Patriotic Front) left New York for St. John's, Newfoundland, on 21 May 1977 and was thence shipped to St. John's, Antigua. The SS <i>Tugelaland</i> from Cape Town picked up the cargo on 27 May and unloaded it at its home port on 10 June where upon "most if not all" of it was sent by rail to Rhodesia. (<i>Zimbabwe Peoples Voice</i> 1.10.77)
19) US	4 OV-10F twin fuselage spotter aircraft (Bronco counter-insurgency planes)	25) South Africa	Unimog military vehicles
	This is said to be the "deadliest COIN (counter-insurgency) aircraft in the world" and established that reputation in Vietnam. It is manufactured by <i>Rockwell International</i> of California and was sold to Indonesia, Thailand, Venezuela and West Germany.		These are made by Daimler-Benz in South Africa for both the commercial and military markets. They have been used to attack refugee camps in Mozambique. They require a substantial maintenance back-up. (<i>Stern</i> 3.2.77)
	This consignment was part of an order for 12, later increased to 16, placed by Indonesia. They were shipped to South Africa though it is not clear whether this was via Indonesia or direct. It does seem certain that the transfer to Rhodesia could not have been carried out without high-level assistance from within the US government. (<i>Los Angeles Times</i> 28.2.79; <i>Gervasi</i> 1979; <i>Flight International</i> 24.3.79)	26) Belgium	22 Siai Marchetti SF 260 W Warrior light strike aircraft
20) UK	12 Britten-Norman Islander/Defender STOL transport/patrol planes		These are probably one of the Rhodesian Air Force's most useful purchases to date, as they are versatile and simple to handle. They were delivered by a Belgian company, <i>Aviation Spare Parts Europe</i> , who purchased them from Italian constructors. Aviation Spare Parts are distributors for Siai Marchetti in Benelux, France and Africa. The consignment was allegedly destined for Mauritius though it is unlikely that the country would have placed such an order. It was ostensibly bought by <i>Rogers Aviation</i> , which is part of a large Mauritian family group with exclusive interests in sugar and tourism. Given the considerable commercial relations between Mauritius and South Africa, particularly in sugar and tourism, it is possible that Rogers were implicated in this deal. As it was, a Portuguese ship took the planes to Durban from Europe, where they arrived at the end of March 1977 and were transported from there to Salisbury. (<i>Flight International</i> 24.2.79; <i>BBC TV Panorama</i> 11.6.79)
	(See also item 15). Britten-Norman is part of the Fairey Group of companies, which has substantial UK government financial support. The aircraft appear to have found their way to Rhodesia from or via Botswana and Mozambique prior to the Portuguese withdrawal. (<i>The Military Balance</i> 1977-8; <i>Flight International</i> 2.7.77; <i>Air International Supplement</i> 1977)	27) South Africa	20 MB326 Impala COIN light strike trainer
21) Israel	106 mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles		The Impala is built under licence in South Africa by Atlas. Production of the Mark 1 (two-seater) began in 1967 and 151 were built. The Mark 2 (one-seater) light strike version, such as those supplied to Rhodesia, went into production in 1974 and 50 were ordered by South Africa. Six were delivered complete and a further 18 as CKD (dismantled in Italy and reassembled in South Africa by Atlas), while the remainder were supplied in component form. The Mark 2 is powered by a Bristol Viper II engine jointly developed by Rolls Royce and Fiat and produced in Italy by Piaggio (<i>ACAS</i> 1978; <i>SIPRI Arms Trade Registers</i> 1979)
22) South Africa France	6 (possibly 12) Mirage III jet fighters	28) UK	"A large consignment of weapons"; Ammunition
	Mirage III and F1 jet fighters are built in South Africa by Atlas under a licence from <i>Dassault</i> (France) granted in 1974. Most Mirage III's, however are directly imported, sometimes via Israel. Rhodesian pilots have undergone training in their use in the Transvaal and it is believed that at least six are in service in Rhodesia with a total of 30 available if needed. The first Mirage III was delivered to South Africa in 1971 followed by a further four in 1973. (<i>Gervasi</i> 1979)		According to a radio broadcast by ZANU (Patriotic Front) this consignment was delivered by <i>Lonrho</i> (UK). ZANU also reported that its military experts had confirmed that Scorpion tanks were being used in attacks against Mozambique. It did not specify whether they were manned by Rhodesian or South African forces. (<i>BBC Monitoring Service reporting Maputo in English for Rhodesia</i> 28.11.77; 5.12.77)
	Addressing troops in April 1977 Lt.-Gen. Walls, the Rhodesian Commander of Combined Operations, said that Rhodesia had the means to combat Mig-21s. He went on to reveal that "six such means had arrived in the country and six more would follow". Without actually mentioning the Mirage by name Walls seems to have left little doubt that he was referring to the Mirage III's. (<i>Guardian</i> 28.4.77)	29) Israel	Chinook helicopters
	According to another source, the regime possesses an estimated 6 Mirage III EZ and 16 Mirage III R2Z. (<i>Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly</i> , quoted in <i>Sell Out in Zimbabwe, CIS Report</i> September 1979)		In March 1978 the Zambian government was reported to be investigating the possibility that these helicopters, of US design, had been used by Rhodesian forces in an attack on Luangwa in Zambia. They were first used by Israeli forces during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. (<i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 15.3.78)
23) France South Africa	Alouette III helicopters; 5.5. in howitzers	30) South Africa (France)	Alouette helicopters (possibly 48)
	Believed to have arrived at the same time as items 22 and 23. The howitzers are UK World War II weapons reconditioned in South Africa. Brand new Alouettes were reported to have been sighted in three out of Rhodesia's four operational areas in existence at this time. (<i>Guardian</i> 28.4.77)		At the end of 1978 the regime was reported to have received a further consignment of these helicopters. (<i>Africa Confidential</i> 1.12.78; <i>Rand Daily Mail</i> 20.12.78)
		31) Portugal	G3 self loading rifles
			150,000 G3 self loading rifles were up for sale in Portugal in the summer of 1978, together with 100 million rounds of ammunition, and were shipped direct to South Africa. Some of the rifles were spotted in use by the Rhodesian army. (<i>Observer</i> 4.2.79)

Country of origin	Item
32) Israel (US/West Germany/Italy)	11 Agusta Bell AB 205 'Huey' helicopters

This is the US military-designated UH-LD/H Iroquois designed and built by the Bell Helicopters division of the US conglomerate *Textron Industries*. Also known as the 'Huey', it was extensively used in Vietnam. They are produced under licence by Dornier in West Germany and by Agusta in Italy. The Italian model is known as the AB 205 and is powered by the Lycoming T 5313A turbo-shaft engine. It carries 15 troops against the Alouette's four. South Africa bought 25 AB 205s from about 1974.

This particular consignment was sold to Israel some years ago (with US approval) where they saw some action. They were then bought by *Cyclone Aviation*, a company owned by associates of the Israeli prime minister and consigned, in component form, to *Jamson Aviation* of Singapore. This company has associate interests in Bermuda and Panama but never saw the AB 205s. They were loaded aboard the 'Hartford Express', a German freighter owned by Oscar Wehr of Hamburg, which was chartered by the Portuguese concern *Aerofrete*. *Aerofrete's* job, it would seem, was to arrange the transportation and to change the manifest. The deal was set up, and the US export licence obtained, on the basis of the Huey's being acquired for commercial reasons in Singapore, by *Air Associates Inc.* of Illinois, owned by a Swiss-registered company, and was paid for in tobacco. According to one source 13 AB 205's were shipped to Rhodesia. (*Flight International* 24.2.79)

The helicopters were assembled in October 1978 at New Sarum airport near Salisbury, after being freighted from South Africa. They have been used for raids inside Mozambique. (*Financial Times* 15.12.78; *Africa Confidential* December 1978; *Rhodesia Herald* 28.12.78; *Guardian* 15.12.78; *Daily Telegraph* 15.12.78; *Gervasi* 1979)

33) South Africa	25 Aerospatiale SA 330 Puma helicopters
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Reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The Puma is intermediate in size between the Alouette and the Huey and its primary use is as a troop carrier. (*SIPRI Arms Trade Registers* 1979)

1979

34) Belgium Italy	Siai Marchetti Warriors
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There have been reports suggesting that a further consignment of these aircraft was still arriving in early 1979 although this may have been due to delays in transit (see *Item* 26). (*Flight International* 24.2.79; *BBC Monitoring Service* reporting ZANU (*Patriotic Front*) *Voice of Zimbabwe*, 9.4.79)

Country of origin	Item
35) US (Holland/UK/Spain)	Armalite rifles; tanks

In September 1978 a Spanish ship en route for Zeebrugge to Bilbao, Spain, the SS Allul, was boarded by police and customs officials when it docked at the British port of Strood, in Kent. The shipment, reportedly a container of 2,800 Armalite rifles (of US origin), was allowed to proceed after the captain had been questioned by the police. A subsequent police statement said that the manifest had been examined and that the SS Allul's cargo was correctly described and was legitimate. The ship's final destination, however, was Durban, South Africa. According to the crew, her cargo, which had been booked through from Zeebrugge by Barreiros Brothers International of Madrid, also included a number of tanks. (*Guardian* 25.9.78; *Johannesburg Post* 26.9.78; *Observer* 4.2.79)

According to a report from ZANU (*Patriotic Front*), 1,400 tonnes of firearms and several tanks from the SS Allul were sent on to Rhodesia from South Africa. (*BBC Monitoring Service* 13.2.79)

The firm of Barreiros Brothers, which makes many of Spain's lorries, also has an arms division manufacturing NATO artillery and ammunition, and is engaged in arms dealing. In 1977/78 it was reportedly involved in the refurbishing and subsequent transfer of a number of redundant Centurion tanks from India to South Africa. (*Observer* 4.2.79)

References and sources — abbreviations used

SIPRI:	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Praeger 1976:	<i>South Africa, The Escalation of a Conflict</i> , Praeger/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1976.
Gervasi 1979:	<i>Report on Clandestine aircraft transfers to the Rhodesian Air Force 1976-78</i> , by Sean Gervasi, presented to United Nations Security Council, February 1979.
A CAS 1978:	<i>US Military Involvement in Southern Africa</i> , (ed) W. Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, South End Press, Boston, 1978.
Lock/Wulf 1977:	<i>Register of Arms Production in Developing Countries</i> by P. Lock and H. Wulf, Hamburg, Arbeitsgruppe Ruestung and Unterentwicklung, 1977.

APPENDIX II: INVENTORY OF RHODESIAN ARMAMENTS

Number in service as noted by:-
(see note below)

Item	Source	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Panhard	(number in brackets indicates the item number in Appendix I)								
AML - 60/90									
armoured cars	F/SA (8/9)	60						60	
Ferret scout cars	UK (17)	*						20	
Centurion tanks	UK (14)							20	
UR-416, Hippo, Hyena,) Leopard - light armoured) personnel carrier)	Locally made	*							
25-pounder field guns	UK/C	*						15	
105 mm pack howitzers	US/I	*						18	
5.5-in. gun howitzers		*							
106 mm recoilless launchers	US/IS (21)	*				*			
Tiger cat missile system	UK (14)							1	
Aircraft: counter-insurgency and all purpose:-									
Aermacchi AL60 Trojan/AM-3C									
Kudu	I/SA (3/7)	12		7	12	7	10	16	16
Cessna/Reims FTB 337 Lynx	US/F (18)	14	20	20	16	16	18	18	22
Britten-Norman Islander/ Defender	UK (15/20)	6	14	12	6	2	14	2	14
Rockwell OV-10 Bronco	US (19)	4	4						4
Siai-Marchetti SF 260W Warriors	I/B (26/34)	17							
Fighters/interceptors:-									
Hawker Hunter FGA 9	UK	9		12	10	12	9	10	9
Vampire FB9	UK	18		12	12	12	12	12	12
Mirage III	F/SA (22)				6				22
Impala MB 326	I/SA (27)				*	*			*
Bombers:-									
Canberra B2	UK	5		12	5	*	8	8	8
Training/reconnaissance:-									
Canberra T4	UK	2		3	2	*	2	3	2
Hawker Hunter T7	UK						2	2	2
Vampire T55	UK			3	8	8	13	6	
Provost T52	UK			12	8	13		8	8
Aermacchi Genet	I	31							
Cessna U - 17A								3	5
Transport and others:-									
Douglas Dakota C47	UK	13		4	9	4	12	7	12
Beech Baron 55	US	1		1		1	1	1	1
Cessna 310	US						1	3	3
Cessna 182	US						*		1
Helicopters:-									
Alouette II/III	F/SA (2/25/30)	43		30		15	30	34	66
Puma SA 330	F/SA (12/33)					*			*
Agusta Bell AB 205 Hueys	US/I/IS (32)	11							12

By taking the highest total in the column, together with figures given in Appendix I for those items marked only with an asterisk * in Appendix II (Impalas and Pumas), these figures amount to 235 aircraft and 105 helicopters.

The regime may, in addition, possess up to 5 North American T-28 armed trainers, acquired from unspecified sources. (*Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, quoted in *Counter Information Services* op. cit: *Milavnews August 1979*)

This inventory has been compiled from the following sources, which are indicated by numbers in the table itself:-

1. *The Military Balance 1979-1980*, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, p. 56.
2. *World Armaments and Disarmament Year Book 1978*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
3. *The World's Air Forces*, supplement to *Interavia* March 1978
4. Defence Marketing Services Inc., Greenwich, Conn. Market Intelligence Report, *Rhodesia Force Structure*, 1978.
5. *Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook* ed. G.R. Copley, London-Washington-New York 1978.
6. *International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory*, Aviation Advisory Services, UK, June 1977.
7. *Army, Airforce and Navy Air Statistical Record*, Aviation Studies Atlantic, London, March 1977.

(Sources 2 to 7 are reproduced in *Clandestine Aircraft Transfers to the Rhodesian Air Force 1976-78*, by S. Gervasi, 1979, Appendix B).

8. *Defence and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, reproduced in *Sell-Out in Zimbabwe*, Counter Information Services Report, London, September 1979.

Notes and abbreviations

Key to countries of origin:

- SA South Africa
- UK United Kingdom
- US United States of America
- C Canada
- IS Israel
- I Italy
- F France

A blank column indicates that the source in question did not list this particular item.

* indicates that the source noted the item but not the number of.

Some items listed in Appendix I are not recorded by any of the sources used in compiling Appendix II - e.g. Chinook helicopters (item 29); Aden cannons (item 14).

APPENDIX III: RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHOT DOWN BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

APPENDIX III: RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHOT DOWN BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.

(This list covers the period from January 1978)

ZANU 1978

From January to April, ZANU reported that they had shot down at least 13 planes including:

- 1 helicopter brought down on 1.1.78.
- 1 helicopter brought down on 3.1.78.
- 1 helicopter brought down on 7.1.78.
- 1 "warplane" brought down on 2.2.78.
- 1 helicopter, 1 spotter plane, 1 "army plane" all brought down on 19.3.78.
- "2 or 3" helicopters brought down on 10.4.78.
- 1 helicopter brought down on 17.4.78.
- 1 light spotter plane brought down on 20.4.78.
- 2 war planes brought down on 24.4.78.

(*Zimbabwe News March-April 1978; BBC Monitoring Service 6.2.78.*)

From May to mid-June the following warplanes were brought down:

- 1 spotter plane on 12.5.78.
- 1 Vampire jet on 13.5.78.
- "several" helicopters from 4-6.6.78.

(*Zimbabwe News May-June 1978; BBC Monitoring Service 8.6.78.*)

From mid-June to August 8 planes were reported shot down, being:

- 1 spotter plane on 7.7.78.
- 1 spotter plane on 8.7.78.
- 1 helicopter on 23.7.78.
- 4 helicopters on 28.7.78.
- 1 helicopter on 12.8.78.

(*Zimbabwe News July-August 1978*)

During September and October 15 war planes were gunned down including:

- 1 Alouette 3 helicopter on 19.9.78.
- 1 spotter plane on 22.9.78.
- 1 helicopter on 30.9.78.
- 1 helicopter on 28.10.78.
- 5 "jets" during the Rhodesian raid into Mozambique in September.

- 3 Mirage jets
- 2 Canberra bombers

(*Zimbabwe News September-October 1978*)

During November and December the following warplanes were reported shot down:

- 1 "aircraft" on 29.11.78.
- 2 jet fighter bombers on 9.12.78.
- 3 "planes" (probably Mirages) on 22.12.78.
- 2 "aircraft" on 29.12.78.

(*BBC Monitoring Service 12.12.78; 8.1.79*)

1979

Between January and June the following planes were reported shot down:

- 1 Mirage jet on 21.1.79. (approx.)
- 1 Dakota troop carrier on 5.2.79.
- 1 "aircraft" on 21.2.79.
- 1 spotter plane on 22.2.79.
- 1 "plane" on 1.3.79.
- 1 spotter plane on 7.3.79.
- 1 spotter plane on 3.4.79.
- 1 spotter plane on 5.4.79.

- 1 Dakota on 13.4.79.
 - 1 spotter plane on 22.4.79
 - 1 Dakota on 24.4.79.
 - 1 "aircraft" on 6.5.79.
- plus 5 other planes.

The only reports since June are of:

- 2 Agusta Bell 205 helicopters and one "aircraft" shot down during the September 5-10 raid into Mozambique.
- 1 spotter plane shot down on 26.9.79.

(*BBC Monitoring Service 10/11.9.79; Guardian 12/28.9.79.*)

ZAPU

1978

(*Zimbabwe People's Voice* reported that ZAPU had shot down 53 aircraft and helicopters inside and outside Zimbabwe during 1978, including British Canberras and Hawker Hunter jets, American Dakotas and Vampires, Agusta Bell 205A helicopters and French Alouette helicopters. Some of them were itemized as:

- 8 "planes and helicopters" brought down around 3.4.78.
- 1 "plane" brought down on 11.9.78.
- 12 aircraft "of all types" including 3 helicopters, 1 Canberra jet, 2 spotter planes, 1 Dakota and 2 "aircraft", brought down during the Rhodesian 19-23 October raid into Zambia.

- 5 "jets" brought down on 7.11.78.
- 1 Dakota and 2 "jets" brought down on 20.11.78.
- 1 reconnaissance plane brought down on 22.11.78.

- 1 jet bomber brought down on 24.11.78.
- 1 Alouette helicopter brought down around 8.12.78.
- 2 "jet fighters" brought down on 28.12.78.

(*Financial Times 3.4.78; Zimbabwe People's Voice 23.9.78; Morning Star 8.11.78; Rand Daily Mail 1.12.78; Facts and Reports 8.12.78; Zambia Daily Mail 28.12.78; ZAPU Press Release 23.10.78; ZAPU Publication: Massacres of Zimbabwean Refugees in Refugee Camps in Zambia, August 1979*)

1979

From January to March 1979 ZAPU reported that they had destroyed 10 aircraft including:

- 1 spotter plane and 2 helicopters on 1.1.79.
- 2 Alouette helicopters on 2.1.79.
- 1 reconnaissance plane on 10.1.79.
- "some planes" on the runway of Salisbury International Airport on 20.2.79.

(*ZPRA Combat Diary Jan-March; Zimbabwe People's Voice 20.1.79, 3.3.79.*)

Since March 1 helicopter was reported shot down on 30.4.79.

(*Zimbabwe People's Voice 12.5.79.*)

The Zambian National Defence Force reported that they had shot down more than 20 Rhodesian planes and helicopters since the beginning of the war. (*Financial Times 25.8.79.*)

TOTALS

	1978	1979 (to September)
ZANU	48	21
ZAPU	53	11
	101	32

Totals of each type of plane

Helicopters - 31 (including at least 5 Alouettes and 4 Agusta Bells);
Reconnaissance/spotter planes - 17
Vampires - 2
Mirages - 7
Canberras - 3
Dakotas - 5

Postscript

In October 1979 the Mozambique authorities announced that five Rhodesian jets and one Canberra bomber had been shot down during Rhodesian raids into Mozambique from 27 September to 3 October (*BBC Monitoring Service 15.10.79*).

APPENDIX IV: SELECTED PRESS CUTTINGS

Guardian, London, 17 April 1978

"The Salisbury authorities allowed a British television team to live with its elite Fireforce anti-terrorist commandos. ROBIN DENSELOW, producer of tonight's Panorama film on BBC-1, reports on the mysterious Selous Scouts".

The double-cross pattern of the Rhodesian war

THE HELICOPTERS flew in across Shabani base camp and landed at the far end of the runway. "Go and take a look," advised one of the Rhodesian Army commandos, "but don't be seen." Sneaking back to their base camp, well out of sight from any suspicious civilians, were the Rhodesians' secret weapon in the war against the guerrillas. These were African members of the mysterious and notorious Selous Scouts—black troops, working for the Rhodesians, who dress and act exactly like the guerrillas they are fighting. They wear blue denims, carry the standard guerrilla weapon, the AK47, and can pose as either members of Mugabe's ZANLA or Nkomo's ZIPRA forces. The only way to tell the difference is that Scouts carry radios, guerrillas don't.

Black Selous Scouts are a vital, but never officially admitted, element in the war that now covers most of Rhodesia. There has been continual speculation about their activities but little hard evidence. For ten days, with a Panorama team I was allowed to live alongside an airborne commando unit known as Fireforce, claimed as the Rhodesians' most effective anti-guerrilla outfit. It became obvious that the Scouts were the secret spies on the ground who guide Fireforce to its targets.

By night these stooge guerrillas wander around African kraals, pretending to be the real thing. They claim to have lost their comrades and ask villagers where the guerrillas can be found. Some of the Scouts are former guerrillas who have been captured and changed sides rather than be hanged. Others have closely studied how guerrillas look and act by talking to captives. They are obviously good enough actors to fool some of the villagers some of the time—though, as we discovered, many villagers

have learned through bitter experience to tell a Scout from a guerrilla.

By day, the Scouts sit in observation posts, usually on hilltops, watching the local countryside. When the guerrillas, or the boys as their African supporters call them, suspect they are there, they send up tigers—village children—to spot them. When the Scouts are in an area it is declared frozen, meaning that no Army activity is allowed there, unless called for by the Scouts. For days on end they watch for any movement that means guerrillas are present. If more cooking than usual is going on in a village, or women are seen taking food out into the bush, they know a guerrilla camp could be close.

Only when a guerrilla group is actually in sight do the Scouts call in Fireforce. There are only three such elite forces in the country, and each consists of three helicopter gunships carrying sticks of four commandos each, a Dakota-load of paratroopers, and a small Lynx, armed with Rhodesia's home-made napalm. The commandos and pilots at Shabani were mostly foreign. They were

professional soldiers (mercenaries many would call them) from Britain, America and South Africa, their main motive being simply that they enjoyed fighting. "I just hate terrorists," explained a veteran of the British Army, Belfast and the Foreign Legion.

The commandos had a costly lack of success during much of the time we were with them. A guerrilla presence of around 300 had been reported around the mining town of Shabani, which is right in the middle of Rhodesia, and Scouts had frozen most of the surrounding area. For eight call-outs in a row Fireforce discovered nothing, before finally ambushing an eleven-man group from

ZIPRA, after a Scouts' sighting.

The Rhodesian commandos proudly claimed that the Africans were always fooled by the Scouts and had no idea of their true identity. This is not the case. A few miles from Shabani, we arranged a secret dawn meeting with villagers who actively help the guerrillas and support them. The

amiable but omnipresent Rhodesian Government censor, who tried to watch everything we did in the Army camp, had to be shaken off before this meeting. If discovered, these villagers faced death for helping the guerrillas.

This brave, necessarily anonymous group, said they knew about the Scouts and that many "guerrillas" were Scouts in disguise. The aim, they said, was "to be cruel to us so that we turn against the boys." The fact that Scouts operate in this way certainly makes it impossible to tell which side is in fact responsible for any "guerrilla activity." It also makes it impossible to tell whether there really is fighting going on between the ZANLA and ZIPRA factions, as the Rhodesians claim. "That is not true," said one of the villagers. "Whenever the Rhodesian soldiers report that ZANLA and ZIPRA are fighting it is not so. I have realised that it is between the boys and the Selous Scouts disguised as the boys."

Today, as Dr Owen meets the "interim government" in Salisbury, he might be interested by the views of the guerrilla supporters of Shabani. "The agreement in Salisbury will never change anything. The boys are very angry about it. They are really pulling hard now. They are going to continue fighting. They will not lay down their weapons. They are adamant about it."

A WOODEN plaque bearing the Osprey insignia of Rhodesia's crack counter-insurgency unit, the Selous Scouts, hangs on the wall of the Palud-R-Inn Club at the Special Air Service barracks in Hereford. It was sent over recently by Ron Reid-Daly, the Scouts' former Commanding Officer, as a mark of appreciation for SAS help with recruiting.

Reid-Daly is a key link in the efficient and clandestine network responsible for identifying and recruiting British-trained counter-insurgency experts for the Rhodesian Army. The network reaches into the heart of military, political and intelligence sources both here and in Rhodesia. And there is no shortage of recruits for what is commonly regarded in the SAS as "the best war going."

The network has been in operation since before UDI and its role in any British-backed settlement will be crucial. Tory MPs with good SAS links and Southern African interests are thus in a powerful position.

Rhodesian SAS numbers about 350 men, the Selous Scouts a further 1400. While the Scouts are 80 per cent black, the SAS is still largely white. The SAS is far less publicised than the Scouts but they are a vital element in the Rhodesian armed forces. Competition for selection is stiff and includes a complete range of advanced military skills including parachuting, tracking and bush craft. Rhodesian SAS activities have included long range strikes into Mozambique, and, on one highly secret occasion, into Angola. And it was the SAS who attacked guerrilla homes in Lusaka, Zambia, and attempted to kidnap Joshua Nkomo.

A discussion document in the hands of the *Leveller*, believed to be about a year old and to have been prepared by a British Army officer on possible scenarios in the event of violence in the transition to majority rule, shows that the regiment would play an important part in any political change.

"The Special Air Service is also generally regarded as being capable of a greater degree of political understanding than the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI). It is just possible that, if senior military men were convinced that the 'coup by the back door' method was the only way to preserve their role and jobs the various Rhodesian security units would be given orders to facilitate such an operation. The more conservatively minded RLI and Territorial Force Units might be sent out on border patrol while the more 'reliable' SAS and Rhodesian African Rifles took care of security at crucial points in the Central central urban areas such as radio stations, parliament

buildings, airports, etc."

Sources within both the British and the Rhodesian armed forces suggest that there are up to 50 former British SAS men in the Rhodesian SAS and a slightly smaller number in the Selous Scouts. Other former SAS men have important jobs in Rhodesian military intelligence. Most of them have British passports; many receive army pensions and are on the British Army's Reserve List.

Serving soldiers returning to Britain on leave bring with them valuable intelligence, personalities and equipment used in Rhodesia, training techniques, the state of morale, the political picture. They take back equally useful information about the latest British Army techniques and equipment and the names of likely future volunteers.

The SAS recruitment network is loose and informal, relying in part on friendships forged years ago when Lieutenant General Peter Walls, commander of Rhodesia's armed forces, commanded C Squadron of the Malaysian Scouts (Special Air Service) from 1951 to 53. C Squadron was mostly made up of Rhodesians and when the British SAS redeveloped, C Squadron retained its Rhodesian identity. One of Walls' Commanding Officers during that period was Colonel John Woodhouse, a former intelligence officer who went on to become commanding officer of the 22nd Special Air Service (the full-time British regiment).

Reid-Daly served in the Rhodesian squadron in Malaya and went on to fight with the SAS in the Middle East. He returned to Rhodesia and left the army. When he was brought out of retirement to set up the Selous Scouts in 1973 he had ready access to the SAS network.

Dudley Coventry was commissioned into the British Army in 1938 and served in the Parachute Regiment. In 1955 he formed the first paratroop squadron of the SAS in Malaya. Described as a "real gentleman, full of the blarney and charm" he retired from the British Army in 1961 and moved to Rhodesia. Although he's described in the Army List as an 'Officer on Retired Pay', he is employed full-time by the Rhodesian government in Special Branch Two.

Ken Phillipson joined the British SAS from the Parachute Regiment and also served in Malaya. He has a reputation as a "real bastard", and was for a while personal aide to Lieutenant Commander John Hickman, Commander of Rhodesia's regular army. (Hickman won the Military Cross in Malaya: it was a public row earlier this year between him and Reid-Daly which led to the recent resignation of both men.)

Phillipson comes on regular trips to England on recruiting missions, usually staying at the Castle Pool Hotel in

Hereford. He drinks at the Palud-R-Inn Club and has an account with the National Westminster bank in town for offering potential recruits their air fare and an advance on their wages. Rhodesian intelligence sources say that "Phillipson is so well-connected he gives the Rhodesian Army the name of every likely SAS man in Britain."

The Rhodesian SAS is still officially designated as C Squadron of the British SAS and the affiliation is proudly printed in the regiment's magazine, *Mars and Minerva*, until UDI it ran joint training operations with the British. At that time John Woodhouse went to Rhodesia to assess the military situation and, he claims, ordered that all the regimental links should be cut.

But Woodhouse himself maintains close contact with the Rhodesian authorities. He has officially retired and runs the soft drinks side of the Hall and Woodhouse family brewery in Dorset. In 1977 he went on a clandestine mission on behalf of the British government to sound out Walls on the military situation. While he was in Salisbury, it was Ken Phillipson who showed him the sights.

Peter Rich was in the British SAS then 'left' and went first into the civil service and then banking. He re-emerged as one of the first Commanding Officers of the Rhodesian SAS, moving on to take charge of the whole Rhodesian Light Infantry. (In Rhodesia, as here, the SAS is officially part of the Light Infantry).

One of the network's most valuable assets is its access to the SAS Regimental Association, which keeps former members in touch with each other. Its records are kept at the regiment's London headquarters at Chelsea barracks and maintained by the secretary, Major Dare Newell. Newell is a one-man walking encyclopaedia of the SAS and crucial to the recruiting operation.

Although the officer network is important, it's the rank and file who do the fighting. The most notorious of these has been Peter MacAleece, the mercenary who was thrown out of the British SAS for drunken brawling, fled into the Rhodesian SAS with warrants hanging over his head in Glasgow and Hereford after beating up various members of his family. MacAleece was back in Britain recently, boasting of having killed more than 70 people in Rhodesia since he got there.

Others, however, have got their just deserts. Chuck Hinds, formerly of the British SAS, was killed in action two years ago. Ian Warrle was court-martialled for throwing a grenade into the

Lighthouse Club in Salisbury and had to go to Oman as a captain in the Sultan's armed forces.

Oman has been a useful conduit for other personnel and weaponry, usually with the help of Timothy Landon, the Sultan's military adviser. According to a recent report in *New African*, London, a former British Army intelligence officer was instrumental in providing helicopter training for Rhodesian pilots. And it was the unlikely location of Oman that Peter Walls chose for a recent holiday.

Bill Bayliss, who is still in the British Army List as a Captain in the Territorial SAS, assisted another SAS Commanding Officer Mike Wingate-Gray (Woodhouse's successor) in training the Sultan's Army and then, according to Rhodesian sources, went out to work for the Rhodesian Special Branch in security liaison.

One of Wingate-Gray's close associates is Major Andrew Nightingale, a former Major in SAS Group Intelligence at Chelsea Barracks. Last year the *New Statesman* reported that Nightingale accompanied Lord Carver as his bodyguard when he visited Rhodesia in November 1977. Nightingale's contacts take him into the more 'disreputable' end of the business: during the trial of John Higgins (see *Leveller* 6 & 25) mercenary recruiter John Banks named Nightingale as his SAS contact.

Colonel Terry Hardy is now CO of 21 SAS, one of the two British territorial units, yet between 1971 and 74, according to Rhodesian sources, he was in Rhodesian intelligence and based in Salisbury.

John Ormowe, was thrown out of 21 SAS at the same time as he was thrown out of the Monday Club in Brighton for being too openly fascist even for them. He went to Rhodesia in the middle seventies and is now the London organiser of the Rhodesian Ex Servicemen's Association, REX, as it's regally known, is closely associated with the Anglo Rhodesian Society and provides a London social network for former Rhodesian servicemen and those still in the forces who come to London for their 'holidays'.

The Society, the public face for some of the SAS network's activities, also provides money for would-be soldiers' air-tickets. At the memorial service for Lord Richard Cecil, the former SAS man turned 'journalist' who was shot in Rhodesia, supporters of the Society turned out by the score at the Guard's Chapel in Wellington Barracks. (See *Leveller* 17). The British SAS sent a Captain Collyer as their official representative.

"REPORT FROM ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA"

"U.S.-BUILT PLANES LEADING ATTACK"

Newsday National Correspondent Les Payne is on an extended trip through central and southern Africa. This is one of a series of reports.

By Les Payne
Newsday National Correspondent

Salisbury—Two types of American-designed military planes transferred to the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Air Force in violation of trade sanctions have provided government forces with their deadliest weapons against African nationalist guerrillas, Newsday has learned.

The Rockwell OV-10F, a light strike aircraft, and the Cessna/Reims FT-337B, a reconnaissance plane, have considerably stepped up the Zimbabwe Rhodesian attack capability. The OV-10F, called

the Bronco, was developed during the Vietnam War. The version of the twin-engine Bronco that Zimbabwe Rhodesia is believed to be using is one of the world's most versatile bush-war aircraft, according to one knowledgeable source. The plane is armed with two machine guns and can carry almost two tons of bombs.

The disclosure that Zimbabwe Rhodesia has the Rockwell and the Cessna brings to three the types of U.S. aircraft being used in the government's struggle. The government's possession of American-made "Huey" helicopters was disclosed several months ago.

One international arms expert said that at least four Broncos were delivered here in 1977—an account also printed in the 1978 World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The arms expert said the Broncos that ended up in Zimbabwe Rhodesia were part of a 1975 order of 16 planes that had been marked for delivery to Indonesia under the U.S. aid program.

A U.S. government source said, "The American government is aware that U.S.-made military equipment is getting to Rhodesia." Another, non-government, source said the helicopters and the plane transfers were made with the "cooperation" of the U.S. government and were part of Washington's attempt to buy time for Rhodesia while the biracial government was being negotiated into position.

In Washington, a State Department spokesman said that officials have heard about the Cessnas and that the matter has been brought up in the United Nations. The spokesman said the department has been investigating the subject for 2½ years, but has reached no conclusions. The department has no firm evidence that the Broncos are in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the spokesman said.

The Bronco, with a double fuselage and a U-shaped tail, was reported to have been spotted flying recently near Salisbury. Refugees from rural Tribal Trust Lands said that they recognized the Bronco when a reporter showed them industry diagrams of the distinctive plane. Several African teenagers, who said that they took special notice of Rhodesian planes flying missions in the rural areas, described the Bronco's mission they observed over the last few months.

"In Shona, we call it Kemabemba—the one with bare," said Johnson Matongo, 19, who escaped to Salisbury from Msama village, 36 miles northeast of here. "They usually fly over the TTLs one at a time. It is very dangerous."

"When villagers see it they run for cover. It flies high and very fast. The boys (guerrillas) say that it is well protected and hard to bring down. I used to see the planes fly over maybe twice a fortnight."

Refugees said that they first noticed the Bronco early last year. Most sightings of the camouflaged plane, they said, were made during daylight. Some said that they had seen it in attack.

"It fires heavily," Matongo said. "It fires bullets from the front when it dives, and when it goes up it drops bombs."

The Bronco, and the helicopter form the main thrust of the government's bush-war air power, which is directed with pin-point precision by another U.S.-designed plane, the Cessna FT-337B, a source said. Rhodesian military officials confirm that the "eyes" of their fire force is the Cessna,

which they call the Lynx. The 1978 armaments yearbook also states that 20 FT-337s were delivered here in 1977.

The FT337 is almost a duplicate of the U.S. military Cessna O-2, used as a spotter plane in Vietnam. The September, 1977, edition of Air International magazine reported that 20 F-337s fitted with ordnance racks, had reached Salisbury by "clandestine procurement" via "circuitous routes after being purchased ostensibly by a Spanish fishing company in the Canary Islands."

Although the government has not previously acknowledged acquiring the Cessnas, a recent edition of the pro-government Rhodesian Herald, whose military stories are cleared by the government, confirmed the reports. In an account attributed to the air force, the newspaper said:

"The tactical support is supplied to the ground forces by means of the Alouette helicopter (and the Lynx). A less known but equally important part of the fire force is the Lynx, a twin-engine light strike aircraft. Many recent successes can be attributed directly to the eyes of the No. 4 squadron in finding enemy base camps. The pilots of these aircraft, flying alone most of the time, have often directed air strikes by both the fire force and the jets."

The story marks the second time the regime revealed that it has American-made aircraft that are banned by U.S. economic sanctions from being sold to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The first admission came in December. Press accounts, which were at first denied by the U.S. State Department, said that Zimbabwe Rhodesia had acquired 11 "Huey" helicopters, which were the U.S. workhorses on Vietnam battlefields. A subsequent State Department investigation, according to a U.S. government source, has traced the 12 Bell helicopters only as far as West Germany. Bell helicopter spokesmen denied selling the copters to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The helicopters supposedly were grounded recently when guerrillas shot one down.

What remains clear is that the Rhodesian military has been greatly strengthened by the clandestine procurement of the American planes and helicopters. The three types of U.S. military aircraft—a total of 36 planes—give Rhodesia one of the world's most effective counter-guerrilla fire forces, one battle-tested by the U.S. military in Vietnam. Before acquiring the American planes, the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Air Force, consisting of old Dakotas and light helicopters, was jokingly called a "flying museum." Two years ago, Rhodesian military officers were pessimistic about their chances of stemming the tide of guerrillas from neighboring Mozambique and Zambia. State Department officials were saying privately that the government could hold out for only a few months.

U.S. military intelligence now believes that the Zimbabwe Rhodesian military could hold off the guerrillas for at least two more years, according to one well-placed source. The country's supreme military commander, Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, is said to have confided to close associates, "We can't win this war, but neither can we lose it." Walls admitted that since the signing of the internal settlement, his military has received large shipments of new, modern equipment, some of which has not yet been used in the fighting. Observers speculate that much of this equipment has been supplied by South Africa, with some of it produced in the United States.

The South African government continues to underwrite the expense of the seven-year-old war, which costs an estimated \$2.7 million a day and has taken about 20,000 lives. Government officials reported recently that they have been killing an average of 500 guerrillas a week. Their air superiority reportedly accounts for their ability to kill 10 guerrillas for every government soldier killed.

A Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union member interviewed near Salisbury acknowledged that his side was taking greater casualties. He said, however, that within six weeks, guerrillas fighting out of Mozambique plan to escalate their attacks within the country. "Most of our people are inside Rhodesia now," he said. "We're spread over 90 per cent of the country. When we attack inside Salisbury, they will find it hard to bomb their own people."

"THE MAN BEHIND THAT 'HUEY' DEAL?"

"In August *New African* revealed the illegal route US helicopter gunships took on their way to the Rhodesian armed forces. Now we uncover what could be the final link in the chain".

IN OCTOBER last year a group of Rhodesian Air Force pilots secretly visited Oman, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, on a special training course about which even Omani Government Ministers knew nothing.

Investigation of what the men were doing there has turned up whole new dimensions to the international web of lies that covers the route by which the Rhodesian regime gets its arms supplies — currently a source of growing embarrassment to the US, where a Commerce Department investigation, instigated by the State Department, is trying to determine who was behind the highly illegal supply of 11 US Huey helicopter gunships, as used in Vietnam, from Israel to Rhodesia's White regime (see cover story, *New African*, August 1979).

Pilots

The Hueys were first seen in action against Zanla guerrillas last November, immediately after the pilots returned from the Gulf. The pilots had gone straight to the Dhofar region in the south of Oman, where government forces have fought the guerrillas of the Marxist P.F.L.O. since 1965 in a bitter war that still sputters on, over lush, tropical, hilly terrain very similar to that on the Rhodesia-Mozambique border.

The Rhodesians spent all their time in Oman with British soldiers on secondment to the Sultan of Oman's army and on mercenary contract. The British taught the pilots everything they had learnt in 14 years of warfare about using helicopter gunships against guerrillas.

Who masterminded this visit, keeping it so quiet that even senior Omani officers in the army still know nothing about it?

The link between White Rhodesia and Oman is an enigmatic, Lawrence of Arabia figure. He is Brigadier Tim Landon, Sandhurst-trained British cavalry officer and soldier-of-fortune.

Landon first went to Oman in 1965 at the start of the Dhofar war as a reconnaissance officer in the Sultan's army, on secondment from the British Army. After a two-year tour of duty he returned to Britain for a course in army intelligence work and returned to Oman as chief intelligence officer. He was a key figure in the 1970 coup engineered by the British Foreign Office, when the present Sultan, Qabous bin Said, who had been at Sandhurst with Landon, deposed his dictatorial father, Sultan Said bin Taimour.

After the coup Landon commanded Qabous' army until he "retired" in 1975 to become special adviser to the Sultan.

Under his command the Sultan's army was transformed from a small and ill-equipped force fighting a losing war against the insurgents into what is now described as one of the best small armies in the Middle East. The big contracts for new equipment went to Britain, for Skyvan, Strikemaster, Defender and Jaguar aircraft, fast patrol boats, masses of modern weapons for the 12,000-man army, and most recently, two

sophisticated Lupo-class 2,400-ton missile destroyers.

Adviser

Last year defence accounted for 40% of Oman's total budget of almost £1,000m. Defence contracts, of course, carry commissions. As special adviser to the Sultan, Landon's role has extended far beyond the military, and Oman's development spending is equally lavish, with equally lavish commissions — last year Britain's share was an estimated £400m.

Landon is intensely shy of publicity. He lives in a heavily fortified house in the protected section of Muscat, Oman's capital, and rarely goes out except for short trips under heavy escort between home and fortified office.

He owns a mansion in Cyprus, another in the South of France, and a large £1m. estate in the south of England which he bought secretly through a Liechtenstein company — but it brought him some most unwelcome public attention earlier this year when a BBC television team investigated alleged ill-treatment of tenants on the estate. He also owns a 40,000-acre ranch in Rhodesia.

He has a long-standing friendship with Pieter van der Byl, arch-hawk Defence Minister in Ian Smith's government and now Minister of Transport in Muzorewa's cabinet. The two men are married to Austrian princesses.

Like Landon, many of Rhodesia's most senior soldiers have fought for the British against insurgent armies. Lieutenant General Peter Walls, Commander-in-Chief of Rhodesia's armed forces, fought against guerrillas in Malaya with the British Army's crack Black Watch Regiment before he returned to Rhodesia. Last year he holidayed in Oman.

Air Marshall Frank Mussell, chief of Rhodesia's air force, who was directly involved in the illegal military purchase of 17 Siai Marchetti 260 fighter planes in service against Zanla, flew Vampire jets for the British against insurgents in Aden. When Britain was dislodged from Aden the country became the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen — chief backers of Oman's Dhofar rebels.

Later Mussell fought again for the British, flying Canberra jet bombers in the war in Cyprus. Later still Mussell spent a year at Britain's Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell in England, the RAF's Sandhurst.

A high-ranking security officer in Oman, one of Landon's chief henchmen, an old crony from the Dhofar war, was previously a mercenary in Katanga, and fought in Ian Smith's army when the guerrilla war was drawing its first blood.

Exposure

Last month Landon suffered his second dose of exposure in the media when an international news magazine accused him of

being a strong backer of the Salisbury government. In an article about the growing threat of US military intervention in the Gulf, *8 Days* magazine spotlighted the US military presence in Oman — a dynamite issue considering the country's strategic position at the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf, through which pass 100 oil tankers a day carrying half the West's supplies and 90% of Japan's. The article has created an anti-Landon furore in Oman.

Landon, the magazine alleged, supports his Sultan's interests, his homeland's interests and his own interests in about equal proportions.

For instance in London, the British Foreign Office expert who deals with Oman has behind his desk a photograph not of Sultan Qabous but of Tim Landon. Yet, while Landon is undoubtedly still heavily involved with the British — for one thing he plans soon to retire to his south of England estate — ranking officials in the Omani Foreign Ministry swear that he works for the Americans. Indeed, the last big batch of Omani military orders went to the US — for air defence systems, anti-tank weapons and infantry equipment.

The Americans are embarrassed because they had granted the Israelis an export licence for the Rhodesian Hueys, despite loud US support for the arms embargo, and, although the route followed was most devious, it is highly unlikely US intelligence did not know of their destination. The US Commerce Department probe into the affair is probably little more than a blind.

Landon's personal stake in Rhodesia, his extensive contacts with and sympathies for the White regime, his wide experience in the arms world, the fact that, as adviser to the Sultan, he could not have failed to know of the Dhofar training course for the pilots, plus the fact that he has business interests in Singapore, to which the helicopters were consigned, would appear to link him as the man behind the shipment of Hueys from Israel to Rhodesia, with the Dhofar course thrown in as a bonus. The pilots trained on Oman air force Hueys.

Intelligence

It must be remembered that Landon has been representing British Foreign Office interests in Oman since 1967 at the latest — his part in the coup aside, he has consistently secured massive export orders for British firms and he has always been deeply involved with the British military and British intelligence. Public knowledge of his likely involvement in the Huey deal could have been embarrassing to the British Government during the Rhodesia Constitution talks in London ●

"SMITH'S HIDEOUS WAR"

"The truth — revealed to the Star by white conscripts".

By COLIN WILLIAMS

WHITE DESERTERS from Ian Smith's security forces have blown the lid off the brutality used to force conscripts to fight and have exposed the full, hideous face of his racist war.

In exclusive revelations yesterday to the Morning Star they told of a dramatic increase in the number of deserters and draft dodgers and of the existence of a deserters' help organisation.

They say morale is crumbling not only among black conscripts but also among white conscripts and territorials.

For over 18 months now they and a group of fellow conscripts have been working within the security forces secretly and among teenagers who are awaiting call-up to counter Smith lies about the Patriotic Front.

LETTERS

They have circulated clandestinely conscripts' letters from base camps, leaflets and their newsheet, Zimbabwe Democrat, to show that "Smith and the self-seeking gang which surrounds him have prepared the ground for a major catastrophe" using young conscripts' lives.

They decided to come out into the open about their work because the special branch in Rhodesia has recently stumbled on the activities of Zimbabwe Democrat and are carrying out intensive investigations.

But we cannot reveal the real names of the six young men because they fear it would certainly result in their families being harassed or in reprisals

being taken against their families.

Vernon, one of the draft dodgers, who is 21, explained how the illegal work started: "Democrats started as a 'deserters' help' group among conscripts called up into the security forces.

EXCLUSIVE

"We passed information and advice, simply by word-of-mouth to start with, on how to desert and escape from the country—because once you desert that's the only course open.

"Gradually, we became more politically conscious and realised the war could not be won by Smith. We countered the constant lies and misinformation by circulating news-sheets and letters from the chaps themselves."

Brain-washing by the military deceived many conscripts into believing they would be tortured to death by the "Charlie Tangos"—the army slang for the guerillas.

According to Pete, 23, at first the Democrats did not acknowledge the Patriotic Front as a real alternative "but we began to see for ourselves that the armed wings of the Patriotic Front were as well trained as the security forces.

"We were able to get hold of Patriotic Front material and to circulate extracts from these. Now we have formalised Zimbabwe Democrat with a loosely formed committee to lead the work."

Twenty-one-year-old Philip, who recently deserted after nearly completing 18 months'

national service, told me his story.

"After a few months basic training I was out in the bush where I spent the greater part of my service.

"Basically, you do a six-week stint in the bush. You are dropped in an area for a five/six day patrol to track.

"Then you're back in the base camp for 24 hours and go on 14-days' rest and recuperation, which includes retraining, and back you go into the bush again.

"We conscripts were just bait for the guerillas to draw them out so that the regulars could then come in for the kill.

"We had no medical kit apart from capsules of morphine, and our radios never worked for more than a day.

"It is mostly young chaps like me who are used on dangerous patrols, straight out of training. We suffer the most casualties—the regulars come in force.

LAI D LOW

"Conscripts are lied to and told they only have to fire their rifles into the air and the guerillas will up and run—but casualties are high—killed outright, or limbs blown off.

"To avoid being hit we just ran from point A to point B and never stopped to look for or check tracks.

"We just laid low and slept until pick-up day and an hour or so before being picked up for base-camp, we jogged around to get a sweat up as a ruse."

Philip said casualty details were never reported and that "the chaps were told not to speak about them." If there were many deaths in one day, they were spread out over a week or more as a cover-up.

Parents are told their son was killed in an "accident" or on a "highly sensitive mission" which cannot be revealed. He died courageously and was awarded a medal, they tell the parents, and hand over the medal.

Rodney, 23, who described himself as a Liberal, completed his 18 months' national service "largely in town on clerical work" for medical reasons, but fled the country to dodge compulsory territorial service.

"All you hear is about atrocities on one side. The social pressures on the chaps and their families are very great—but they simply don't know what's waiting for them out in the bush," he said.

According to Philip the "chaps who are still doing the fighting are the regulars — the Selous Scouts, Special Air Services, Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Rhodesian African Rifles.

"But they represent less than 10 per cent of the security forces and are heavily infiltrated by mercenaries, mainly South African, British, Australian, French and US Vietnam war veterans."

Flight into bush

The story of disenchantment and brutality told by the six deserters includes:

● January 1978. Half the 220 black apprentices due for call-up immediately gave up their apprenticeships to evade military service.

● First intake of African students January, 1979. From a batch of 1,045, only 150 were dragged off into barracks for training. The rest went into the bush and joined the guerillas.

● Intake No. 163, January, 1979. Of nearly 1,900 whites called up, 800 simply did not register and have not done so to this day. Many of them

fled the country, some linking up with Zimbabwe Democrat.

● January 20, 1979. At Bala Bala near Bulawayo, ten black conscripts were shot "as a practical warning to all who might think of defying orders in future.

● If a conscript "shows lack of will to fight" he is put in the "box" (military detention). His hair is shaved off. If black he has a white sergeant over him, if white a black sergeant. He is stripped of any non-commissioned rank he may have. Everything has to be done at the double, including carrying sandbags. Harassment and beatings are continual.

"Rhodesian Army men sickened by Smith's war"

"CONSCRIPTS TELL OF SMITH'S BUTCHERY"

Six young deserters from the Rhodesian Army recently told COLIN WILLIAMS of the reality of Smith's war against the people of Zimbabwe.

"PEOPLE are being starved, bombed and shot into submission. But there's still no doubt of the determination there is to defeat this mob," wrote one young white conscript in Ian Smith's security forces referring to the Smith regime.

This letter is now circulating among young white national servicemen in Rhodesia to let them know what is happening. It is being circulated by Zimbabwe Democrat, an organisation of conscripts working illegally within the security forces.

Zimbabwe Democrat, which has now come into the open, has revealed a dramatic increase in the number of deserters and draft dodgers and the existence of a "deserters help" organisation.

The young conscript's letter continues: "They have declared war on the local population . . . dozens are getting knocked off every day . . . mainly the old, young or too sick to run, or just in the wrong place at the wrong time. . . ."

"Martial law courts are operating in large areas of the country . . . basically the SF (security forces) just use the thugs as a psychological weapon, moving into an area, set up one of these things (courts) and then arrest and sentence as many people as possible.

Hammer

"No defence and no chance of acquittal! It's all part of an obvious attempt to literally destroy the resistance by hammering the local population into submission.

"Crops have been destroyed, livestock confiscated or destroyed and stores closed (especially in the South-West), which means that there is no food — for the guerrillas and the local population."

The letter goes on to refer to the private armies of the black leaders in the interim government.

"As for the 'private armies,' they are just killing anyone and everyone. Each of the black COs has got a 'hit' list for the other party.

"People are shit scared of Chikerema and Sithole. Those are the brutal bastards." Mr. James Chikerema is first vice-president of Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council.

As Tory leader Mrs. Thatcher sends out her team to see that Smith's elections are all fair and above board, a special issue of the clandestine Zimbabwe Democrat circulating within the security forces this week is telling national servicemen:

"The whole country is engulfed by war: at least 50 people are dying every day; 90

Martial law courts are operating in large areas of the country . . . basically the S.F. (Army) just use the thugs as a psychological weapon, moving into an area, set one of these things up and then arrest and sentence as many people as possible. No chance of acquittal!

Part of the damning letter.

Martial law courts are operating in large areas of the country . . . basically the SF (Army) just use the things as a psychological weapon, moving into an area, set one of these things up and then arrest and sentence as many people as possible. No defence and no chance of acquittal!

per cent of the country is under martial law; prisons and detention centres are overflowing; over a quarter of a million people have fled into neighbouring African countries; and nearly 10 per cent of the white population has absconded in the past year.

"And finally the Smith regime has apparently decided that it is time for 'majority rule.' It is time these madmen had their faces rubbed in reality."

I have met young white deserters from the security forces and what they have told me and what is related in this young conscript's letter is confirmed by the official organ of Mr. Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union — The Zimbabwe People's Voice on January 20 this year.

"January 8, 1979: The regime murdered 49 defenceless civilians throughout operational areas. In the Inyazura district 17 villagers were herded into a hut which was then set on fire by the regime's Selous Scouts.

"January 9, 1979: Enemy jet bombers sprayed napalm on African villages suspected of harbouring guerrillas in the Lupane District and in the same area eight young boys who were herding cattle were shot dead . . . the regime said they were 'running' with freedom fighters.

According to Philip, one of the white deserters I have met who has now thrown in his lot with Zimbabwe Democrat, there would hardly be a regular army without the mercenaries. "British, American or Australians were the ones I came into contact with.

"These are the people com-

mitting atrocities. They carry mementoes — skulls of their victims on their jeeps, wallets made of human skin—just as the mercenaries did in the Congo.

"To get information about guerrillas they resort to all kinds of things—beatings of all kinds. A favourite is an electric shock from a hand-powered generator to sensitive parts of the body, genitals, ear lobes," he told me. "They leave people for hours in hot corrugated iron huts. Place them naked in concrete cells and throw water in. They wrap wet towels around their heads, covering their eyes.

"They burn them with cigarette ends and they even resort to pouring beer that has been boiled over people."

The slang the mercenaries use for guerrillas they kill is "foppies," or they simply say "got six ters (terrorists) today" referring to an operation. Philip stressed they could be children or just old women, but they are all included as "ters."

Philip also told me something of the methods used to "recruit" to the private armies run by the black leaders in the interim government.

The nucleus is formed from Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian Army's most brutal corps. But the bulk of the youngsters, who are no more than 15 or 16 years old, are press-ganged and offered drinks, drugs, money and women.

In the south Muzorewa aides use trucks painted with the sign "weneta" — trucks used ostensibly for recruiting labour for mines in South Africa. The lads sign on but are then driven off to the bishop's training camp farms.

Another deserter, Vernon, gave me details about two British ex-officers who were active in recruiting mercenaries from Britain.

One is a certain Peter Rich, in his mid-fifties and currently Officer Commanding, Rhodesian Light Infantry.

He holds a British passport and draws a British service pension and saw service in Malaya.

He has paid frequent visits to Britain and recruited through the "old boy network" according to Vernon.

He has held several high-ranking posts in Smith's forces, including the post of Officer Commanding the Rhodesian SAS. He is a close friend of Gen. Peter Walls, the current Commander of Combined Operations.

Another recruiter of mercenaries from Britain some 18 months ago was another high-ranking officer, Dudley Coventry.

He also holds a British passport and draws a British service pension and saw service in Malaya.

He is thought to be retired now in Rhodesia, but formerly held a high-ranking post in the Rhodesian SAS and is another close colleague of Peter Walls.

Vernon told me: "SAS training was done by British officers, and most of the SAS officers are still British.

"The British end looks at the Rhodesian SAS as its 'C' squadron."

Close contact

He claims the high-ranking officers in Smith's police force are still British and that there is close contact between the Rhodesian police and the British police.

What concerns these young deserters is that Smith is still able to get spares for weapons he got before he declared UDI — sten and Sterling sub-machine guns, British Mills hand-grenades and so on.

"There's no shortage of spares," he said, "for Canniberras, Hawker Hunters and Vampires or the British Ferret armoured cars—all obtained before UDI.

"Now they have the NATO Belgian-made FN rifles, plus the South African equivalent, the RI, made under licence in South Africa.

"Radios used by the security forces are made by the British firm Racal. There's a never-ending supply of transport, British Leyland-made Land-Rovers, for instance.

"The security forces even have British army manuals on guerrilla warfare."

He said that in June 1978 a whole new consignment of SLRs (self-loading rifles) made in Britain—whole crates of them—were delivered to Smith. They had probably come via South Africa. But they must have originated in Britain.

"ANGOLA SOLDIER WITH RHODESIA FORCES"

(abridged)

By Nick Davies

PETER McALEESE, the man who took over from the notorious "Callan" as the leader of British mercenaries in Angola, is now an active member of the Rhodesian army, fighting guerrillas of the Patriotic Front. He owes his new place on the front lines to his earlier career with the Special Air Service Regiment.

Mr McAleese, aged 36, has been in Britain on a month's leave. For more than two weeks he was in custody in Glasgow, where he pleaded guilty to charges of assaulting his father and brother in 1976. He also visited his old regiment's headquarters in Hereford, where he boasted to friends of his "high kill rate." He told one that he had killed more than 70 men.

His presence in the Rhodesian army is a source of embarrassment to the regime which has always insisted that it does not want foreign mercenaries. He gained his position in January 1977 after making contact in Salisbury with friends from his SAS days in the 1960s.

His British training stood him in good stead and, despite his Angolan reputation as a mercenary killer he was put through six months training by the Rhodesian SAS in Salisbury. He is now a sergeant and has told friends that he has been regularly attached to the Rhodesian SAS.

Mr McAleese was among the original group of 19 mercenaries recruited by Mr John Banks's Security Advisory Services who travelled to Angola in January, 1976. After the massacre at

Maquetla in February, when "Callan" Costas Georgiou, ordered the execution of 14 British mercenaries, Mr McAleese was promoted to colonel and given Callan's job by Mr Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA.

It was soon after his return to England in March 1976, that he was charged with assaulting his brother and father in Glasgow. He appeared in court in Glasgow in June that year and was bailed. By the time his case came up in January 1977, he was in Rhodesia.

He has been in Rhodesia since then. But when he returned home on leave at the beginning of July he went to stay with his wife in Hereford and was picked up by the police on July 4. The next day he appeared before the Sherriff Court in Glasgow and pleaded guilty to assault, breaching of the peace and malicious mischief.

He was held in custody until July 21. During that time he was examined by a psychiatrist, who reported that Mr McAleese was fit and sane but liable to become aggressive when drunk. He told a social worker that he was a full member of the Rhodesian army, that he hoped to emigrate there, and that he would be charged with desertion if he was not back by July 25.

The Sheriff Court fined him £100 on July 21 and freed him. But at the last moment, Mr McAleese cancelled his reservation on the July 25 flight. He is believed to have left on a British Airways flight to Johannesburg on Tuesday, July 31.

'Fire Force' is the term used by the illegal regime in Rhodesia to describe the use of combined air and ground troops against supporters of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. It aptly sums up the methods used by the Rhodesian security forces to crush resistance to white minority rule.

Fire Force Exposed is a comprehensive account of the composition and strengths of the different units within the Rhodesian army, air force and police. Much of the information, so essential to an assessment of the character and military capacity of the security forces, is virtually unknown outside Rhodesia. There are further sections on the illegal regime's defence budget, South African military intervention, the use of chemical warfare methods and morale within the armed forces.

Fire Force Exposed shows that the 'internal settlement' agreement, and the appointment of Bishop Muzorewa as Prime Minister of an ostensibly black administration, have not brought any real changes in the nature of the Rhodesian security forces. On the contrary, the Rhodesian army, air force and police continue to form an integral part of the white power structure. They are also the forces which are daily attacking the African front line states, precisely because those states have declared their support for the cause of freedom in Zimbabwe.

The Rhodesian security forces, in short, are incapable of playing any positive role in a genuine transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole, and must be disbanded.

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campaigns for freedom in Southern Africa
and for an end to British collaboration with the racist minority
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